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Amidst the growing turbulence of the modern competitive landscape, enterprise agility 
has become an increasingly important determinant of business success. While the 
potential of Information Technology (IT) for enabling agility is unquestionable, the 
existing prescriptions for the attainment of IT-enabled enterprise agility generally lack 
empirical validation and tend to be overly abstract. More importantly, although enterprise 
agility is conceived as a composite capability consisting of customer agility, partnering 
agility, and operational agility, there is a lack of research on how each of these forms of 
agility may be achieved. More specifically, virtual communities (VCs), technology-
enabled platforms, and the organizational capability for agile IT deployment have been 
suggested as the primary means of attaining the three forms of agility respectively. Yet, 
to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies to date on how each of these IT artifacts 
or capabilities can be developed and enacted for agility. With these gaps in the literature 
in mind and in seeking to answer the overarching question of how IT-enabled enterprise 
agility may be achieved, this thesis frames the following research questions: (1) “How 
can a VC be developed and leveraged for the attainment of customer agility?” (2) “How 
can a technology-enabled platform be developed and leveraged for partnering agility?” 
and (3) “How can the capability for agile IT deployment be nurtured and leveraged for 
operational agility?”  
To address the first research question, a theoretical lens is constructed by infusing a 
seminal framework on IT-enabled organizational value creation with key concepts and 
propositions from the existing VC literature. Applying this theoretical lens to analyze a 
case study of Hardwarezone, the most commercially successful VC in Singapore, a two-
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dimensional process model is inductively derived that depicts the specific mechanisms 
for developing and leveraging a VC for customer agility and organizational value 
creation across the various stages of a typical VC development life cycle. With its 
findings, this case study represents one of the first in-depth studies of the association 
between VCs and customer agility, challenges the existing knowledge and assumptions of 
VC-enabled organizational value creation, and provides a comprehensive and empirically 
supported framework for VC managers and sponsors to analyze and optimize their 
investments in VCs. 
Next, as Digital Business Ecosystems (DBEs) are technology-enabled platforms that may 
be crucial to partnering agility for organizations engaged in intense, inter-network 
competition, we apply the literature on business ecosystems to analyze the case of 
Alibaba.com, a B2B portal that organizes one of the largest DBEs worldwide, to address 
our second research question. In doing so, a process model of how a DBE may be 
developed and leveraged for partnering agility is inductively derived that sheds light on 
the antecedents, nature and agility-enabling mechanisms that arise as a result of DBE 
development. Specifically, our study reveals that an organization with the ability and 
motivation to be a core firm within a DBE may adopt specific combinations of 
organizational strategies and ecosystem roles to drive ecosystem development along three 
distinct stages for increasing levels of enterprise agility. With its findings, this study 
contributes to a networked perspective of IT-enabled enterprise agility, and provides 
practitioners with a holistic and systematic framework for the development and 
subsequent leverage of a DBE. 
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Finally, as improvisation may be an important mechanism for attaining agility in IT 
deployment, we apply the literature on organizational improvisation to analyze the case 
of Chang Chun Petrochemicals, one of the largest privately-owned petrochemical firms in 
Taiwan with a storied history for agile IT deployment, to address our third research 
question. In doing so, a process model is inductively derived that sheds light on how the 
organizational capability for improvisation in IT deployment can be developed, leveraged 
for operational agility, and routinized for repeated application. With its findings, this 
study contributes to the knowledge on agile IT deployment and the broader concept of 
IT-enabled enterprise agility, and provides a useful reference for practitioners who face 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
For many years, sustainable competitive advantage has been viewed as the holy grail of 
strategic management (Collis 1994). Yet, amidst the turbulent strategic and operating 
conditions, increased time-to-market pressures, regulatory changes and rapidly evolving 
customer demands of the modern business landscape (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2008; 
Overby et al. 2006), contemporary management scholars have grown increasingly 
skeptical about the possibility of sustaining competitive advantages over time (Sirmon et 
al. 2007). Consequently, a more recent school of thought; aligned with a set of strategic 
principles dubbed the logic of opportunity (see Eisenhardt and Sull 2001), has instead 
emphasized rapid and continuous innovation as the means for creating of a series of 
temporary competitive advantages to enable an organization to maintain its competitive 
edge in the long term (D'Aveni 1994; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). The organizational 
capability that underpins a relentless, high-velocity stream of effective innovations is 
termed enterprise agility, which is defined as the ability to consistently detect and seize 
market opportunities with speed and surprise (Sambamurthy et al. 2003). 
With important advances in the global Information Technology (IT) landscape over the 
last decade, the potential of IT in enabling enterprise agility has grown considerably 
(Sambamurthy et al. 2003). To illustrate, the real world success stories of organizations 
such as Cisco and Yahoo that derive from the leverage of IT to facilitate a chain of 
rapidly evolving strategies (See Eisenhardt and Sull 2001; Fryer and Stewart 2008) attests 
to the agility enabling potential of IT. Accordingly, the concept of IT-enabled enterprise 
agility has received a growing amount of attention from scholars and practitioners in 
recent years (van Oosterhout et al. 2006). Yet, notwithstanding the academic and 
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practical contributions of the growing research in this area, a number of gaps can be 
identified in the literature. 
As will be elaborated on in the following chapter, although a number of scholars have 
provided insightful propositions about how IT-enabled enterprise agility can be attained 
(e.g. Overby et al. 2006; Seo and La Paz 2008), few have supported their propositions 
with empirical evidence (Tan et al. 2009). In addition, much of the existing prescriptions 
for achieving IT-enabled enterprise agility are overly abstract (e.g. Holmqvist and Pessi 
2006; Zain et al. 2005) in that they employ a variety of broad IT-related constructs that 
“precluded consistent, unambiguous, and readily comparable studies” (Pavlou and El 
Sawy 2006, p. 198), and provide little indications for practical action. While gaps in the 
literature are certainly to be expected given the relative immaturity of the research area, 
collectively, these gaps are symptomatic of a lack of knowledge on how IT-enabled 
enterprise agility can be achieved. Without grasping the nature of this underlying process, 
it may be difficult, if not impossible to consistently unlock the potential of IT for 
enabling agility. 
In particular, although enterprise agility may consist of customer agility, partnering 
agility, and operational agility (refer to Table 1), there is scant research on how IT and its 
related capabilities can facilitate the acquisition of these capabilities. More specifically, 
although nurturing and enhancing virtual communities (VCs) is one of the primary IT-
enabled means for attaining customer agility (Nambisan 2002; Porter and Donthu 2008), 
there are no studies to date on the development and leverage of VCs for customer agility. 
Similarly, although the role of IT in enabling partnering agility lies in facilitating inter-
firm collaboration (Sambamurthy et al. 2003), we did not find any studies in an extensive 
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literature review on how a technology-enabled platform may be nurtured and exploited 
for partnering agility. Finally, although the “ability to quickly change the type and flow of 
information within an organization must underlie a rapid and graceful reorganization” 
(Mathiassen and Pries-Heje 2006, p. 117), implying the importance of agility in IT 
deployment for the attainment of operational agility, there is little research on how this 
capability can be achieved as well (For a review, refer to Sambamurthy et al. 2003). 
Table 1: Types of Agility 
Type of Agility Definition Role of IT 
Customer 
Agility 
Ability to co-opt customers in the 
exploration and exploitation (March 
1991; O'Reilly and Tushman 2004) of 
innovation opportunities: 
• as sources of innovation ideas 
• as co-creators of innovation 
• as users in testing ideas or helping 
other users learn about the idea 
Technologies for building 
and enhancing virtual 
customer communities for 




Ability to leverage assets, knowledge, 
and competencies of suppliers, 
distributors, contract manufacturers and 
logistics providers in the exploration 
and exploitation (March 1991; O'Reilly 




such as collaborative 
platforms and portals, 
supply-chain systems, etc. 
Operational 
Agility 
Ability to accomplish speed, accuracy, 




integration of business 
processes 
Adapted from: Sambamurthy et al., 2003 
 
With these gaps in the literature in mind and in seeking to answer the overarching 
question of how IT-enabled enterprise agility may be achieved, the purpose of this thesis 
is threefold. First, using a case study of Hardwarezone.com (HWZ), a humble e-
commerce startup that leveraged its VC strategically to transform itself into the dominant 
market leader in Singapore’s IT publications industry within a short span of seven years, 
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this thesis seeks to investigate how a VC can be nurtured and leveraged to bring about 
customer agility for the organization that sponsors them. In this thesis, we use the term 
“sponsoring organization” to refer to the firm that manages and provides the resources 
necessary to operate and sustain the VC. With its findings, this case study will represent 
one of the first in-depth studies of the association between VCs and customer agility, 
challenge the existing knowledge and assumptions of VC-enabled organizational value 
creation, and provide a comprehensive and empirically supported framework for VC 
managers and sponsors to analyze and optimize their investments in VCs. 
Second, based on a case study of Alibaba.com, one of the world’s largest online Business-to-
Business (B2B) e-commerce portals that supports a technology-enabled platform of over 35 
million members worldwide, this thesis will examine how partnering agility can be attained by an 
organization operating as a core firm within a business network. A core firm is defined as an 
organization serving as a richly-connected hub wielding significant influence in a business 
network (Iansiti and Levien 2004a). The scope of our inquiry into partnering agility is limited to 
the context of a core firm as the decisions and actions of the core firm has the widest ranging 
implications for the extent of collaboration and performance within a business network (Pierce 
2009). With its findings, this study will contribute to a networked perspective of IT-
enabled enterprise agility, and provide practitioners with a holistic and systematic 
framework for the development and subsequent leverage of a DBE. 
Third, using a case study of Chang Chun Petrochemicals (CCP), one of the largest privately-
owned petrochemical firms in Taiwan with a storied history for agile IT deployment, this thesis 
will provide an in-depth examination of the underlying process through which agility in IT 
deployment can be developed, and subsequently, enacted for the attainment of operational agility. 
In doing so, our aim is to generate prescriptions related to a specific mechanism for attaining 
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operational agility (i.e. agility in IT deployment) and open the “black box” of the relationship 
between the capability and operational agility. With its findings, this study will contribute to 
the knowledge on agile IT deployment and the broader concept of IT-enabled operational 
agility, and provide a useful reference for practitioners who face resource constraints or 
time pressures in IT deployment. 
Beyond its academic significance, the utility of this thesis lies in tracing the three primary 
IT-enabled means of attaining enterprise agility (Mathiassen and Pries-Heje 2006; 
Sambamurthy et al. 2003) in their entirety (i.e. attaining customer agility through the 
development and leverage of a VC, attaining partnering agility through the development 
and leverage of a technology-enabled collaborative platform, attaining operational agility 
through the organizational capability for agile IT deployment). In doing so, this thesis can 
potentially serve as a useful reference for practitioners in the formulation of value-
creating IS strategies, as well as a detailed blueprint for the implementation and strategic 
leverage of information systems in line with the opportunities and risks presented by the 
contemporary business environment. Corresponding to its purpose, the research questions 
that this thesis aims to answer are: (1) “How can a VC be developed and leveraged for 
the attainment of customer agility?” (2) “How can a technology-enabled platform be 
developed and leveraged for partnering agility?” and (3) “How can the capability for 
agile IT deployment be nurtured and leveraged for operational agility?” 
This thesis is organized into 6 chapters. The first chapter has established our motivation 
and the research questions we intend to answer. In the following chapter, we review the 
relevant literatures to construct the foundation for our subsequent theoretical arguments. 
The research methodology is then presented in the third chapter, followed by a 
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description of the events that transpired at the three case organizations in the fourth 
chapter, so that the reader may follow the process of theory building (Klein and Myers 
1999) and judge the validity of the developed theory based on the cogency and 
plausibility of the underlying logic (Walsham 1995). The fifth chapter of the paper 
presents the theoretical arguments inductively derived from the three case studies, before 
a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of our findings in the concluding 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The Origins of the Notion of Agility 
The notion of agility in the context of information systems (IS) has its roots in the 
concept of agile manufacturing (Desouza 2011) that was introduced in the field of 
operations management in the 1990s (in Nagel et al. 1991). Agile manufacturing was 
conceptualized as a means of responding to the growing turbulence in the global 
competitive landscape through the production of high-quality, tailored goods and services 
(Goldman et al. 1995). The production of these goods and services, in turn, stems from 
two organizational capabilities: The ability to sense both anticipated and unexpected 
changes in the environment in an effective and timely manner, and the ability to respond 
to these changes quickly to capitalize on emerging business opportunities (Sharifi and 
Zhang 1999; Sharifi and Zhang 2001).  
More specifically, some researchers (see Sharifi and Zhang 1999; Sharifi and Zhang 
2001) have suggested that an agile manufacturing system should consist of three 
elements: agility drivers, agility providers and agility capabilities (refer to Table 2). 
Agility drivers precipitate the need for an organization to become agile, which in turn, 
leads to the strategic intent to be agile and the formulation of an agile strategy. When 
coupled with the appropriate agility providers in the form of organizational resources 
such as technology, people, and innovation, agile practices, methods and tools are formed 
to enable agility capabilities. The four agility capabilities are responsiveness, 
competency, flexibility and quickness. The definition of these capabilities and their 
corresponding components are summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 2: Components of an Agile Manufacturing System 
Component Definition 
Agility Drivers Triggers in the organizational environment that necessitate new 
means of operations in order to maintain competitive advantage 
Agility Capabilities Key capabilities required by an organization to respond quickly 
and effectively to change  
Agility Providers Means of acquiring or developing agility capabilities 
Adapted from Sharifi & Zhang, 2001 
 
Table 3: Types and Components of Agility Capabilities 
Capability Definition Components 
Responsiveness Ability to identify 
changes and quickly 
respond reactively or 
proactively to them, and 
recover from them 
• Sensing  and anticipating changes 
• React to change by immediately 
effecting them into system 
• Recovery from change 
Competency Full suite of abilities 
that provide 
productivity, efficiency, 
and effectiveness of 
activities towards the 
strategic objectives of 
the organization 
• Strategic vision, 
• Appropriate technology (hard and 
soft)/ Sufficient technological ability 
• Products/services quality 
• Cost effectiveness 
• High rate of new products introduction 
• Change management 
• Knowledgeable, competent, and 
empowered people 
• Operations efficiency and electiveness 
(leanness) 
• Cooperation (internal and external) 
• Integration 
Flexibility Ability to achieve 
different objectives and 
process different 
products with the same 
resources 
• Product volume flexibility 
• Product model/configuration flexibility 
• Organization and organizational issues 
flexibility 
• People flexibility 
Quickness Ability to perform 
operations and tasks in 
the shortest possible 
time 
• Quick new products time to market 
• Products and services delivery 
quickness  
• Timeliness 
• Fast operations time 




As a theoretical concept, agility is likely to have evolved from prior concepts in 
management that pertain to strategizing and competing in dynamic environments (Overby 
et al. 2006). However, what differentiates agility from concepts such as dynamic 
capabilities (Teece et al. 1997), strategic flexibility (Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001), and 
absorptive capacity (Zahra and George 2002) is that it augments the classic formula of 
flexibility and adaptability with scalability and speed (Baskerville et al. 2005). It is this 
unique combination of traits; traits that are recognized to be crucial to competing in 
turbulent conditions, that has captured the imagination and attention of academics and 
practitioners alike. Consequently, the notion of agility began to diffuse from the field of 
manufacturing to a range of management disciplines as the concept of agile 
manufacturing was extended into ‘agile corporations’. Agile corporations are firms 
capable of coping with the turbulent demands of contemporary business competition 
through the rapid reconfiguration of resource bundles in response to emerging market 
opportunities (Kidd 1995). The organizational capability that underpins agile 
corporations in turn, is termed enterprise agility (Sambamurthy et al. 2003).  
Deriving from prior conceptualizations of agility (e.g. Sharifi and Zhang 1999), 
enterprise agility is typically conceptualized as a composite capability consisting of two 
components: the organizational ability to sense or anticipate changes in the external and 
internal organizational environment, and the ability to respond in a timely, cost efficient 
and effective manner (Seo and La Paz 2008). External environmental changes that trigger 
the need for enterprise agility may include economic fluctuations, technological 
advancements, changes in consumer demands, regulatory or legal changes, and the 
competitive actions from rival firms (Overby et al. 2006), while changes that stem from 
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the internal organizational environment may include the enactment of mergers and 
acquisitions, the deployment of new IT systems and the restructuring of the 
organizational IT function (van Oosterhout et al. 2006). In response to the changes, an 
agile organization would process the incoming signal and react accordingly. The response 
may take the form of a re-alignment of resources, the restructuring of business processes, 
or the formulation of new strategic objectives, depending on the scope and magnitude of 
change (Seo and La Paz 2008).  
2.2 IT-Enabled Enterprise Agility 
As IT possess the immense potential for enabling enterprise agility (Peppard and Ward 
2004; Sambamurthy et al. 2003), the concept of IT-enabled enterprise agility has 
similarly garnered considerable research attention since it was mooted a number of years 
ago (Holmqvist and Pessi 2006). The interest in IT-enabled enterprise agility stems from 
the ability of IT to provide an organization with “digital options” (Sambamurthy et al. 
2003). Digital options are a set of IT-enabled capabilities in the form of digitized business 
processes and knowledge systems that may be applied to capturing emergent 
opportunities, or remain unused depending on the focal firm’s environment and strategy 
(Fichman 2004). Yet, despite the growing research in this area, a number of gaps remain 
in the literature. 
2.2.1 Lack of Empirical Validation 
First, of the existing prescriptions for how IT-enabled enterprise agility can be achieved 
in the literature, most of them are conceptual in nature and not supported by empirical 
evidence (Tan et al. 2009). For example, Weill et al. (2002) proposed ten IT capability 
clusters that are crucial to enabling enterprise agility for a number of electronic-based 
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business initiatives (refer to Figure 1). The ten consists of six capability clusters related to 
the physical IT infrastructure; including (1) channel management, (2) security and risk-
management, (3) communications, (4) data management, (5) applications infrastructure, 
and (6) IT facilities management, as well as four clusters representing management-
oriented IT capabilities; including (7) IT management, (8) IT architecture and standards, 
(9) IT education, and (10) IT research and development (For a review, refer to Weill et al. 
2002). 
In another study, Overby et al. (2006) described how IT-enabled enterprise agility may be 
achieved through the assimilation of knowledge and process-oriented information 
technologies (refer to Figure 2) that enable four types of digital options. The four types of 
digital options are related to the breath of resources (i.e. reach) and quality of information 
available (i.e. richness) in support of a firm’s knowledge and business processes. They 
are (1) digitized process reach, (2) digitized process richness, (3) digitized knowledge 
reach, as well as (4) digitized knowledge richness (refer to Table 4), and the acquisition 
or enhancement of each of the four digital options is expected to facilitate a firm’s ability 
to sense and respond to environmental change, thereby making it more agile (Overby et 
al. 2006). 
Finally, Seo and La Paz (2008) identified twelve common problems related to the 
organizational assimilation of IS that may potentially inhibit enterprise agility. These 
include (1) data flooding, (2) lack of integration between perception systems and sources, 
(3) unstandardized perceived data, (4) limited scope of processing, (5) missing or 
undetected perception and processing signals, (6) low information accuracy, (7) 
information overload for decision makers, (8) time lag between information systems 
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implementation and organizational response, (9) systems inflexibility, (10) technology 
dependence, (11) greater propensity for errors, and (12) the need for greater management 
efforts due to the use of IT. In addition, to overcome these barriers to enterprise agility, 
the mechanisms of (1) standardization, (2) making an informed choice between buying, 
leasing and outsourcing, (3) developing management skills and individual agility, and (4) 
creating an organizational structure and culture conducive to enterprise agility were 
proposed (For a review, refer to Seo and La Paz 2008).   
Table 4: Types of Digital Options 
Digital Option Definition Examples of IT 
Digitized Process 
Reach 
Extent to which a firm deploys common, 
integrated, and connected IT-enabled 
processes. High reach is associated with 
processes that tie activity and information 
flows across departmental, functional, 










Quality of information collected about 
transactions in the process, transparency of 
that information to other processes and 
systems that are linked to it, and the ability 
to use that information to reengineer the 
process (e.g. technologies related to 
decision support and data analytics) 
Decision support, 





Comprehensiveness and accessibility of 
codified knowledge in firm’s knowledge 
base and interconnected networks and 
systems for enhancing interactions among 
individuals for knowledge transfer and 








Systems of interactions among 
organizational members to support sense-
making, perspective sharing, and 
development of tacit knowledge (e.g. 
video-conferencing systems, collaborative 
systems) 










Yet, while the discourse on agility-enabling IT capability clusters (Weill et al. 2002),  the 
facilitating role of various forms of knowledge and process-oriented IT systems (Overby 
et al. 2006), and mechanisms for overcoming the barriers to enterprise agility (Seo and La 
Paz 2008) has been enriching and provides plenty of insights for IT researchers and 
managers, we did not identify any confirmatory studies that have empirically validated 
the propositions of these papers. Without empirical support, future research that build on 
these works can only remain in the realm of guesswork and assumptions, from which it is 
difficult to derive concrete theories and principles for the advancement of knowledge in 
this area. 
2.2.2 Abstract Prescriptions for Attaining IT-Enabled Enterprise Agility 
Second, most of the existing prescriptions for attaining enterprise agility through the use 
of IT also tend to be overly abstract in that they do not offer specific indications for 
practical action. For instance, Zain et al. (2005) posited that the use of IT in itself would 
invariably lead to enterprise agility (refer to Figure 3), and although results that strongly 
support this hypothesis were presented, the body of research in the area of IS alignment 
refutes this. To summarize, IS alignment research holds that it is not the uncritical use of 
IT that enables any form of strategic benefits, but the complex, multi-point alignment 
between business and IT strategies, business needs and systems development priorities, as 
well as business processes and the enabling IT infrastructure (For a review, refer to Chan 
and Reich 2007).  
In a similar vein, although the concept of digital options was mooted as the antecedent of 
agility in the originating seminal paper on IT-enabled enterprise agility (see 
Sambamurthy et al. 2003), the critical issue of how digital options may be acquired or 
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developed is only touched upon briefly. In particular, it is suggested that digital options 
arise as a result of the interaction between an organization’s IT competence and 
entrepreneurial alertness (refer to Figure 4). But while these constructs hints at the 
overarching categories of organizational factors crucial to the attainment of IT-enabled 
enterprise agility, at the intended level of an overview, they are unspecific, broadly 
defined, and difficult to act upon (refer to Table 5). 
In another study, Holmqvist and Pessi (2006) used a case study of Volvo’s global 
initiative to provide web services, a web portal, and a platform for selling spare parts over 
the Internet to underscore the potential application of scenario development and an 
incremental systems development methodology for the attainment of IT-enabled 
enterprise agility (refer to Figure 5). However, the generic process of how to go about 
developing scenarios and planning for contingencies, as well as the steps of the suggested 
incremental systems development methodology were never discussed beyond the singular 
instance (i.e. the case of Volvo) presented (For a review, refer to Holmqvist and Pessi 
2006). As such, the argument for the significance of a flexible, continuous, and 
incremental systems development methodology for the attainment of IT-enabled 
enterprise agility was made convincingly; and this is corroborated by the literature on 
agile systems development (e.g. Mathiassen and Pries-Heje 2006), but the specifics of the 
methodology has not been explained. 
The problem with these proposed antecedents of IT-enabled enterprise agility is that all of 
them (i.e. the use of IT, IT competence, entrepreneurial alertness, scenario development, 
and incremental systems development) can take on a boundless range of possible values 
and configurations. The sheer variety of possibilities embedded in the definition of these 
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constructs strips them of the ability to generate meaningful and actionable indications for 
practice, without which the utility and interpretability of these prescriptions are limited. 




Level of IT investments 
IT 
Capabilities 
Base of organizational resources and capabilities; such as the quality of 
the IT infrastructure (global connectivity and reliability), IT human 
capital (appropriate technical and business skills), and the nature of 








The ability to visualize possible linkages between agility, digital options 
and the emerging market opportunities 
Adapted from Sambamurthy et al., 2003 
 
2.2.3 Lack of Research on the Attainment of the Three Types of Agility 
Third, as “agility encompasses a firm’s capabilities related to interactions with 
customers, orchestration of internal operations, and utilization of its ecosystem of 
external business partners” (Sambamurthy et al. 2003), enterprise agility is typically 
conceived as a composite capability consisting of customer agility, partnering agility and 
operational agility. Customer agility refers to the co-opting of customers in the 
identification and exploitation of opportunities for innovation and competitive actions. In 
particular, customers may play three important roles in stimulating innovation and 
competitive actions. First, they may act as sources of ideas for innovation (Nambisan 
2002). Second, they may be involved in the co-production of innovations (Lengnick-Hall 
1996). Third, they may serve as product testers or power users that influence or help 
others learn about the new product or service (Sambamurthy et al. 2003). In other words, 
customer agility centers on leveraging the feedback and collective resources of customers 
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to detect and seize market opportunities (Raschke and David 2005), and the primary 
mechanism through which IT can facilitate this lies in the building and enhancement of 
VCs (Nambisan 2002; Sambamurthy et al. 2003). 
Partnering agility is defined as a firm’s capability to leverage the assets, knowledge, and 
competencies of entities within its business ecosystem (such as suppliers, distributors, 
logistics providers, and contract manufacturers) through partnerships, alliances and joint 
ventures (Venkatraman and Henderson 1998) for the joint exploration and exploitation 
(March 1991; O'Reilly and Tushman 2004) of opportunities for innovation and 
competitive actions (Sambamurthy et al. 2003). This may attained through the efficient 
sourcing and recombination of network assets and competencies when the requisite 
resources, knowledge and capabilities are available within the business network, or the 
adaptation and outward extension of the network that seeks their acquisition when they 
are not (Dyer and Singh 1998). Firms with extensive information networks are typically 
able to respond faster and perform better amidst uncertainty (Zaheer and Zaheer 1997). 
As such, the primary mechanism through which IT can facilitate partnering agility lies in 
the development and leverage of technology-enabled platforms such as “portals, supply 
chain management and visibility technologies” (Sambamurthy et al. 2003). 
Operational agility refers to the internal capabilities of an organization that enables fast, 
accurate and cost efficient actions in sensing and responding to emerging market 
opportunities (Sambamurthy et al. 2003). It facilitates the rapid redesign of existing 
business processes in response to environmental stimuli (Malone et al. 1999) and enables 
firms to reduce information asymmetries between transaction partners through the rapid, 
timely and comprehensive sharing of business-critical information (Amit and Zott 2001). 
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IT facilitates operational agility by enabling the modularization of existing business 
processes, and subsequently, the rapid recombination of various modules to create new 
business processes in response to environmental demands (Sambamurthy et al. 2003). As 
such, the extent to which IT can facilitate operational agility is necessarily dependent on 
the speed and effectiveness of its deployment (Mathiassen and Pries-Heje 2006; Tiwana 
et al. 2003), and the organizational capability for agile IT deployment is generally seen as 
the primary mechanism for the attainment of operational agility (Goh et al. 2010; 
Hovorka and Larsen 2006). 
Overall, the lack of empirical validation and the abstract nature of the existing 
prescriptions in the literature indicate a general lack of knowledge on how IT-enabled 
enterprise agility can be achieved. Moreover, although the three types of agility are 
posited to enhance an organization’s ability to engage in competitive actions of greater 
variety, complexity and speed, there is a lack of research on how each of these forms of 
agility can be achieved. For instance, the literature review undertaken did not identify any 
studies that examine the association between VCs and customer agility although VCs are 
the primary IT-enabled means of attaining customer agility (Sambamurthy et al. 2003). 
Accordingly, to address our first research question and understand how VCs can be 
nurtured and leveraged for customer agility, we conduct a review of the literature on 
VCs. This is presented in Section 2.3 of this thesis. 
Similarly, although the development and leverage of a technology-enabled platform is the 
primary IT-enabled means of attaining partnering agility (Sambamurthy et al. 2003), we 
did not find any studies related to this mechanism. Moreover, the overarching conceptual 
frameworks guiding research on IT-enabled enterprise agility are based on the precepts of 
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traditional strategic management, which views the organization as a focused, tightly-
coupled system and emphasizes internal organizational strengths and weaknesses as the 
key to business competition (see Iansiti and Levien 2004a). Thus, the primary means 
advocated in the existing literature for the attainment of enterprise agility are the internal 
organizational processes of IT capability development (Weill et al. 2002), and 
organizational learning from prior competitive actions (Sambamurthy et al. 2003).  
Yet, the reality is that significant changes in the managerial, legal and technological 
capabilities of organizations at the turn of the millennium have led to a new networked 
economy that is no longer driven by economies of scale, but the “economics of networks” 
(Shapiro and Varian 1999). As “distributed business networks became the established 
way of doing business” (Iansiti and Levien 2004a), the management of internal assets and 
competencies became less crucial to business success than managing the concurrent and 
paradoxical forces of stability and instability (Stacey 1995), cooperation and competition 
(Lengnick-Hall and Wolff 1999) that the focal organization is subjected to. Consequently, 
we contend that there is also a need for a different perspective of IT-enabled enterprise 
agility, one that accounts for the new dynamics of business competition in the present 
networked economy (Iansiti and Levien 2004a). 
Therefore, to address the second of our research questions and to construct a networked 
perspective of IT-enabled enterprise agility, we conduct a review of the literature on 
business ecosystems, which is an appropriate starting point for our inquiry since the 
research stream is primarily concerned with mechanisms that promote partnering agility 
(See Adner 2006; Teece 2007) as the means to superior performance for organizations 
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operating in complex business networks. Our review of the literature on business 
ecosystems is presented in Section 2.4. 
Finally, although the organizational capability for agile IT deployment is one of the key 
means of attaining operational agility (Mathiassen and Pries-Heje 2006; Tiwana et al. 
2003), research on how this capability can be acquired is limited. More specifically, the 
existing research on agile IT deployment may be characterized into a number of 
perspectives (refer to Table 6). 
The first perspective is the developmental perspective that views the effective adoption 
and adaptation of agile development methods as the key to agile IT deployment. Agile 
development methods may include the Agile Alliance Manifesto, Scrum, eXtreme 
Programming, DSDM and FDD (Lee and Xia 2010). Studies adopting this perspective 
have uncovered the influence of an array of factors such as individual knowledge, 
empowerment, project team management, team leadership, technological compatibility, 
nature and size of task, resource constraints, and method characteristics on the effective 
employment of agile development methods (Conboy and Fitzgerald 2010; Mangalaraj et 
al. 2009; McAvoy and Butler 2009). From a process-oriented standpoint, the mechanisms 
of Method for Method Configuration (Karlsson and Agerfalk 2009) and method 
appropriation (Cao et al. 2009) have also been proposed to be crucial in tailoring agile 
development methods to the focal organization. 
A second perspective is rooted in the coordination theory. This perspective suggests that 
agile IT deployment is a result of effective collaboration between information systems 
development (ISD) teams and/ or business network partners, particularly in contexts 
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where ISD is enacted across geographical and organizational boundaries. In the context 
of geographically distributed ISD, studies aligned with the coordination perspective have 
suggested that agile IT deployment consists of three dimensions (i.e. resource, process, 
linkage) and eight sub-dimensions (Sarker and Sarker 2009). Moreover, of the eight sub-
dimensions (i.e. people, technology, methodology, temporal, environmental awareness, 
cultural, communicative), communicative and cultural agilities are most important to 
effective collaboration (Sarker et al. 2009). In the context of inter-organizational ISD, 
studies aligned with the coordination perspective have revealed that the characteristics of 
network partners and communication processes that strengthen social influence and 
facilitate knowledge transfer are crucial to agile IT deployment (Hovorka and Larsen 
2006). 
Table 6: Perspectives on Agile IT Deployment 
Perspective on Agile IT Deployment Representative Works 
Developmental Cao et al. (2009) 
Karlsson & Agerfalk (2009) 
Mangalaraj et al. (2009) 
McAvoy & Butler (2009) 
Conboy & Fitzgerald (2010) 
Coordination  Hovorka & Larsen (2006) 
Sarker & Sarker (2009) 
Sarker et al. (2009) 
Organizational Learning Lyytinen & Rose (2006) 
Vinekar et al. (2006) 
Vidgen & Wang (2009) 
Contingency Austin & Devin(2009) 
Harris et al. (2009) 
Maruping et al. (2009) 
Port & Bui (2009) 
 
A third perspective is the organizational learning perspective, which emphasizes the 
mobilization and balance of the learning capabilities of exploration and exploitation 
(March 1991) for the attainment of agile IT deployment. Prior studies aligned with this 
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perspective suggest that organizations adopt different ISD approaches based on their 
needs and capabilities for exploration and exploitation (Lyytinen and Rose 2006). To 
leverage and strike a balance between both capabilities for agile IT deployment, some 
researchers have argued that there is a need to lay the groundwork for ambidexterity 
(O'Reilly and Tushman 2004) with the establishment of explorative and exploitative 
organizational subunits (Vinekar et al. 2006). Others have suggested that balance can be 
achieved through the workings of the capabilities for process adaptation and product 
innovation of the ISD team. These capabilities, in turn, are subject to the influence of a 
number of enablers and inhibitors (see Vidgen and Wang 2009).   
A fourth and final perspective of agile IT deployment in the existing literature is the 
contingency perspective. Studies aligned with this perspective suggest that agility is 
inextricable from improvisation (Austin and Devin 2009; Port and Bui 2009) and the 
attainment of agile IT deployment via an improvisational approach is contingent on the 
environmental conditions surrounding ISD (Harris et al. 2009; Maruping et al. 2009). 
More specifically, some have suggested that improvisation should be a legitimate 
recourse only if there is environmental uncertainty (Harris et al. 2009) and if the benefits 
of innovation outweigh the costs of pursuing it (Austin and Devin 2009). Moreover, the 
outcome of adopting an improvisational approach is contingent on requirements volatility 
(Port and Bui 2009) and the judicious application of formal and informal controls 
(Maruping et al. 2009). Conversely, if environmental uncertainty is low and if the costs of 
innovation are greater than the benefits of pursuing it, then a planned or mixed approach 
might be more appropriate (Austin and Devin 2009; Port and Bui 2009).  
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More broadly, and often encompassing one or more of the aforementioned perspectives, 
there is also a significant number of studies centered on the identification of the critical 
success factors (CSFs) of agile IT deployment. These CSFs are the necessary conditions 
or key areas where “things must go right” (Rockart 1979) for the attainment of agile IT 
deployment. Among others, the more frequently cited CSFs of agile IT deployment in the 
literature include the autonomy, diversity, response extensiveness and response efficiency 
of the ISD project team (Lee and Xia 2010), as well as business-IT alignment, 
communication, modularized IT architecture, extent of conflict, technical skills, 
decentralized knowledge, top management support and flexibility (Bruque-Camara et al. 
2004; Lee et al. 2006). 
Overall, the four perspectives and research on CSFs have identified a number of 
mechanisms and enablers for the attainment of agile IT deployment. Yet, many 
organizations continue to face difficulties in achieving agile IT deployment in practice 
(Lee and Xia 2010) and reviews of the literature suggests that the existing body of work 
is lacking in clarity, a unified direction, parsimony, and a cumulative research tradition 
(see Conboy 2009; Dyba and Dingsøyr 2008). These limitations constrain its ability to 
provide indications to practice (Abrahamsson et al. 2009). 
The organizational ability to improvise is seen to be complementary to the dynamic and 
operational capabilities of a firm (Pavlou and El Sawy 2010). An improvisational 
approach to systems implementation (see Orlikowski 1996) may hold the key to agility in 
IT deployment, particularly in a turbulent environment (Pavlou and El Sawy 2010) where 
agility is most needed (Sambamurthy et al. 2003). This is because improvisation can 
facilitate creativity (Crossan et al. 2005), enhance the speed of implementation by 
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eliminating the need for planning (Weick 1998), and increase the effectiveness of systems 
development (Ciborra 1996a; Orlikowski 2000). Accordingly, to understand how agility 
in IT deployment can be achieved and translated to operational agility, and to address our 
third research question, we conduct a review of the literature on organizational 
improvisation. The literature on organizational improvisation is particularly appropriate 
for guiding our inquiry since the research stream is primarily concerned with the 
mechanisms and constructs that underlie the organizational capability for improvisation 
(e.g. Crossan 1998; Moorman and Miner 1998). Our review of the literature on 
organizational improvisation is presented in Section 2.5. 
2.3 Virtual Communities 
The advent of Internet technologies facilitated the creation of the first VCs by enabling 
synchronous communications and interactions that transcend the physical limits of time 
and space (Sangwan 2005). Although VCs may be differentiated according to their 
purpose (Armstrong and Hagel 1996), social structure (Kozinets 2002), physical features 
(Preece 2001), and organization (Porter 2004), there are a number of characteristics that 
are common across most VCs (Porter and Donthu 2008). In particular, VCs are social 
aggregations based on common interest (Rheingold 1993; Sangwan 2005), and comprises 
of members that engage in frequent interactions (Balasubramanian and Mahajan 2001), 
generate communal information and resources (Gu et al. 2007), demonstrate reciprocity 
(Preece 2001), and share cultural norms, moral standards and governing policies 
(Kozinets 2002). The earliest VCs were self-organizing and socially-oriented, centered on 
the personal, non-professional relationships between VC members (Kannan et al. 2000). 
It was not until the mid 1990s when the idea was first raised that VCs can be used as a 
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powerful business tool to tap into the collective intelligence of employees and customers; 
transforming the basis of competition to create competitive advantage and organizational 
value for the organizations that sponsor them (Armstrong and Hagel 1996). As this notion 
permeated the collective consciousness of e-commerce practitioners worldwide, it paved 
the way for the emergence of the first commercial VCs (Kannan et al. 2000). 
Commercial VCs are typically sponsored by two groups of organizations (Porter 2004). 
The first group comprises of product manufacturers and service providers seeking to 
market their offerings and build direct relationships with their customers (Kannan et al. 
2000). The second group of sponsoring organizations consists of third parties that are 
unaligned with specific product manufacturers or service providers, seeking to play the 
role of an objective intermediary that caters to the needs of a community of consumers 
with common interests (Brown et al. 2002; Kannan et al. 2000).  
According to the existing literature, VCs present numerous benefits for both groups of 
sponsoring organizations. For example, studies have shown that VC members are twice 
more likely to purchase online, nine times more likely to make repeat purchases 
(Sangwan 2005), and make purchases that are 57% larger than non-VC members (Cothrel 
2000). Other studies suggest that VC members are more likely to generate positive word-
of-mouth (Dellarocas 2003), refer other customers, and moreover, they are more likely to 
refer in volume (Cothrel 2000). But more pertinent to the topic of this thesis, beyond 
these transactional and reputational benefits, VCs also confer the strategic advantage of 
customer agility (Nambisan 2002; Sambamurthy et al. 2003) 
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2.3.1 Nurturing and Leveraging a VC for Customer Agility 
Building on strategic management, entrepreneurship and IT management literatures, 
Sambamurthy et al.’s framework (2003) on IT-enabled enterprise agility identifies two 
organizational capabilities (IT competence, digital options) and two strategic processes 
(capability-building and entrepreneurial action) as the key antecedents and mechanisms 
of customer agility. According to the framework, the process of attaining agility through 
the leverage of IT begins with the strategic process of capability-building in which IT 
competence is translated to digital options through new investments in IT and an intricate 
blend of IT, organizational knowledge and business processes (Barua and Mukhopadhay 
2000).  
Of the four digital options identified in Sambamurthy et al.’s framework (refer to Table 
4), the two options related to digitized knowledge are more salient in the context of VCs. 
This is because the ability of VCs to enhance interactions between organizational 
stakeholders (i.e. digitized knowledge richness) (Butler 2001; Gu et al. 2007), and serve 
as the basis of a knowledge repository (i.e. digitized knowledge reach) (Bieber et al. 2002; 
Srinivasan et al. 2002; Wasko and Faraj 2005) is well-documented. On the other hand, 
VCs, being customer-centered (Armstrong and Hagel 1996; Rothaermel and Sugiyama 
2001), are conceivably less relevant to the core business processes and backend 
information flows (i.e. digitized process reach and richness) of the sponsoring 
organization.  
The existing literature on VCs is replete with prescriptions on how these VC-enabled 
digital options (i.e. digitized knowledge reach and richness) may be effectively 
developed. Yet, despite the unbridled diversity and the lack of a cumulative tradition 
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(Ginsburg and Weisband 2006) in existing VC research, the essence of the majority of 
these prescriptions centers on three distinct competencies (Porter and Donthu 2008; 
Preece 2001) (refer to Table 7). First, the sponsoring organization can facilitate the 
development of VC-enabled digital options by managing content, as content that is 
perceived to be interesting and unbiased may motivate VC members to participate and 
contribute knowledge (Brown et al. 2002; Ridings et al. 2002).  
Second, the sponsoring organization can develop VC-enabled digital options by fostering 
embeddedness. Embeddedness refers to the process through which economic actions are 
ingrained within wider social structures (Dacin et al. 1999) and in the organizational 
context, the state of being “embedded” refers to the centrality of the customer within the 
focal organization’s social network (Bhattacharya and Sen 2003). Embeddedness is 
particularly important to the development of VC-enabled digital options as it is a 
significant determinant of the extent to which the customer identifies with both the VC 
and the sponsoring organization (Bhattacharya and Sen 2003). This in turn, translates to 
increased participation, trust, exchange of socio-emotional support, and willingness to 
contribute knowledge within a VC (Blanchard and Markus 2004; Ma and Agarwal 2007). 
Finally, the sponsoring organization can develop VC-enabled digital options by 
enhancing interactivity. Interactivity can be enhanced through deliberate measures such 
as promoting special topics (Mohammed et al. 2004), hosting moderated discussions 
(Porter and Donthu 2008) or improving the ease, efficiency and effectiveness of 
communications that decreases the cost of participation within a VC (Preece 2001). 
Interactivity is important because a vibrant community works in a virtuous cycle to 
facilitate the attraction and retention of VC members, which in turn, drives further 
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interaction and knowledge contribution (Dholakia et al. 2004; Preece 2001). These three 
competencies, in tandem with the enabling technological infrastructure (see, e.g. Preece 
2001) that underlies the VC, constitute the fundamental building blocks of the two VC-
enabled digital options.   
Table 7: Existing Perspectives on the Development of VC-Enabled Digital Options 
Key Competencies in 
the Development of 
VC-Enabled Options 
Related Concepts in VC Literature 
Managing content Information quality (Lin 2008; Lin et al. 2007) 
Value of collectively held knowledge (Rothaermel and Sugiyama 2001)  
Functional needs (Sangwan 2005) 
Support for personalization (Schubert and Ginsburg 2000) 
Site content (Rothaermel and Sugiyama 2001) 
Fostering 
embeddedness 
Sense of virtual community (Blanchard and Markus 2004; Koh and Kim 
2003) 
Economic on social grafting (Balasubramanian and Mahajan 2001) 
Involvement (Shang et al. 2006) 
Relationship development (Kozinets 2002) 
Commitment (Wasko and Faraj 2005) 
Trust (Leimeister et al. 2005; Lin 2008; Walden 2000) 
Emotional needs (Sangwan 2005) 
Pro-sharing norms (Lin et al. 2007) 
Perceived identity verification (Ma and Agarwal 2007) 
Sense of belonging (Lin 2008) 
Enhancing 
interactivity 
Sociability  (Preece 2001) 
Usability (Preece 2001) 
Social usefulness (Lin 2008) 
Amount of Quality Postings (Gu et al. 2007) 
Participation (Rothaermel and Sugiyama 2001) 
Contextual needs (Sangwan 2005) 
System quality (Lin 2008; Lin et al. 2007) 
Social interaction possibilities (Lee et al. 2005) 
Convenience (Lee et al. 2005)  
 
Following the development of VC-enabled digital options, Sambamurthy et al.’s 
framework (2003) describes how they, in turn, can be translated to customer agility in the 
next phase of capability-building. In particular, a VC can facilitate customer agility by 
serving as the basis of a platform that enables two forms of interactions. First, by 
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enabling interactions between VC members and the sponsoring organization, the 
sponsoring organization is able to obtain direct feedback and product configuration 
knowledge from its customers to gain an understanding of their current and expressed 
needs (Armstrong and Hagel 1996; Porter and Donthu 2008). Second, by enabling 
interactions between VC members, the sponsoring organization can monitor the 
interactions between its members to anticipate future and unexpressed needs (Kozinets 
2002; Nambisan 2002). 
In the context of generic IT-enabled organizational value creation, Sambamurthy et al.’s 
framework (2003) describes a process of entrepreneurial action that follows capability-
building in which enterprise agility can be activated for organizational value. Although a 
myriad of strategies for creating organizational value have been prescribed in extant 
literature, the essence of the majority of these strategies can be distilled into three distinct 
logics (Eisenhardt and Sull 2001; Sambamurthy et al. 2003). These logics, dubbed the 
three logics of strategy, are summarized in the Table 8. In particular, given the dynamic 
and turbulent operating conditions of the contemporary business landscape (McAfee and 
Brynjolfsson 2008; Sull 2009), Sambamurthy et al. argue that the leverage of IT for 
organizational value creation “must embrace the logic of opportunity and be targeted at 
seizing series of competitive advantages” (Sambamurthy et al. 2003). Hence, the strategic 
process of entrepreneurial action is aligned with the logic of opportunity (see D'Aveni 
1994; Eisenhardt and Sull 2001), and entails the leverage of enterprise agility to allow the 
focal organization to rapidly launch a wide variety of competitive actions (e.g. Eisenhardt 
and Sull 2001). This in turn, leads to the creation of organizational value as the 
organization is able to rapidly develop new value propositions, and establish an 
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unconventional basis of competing that disrupts the competitive equilibrium (Eisenhardt 
and Martin 2000; Lengnick-Hall and Wolff 1999). 
In the context of VCs, customer agility can be leveraged for the launch of a variety of 
competitive actions through three distinct mechanisms. First, the competitive actions may 
be reactive responses to the current and expressed needs of VC members. For instance, 
there are numerous illustrative examples in the existing VC literature of how sponsoring 
organizations may launch new content (Rothaermel and Sugiyama 2001), features 
(Ginsburg and Weisband 2006), promotions (Armstrong and Hagel 1996), products 
(Kozinets 2002), and even revenue streams (Kannan et al. 2000) as a result of direct 
interactions between VC members and the sponsoring organization.  
Second, the competitive actions may arise from proactive responses to the anticipated 
needs of the VC members. These responses may be attempts at catering to future and 
unexpressed needs that are extrapolated from the interactions between VC members 
(Hagel and Armstrong 1997; Rothaermel and Sugiyama 2001), or directed marketing 
efforts that cater to the perceived needs of different segments within a VC 
(Balasubramanian and Mahajan 2001; Kozinets 2002).   
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Table 8: The Three Logics of Strategy 
 Logic of Positioning Logic of Leverage Logic of Opportunity 
Representative 
Theories 
 Competitive Strategy 
(Porter 1996) 
 Resource-Base View 
(Barney 1991; Peteraf 
1993) 
 Dynamic Capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000; Teece et al. 1997) 
 Hypercompetition (D'Aveni 1994; Eisenhardt 
and Sull 2001) 
Core Tenets • Systematic 
consideration of 
environmental forces 
• Identification of 
attractive market 
position 
• Occupy and defend 
position through a 
tightly integrated 
activity system 





• Develop and leverage 
strategic resources 
• Use of dynamic capabilities that allow 
managers alter their resource base in dynamic 
environments to generate new value-creating 
resource configurations 
• Use of creative and unconventional means to 
deliberately disrupt the existing business 
paradigms in the competitive environment and 
foster radical transformations in the rules of 








associated with market 
position 
• Unique value proposition 
as a result of firm-specific 
resources and capabilities. 
• Resultant competitive 
advantage is sustainable if 
the resources can be 
protected from imitation. 
• Rapid sense-and-respond capabilities that 
allows an organization to recombine existing 
assets and competencies to form new value 
propositions to keep competitors off balance.  
Or 
• Adopt aggressive measures to cause 
fundamental instability and create a unique 




Third, competitive actions may stem from innovations developed in conjunction with VC 
members. More specifically, VC members may be engaged in the co-production of 
innovations (Nambisan 2002; Porter and Donthu 2008), which shortens the development 
cycle by eliminating the time lag between discerning and acting on the need for 
innovation, and provides the strongest assurances that the innovations pursued by the 
sponsoring organization are in accordance with the members’ needs (Lengnick-Hall 
1996). 
To summarize, the development and leverage of a VC for customer agility begins with 
the strategic process of capability-building in which VC competence, consisting of three 
VC-enabling competencies (i.e. managing content, fostering embeddedness, and 
enhancing interactivity), is translated to customer agility through the development of two 
VC-enabled digital options (i.e. digitized knowledge reach and richness). Organizational 
value, in turn, is created through the strategic process of entrepreneurial action in which 
customer agility is leveraged to enable the community sponsor to detect windows of 
market opportunity (i.e. via enhanced means of accessing information on their members’ 
needs), and launch a stream of rapid and effective innovations to seize them with speed 
and surprise.  
By synthesizing Sambamurthy et al.’s framework (2003) on generic IT-enabled enterprise 
agility with pertinent concepts and propositions from the existing VC literature, we are 
able to construct a theoretical lens (refer to Figure 6) that is specific to the context of 
VCs, and can serve as “sensitizing device” (Klein and Myers 1999) to guide subsequent 
data collection and analysis (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Walsham 2006). In their 
original article, Sambamurthy et al. (2003) also discussed a strategic process of co-
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evolutionary adaptation through which the organizational value gained from the firm’s 
competitive actions enhances enterprise agility, and subsequently, digital options in a 
mechanism of feedback. However, as the scope of our study is limited to the development 
and leverage of VCs for customer agility, we omitted the process of co-evolutionary 
adaptation; which deals with the reverse mechanisms of our phenomenon of interest, so 
as to preserve the simplicity and parsimony of our theoretical lens. Applying this 
theoretical lens to analyze the case of HWZ (refer to Section 4.1), a process model of the 
development and leverage of a VC for organizational value creation is inductively 
derived (refer to Section 5.1) to address the first research question set forth at the 
beginning of this thesis. 
Figure 1: Theoretical Lens on VC-Enabled Customer Agility 
 
2.4 Business Ecosystems 
Business ecosystems research emerged as a response to the growing need for a new 
paradigm for strategizing, competing and innovating in the networked economy (Iansiti 
and Levien 2004a) and has its intellectual roots in theories of complexity (Stacey 1995) 
and organizational ecology (e.g. Hannan and Freeman 1977). Business ecosystems are 
networks of organizations that are held together through formal contracting and mutual 
dependency (Pierce 2009). The entities of a business ecosystem are structured around 
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core firms, whose centrality is established on the basis of control over the dominant 
technological architecture or brand that structures value in the ecosystem, or other factors 
such as product characteristics or geography (Teece 2007). These entities include 
suppliers, producers and retailers that work in tandem to create value, as well as 
customers (Moore 1996) and producers of complementary products and services termed 
“complementors” (Teece 2007). Collectively, these entities comprise niche markets 
within the ecosystem, which are specialized functions tied to the core firm (Pierce 2009). 
The development and subsequent leverage of a business ecosystem by a core firm can 
bring about a number of important benefits for the focal organization. These benefits 
include enhanced procurement processes, an optimized product mix, operational 
efficiency and enhanced information sharing (Iansiti and Levien 2004b). More 
pertinently, business ecosystems may give rise to partnering agility by enhancing the 
organizational ability to sense and respond to market and technological opportunities 
(Teece 2007), and facilitating the co-creation of effective and timely innovations (Adner 
2006). The process of ecosystem development in turn, is determined by two primary 
factors: The discrete organizational strategies of the core firm and the role it plays within 
the ecosystem (Iansiti and Levien 2004a). 
2.4.1 Core Firm Strategies 
Although a core firm is faced with a vast array of strategies to choose from, and the 
intricacies of each possible strategy is certainly beyond the scope of a single paper, the 
essence of the most prominent streams of contemporary strategic management thought 
can be distilled into three distinct logics (Lengnick-Hall and Wolff 1999). The three core 
logics of contemporary strategic management are summarized in the Table 9. 
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A core firm may pursue strategies aligned with the capability logic by leveraging firm-
specific strategic resources and capabilities to create a unique value proposition (Barney 
1991). This influences ecosystem development as the unique value proposition can serve 
to attract new entities; such as customers, suppliers and complementors, into the 
ecosystem, and the entities in the ecosystem in turn, can coordinate value creation around 
the seed proposition of the core firm (Moore 1993). In addition, by protecting the value 
proposition from imitation, the core firm delineates the boundary of the ecosystem by 
defining a distinct identity, which serves as an entry barrier that controls membership in 
the ecosystem. 
Conversely, a core firm may pursue strategies aligned with the guerilla logic by 
developing the vision, capabilities and tactics for causing market disruptions that allow 
the firm to rapidly innovate (D'Aveni 1994) or recombine existing assets and 
competencies to create a series of temporary competitive advantages (Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000). With the core firm acting as the lead innovator, its actions influence 
ecosystem development by introducing a continuous stream of fresh ideas that promotes 
self-renewal and staves off obsolescence (Moore 1996). Moreover, continuous innovation 
by the core firm coerces the other entities in the ecosystem to adapt to the changes or exit 
the ecosystem (Pierce 2009). With successive iterations, the surviving entities develop the 
capabilities to adapt efficiently and effectively, which results in the development of a 
robust business ecosystem.   
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Table 9: The Three Core Logics of Contemporary Strategic Management 




 The Resource-Based View 
(RBV) of the firm  (Barney 
1991) 
 Theory of 
Hypercompetition (D'Aveni 
1994) 
 Dynamic Capabilities 
Approach (Teece et al. 
1997) 
 Complexity Theory (Stacey 1995) 
 Business Ecosystems (Iansiti and 
Levien 2004a) 
 
Core Principles Postulates that superior 
performance is the result of 
leveraging firm-specific strategic 
resources and capabilities and 
protecting them from imitation. 
Posits that superior performance 
is the result of rapid and 
relentless innovation that disrupts 
existing business paradigms to 
keep competitors off-balance 
Suggests that superior performance is a 
result of maintaining the health of the 
business ecosystem, which leads to 
productivity, synergies from diversity 
and durability of the benefits derived. 
Key 
Prescriptions 
• Identify and exploit firm-
specific strategic resources 
that are valuable, rare, 
inimitable and non-
substitutable 
• Leverage complementary 
resources that enhance the 
value creating potential of 
strategic resources 
• Develop dynamic capabilities 
that allow an organization to 
rapidly recombine existing 
assets and competencies to 
form new value propositions. 
• Adopt aggressive measures to 
cause fundamental instability 
and create a unique and 
unconventional basis for 
competing 
• Understand and manipulate the 
underlying forces and attractors that 
create order in the business 
ecosystem 
• Develop ecosystem capabilities (as 
opposed to self-serving, internal 
organizational capabilities) through 
direct intervention or providing the 
means for capability development 
across the network    




Finally, a core firm may pursue strategies aligned with the complexity logic by 
attempting to manipulate the underlying forces and attractors that create order in the 
business ecosystem; such as shared values, the collective vision, mechanisms of control 
and platforms for interaction (Stacey 1995), maintaining the ecosystem at the “edge of 
chaos” (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997) so that the ecosystem is primed for innovation and 
continuous change (Stacey 1995). Alternatively, the core firm may focus on helping the 
other entities in the ecosystem develop their capabilities through direct intervention, or 
providing the tools and interfaces for capability development (Iansiti and Levien 2004a). 
The result of these community-oriented measures is the development of a healthy 
business ecosystem characterized by symbiotic relationships, collective strategies and 
orchestrated actions (Lengnick-Hall and Wolff 1999).  
2.4.2 Ecosystem Roles 
In addition to its organizational strategies, the role that the core firm plays within the 
ecosystem also has profound implications for ecosystem development. Specifically, the 
core firm can choose to play the role of a keystone by providing benefits to the rest of the 
ecosystem so as to improve its own chances of survival (Iansiti and Levien 2004a; Iansiti 
and Levien 2004b). By taking on the role of a keystone, the core firm influences 
ecosystem development through three distinct mechanisms. First, the keystone may 
enhance ecosystem productivity by maintaining the population of the ecosystem within 
an optimum range, or connecting different nodes within the network, thereby decreasing 
the complexity of coordination and integration in value co-creation (Iansiti and Levien 
2004a). Second, the keystone may facilitate ecosystem robustness by introducing a 
continuous stream of innovations and providing a reliable point of reference for other 
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entities in the ecosystem. This serves to buffer the ecosystem from environmental shocks 
and help ecosystem members adapt to new and uncertain conditions. Third, the keystone 
may encourage diversity within the ecosystem by offering new capabilities to an array of 
third-party organizations that enable them to participate meaningfully in the ecosystem  
(Iansiti and Levien 2004b).  
Alternatively, the core firm can choose to play the role of a dominator by exploiting their 
centrality in the network to take control or extract value from the ecosystem. This 
influences ecosystem development in two possible ways. First, by expanding horizontally 
and vertically to control a large proportion of the business network, the dominator may 
become primarily responsible for value creation within the ecosystem, which stifles 
ecosystem development by leaving little room for diversity. Second, by draining the 
value created by other entities within the ecosystem from the network, the dominator may 
leave behind “a starved and unstable ecosystem”(Iansiti and Levien 2004a) that is unable 
to sustain itself, which may ultimately collapse and lead to the demise of these entities 
(Iansiti and Levien 2004b).    
It is important to note that the ecosystem role of the core firm is distinct from the 
organizational strategies that it chooses to employ, which are primarily influenced by its 
independent business objectives. For example, although the role of a keystone is more 
commonly associated with the complexity logic (e.g. Lengnick-Hall and Wolff 1999), a 
keystone may use (1) the capability logic to control the population of the ecosystem for 
optimum productivity, (2) the guerilla logic to introduce a continuous stream of 
innovations that promotes ecosystem robustness, and (3) the complexity logic to promote 
capability development across the network that promotes meaningful diversity in the 
38 
 
ecosystem. Likewise, a dominator may use (1) the capability logic to establish ownership 
and control over the ecosystem, (2) the guerilla logic to expand horizontally and 
vertically in the network, and (3) the complexity logic to manipulate the underlying 
forces and attractors to facilitate domination and value extraction (Iansiti and Levien 
2004b; Moore 1996). This conceptual distinction is important to studying ecosystem 
development as the precise nature of the process can only be understood by examining 
both factors in tandem. 
Overall, the literature on business ecosystems suggests that the development and leverage 
of a digital business ecosystem (DBE); a specific type of business ecosystem defined as 
an IT-enabled business network of entities with differing interests bound together in a 
collective whole (Iansiti and Levien 2004a), may be the key to attaining partnering agility 
for organizations operating in the networked economy. This is because business 
ecosystems can be leveraged to enhance the ability to sense and respond to market and 
technological opportunities (Adner 2006; Teece 2007), and the extent of coordination and 
integration required for entities engaged in intense networked competition can only be 
achieved using IT (Riggins and Rhee 1998). The process of DBE development is in turn, 
determined by the strategies of the focal organization and the role it plays within the 
ecosystem. Applying this body of knowledge as a theoretical lens to analyze the case of 
Alibaba (refer to Section 4.2), a process model of the development and leverage of a DBE 
is inductively derived (refer to Section 5.2) to address our second research question.     
2.5 Organizational Improvisation 
Organizational improvisation theory draws from insights obtained from a kaleidoscopic 
array of contexts (Moorman and Miner 1998) ranging from music (e.g. Barrett 1998) and 
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theater (e.g. Crossan 1998) to sports (e.g. Bjurwill 1993), and even firefighting 
management (e.g. Weick 1996). Like the concept of enterprise agility, the present 
fascination with organizational improvisation stems from the need to manage the 
unprecedented turbulence and complexity of the modern competitive landscape 
(Kamoche et al. 2003). Improvisation is seen as one of the key enablers of innovativeness 
and spontaneity; traits that are crucial for dealing with the complex, unpredictable, and 
time-critical issues that are frequently confronted by organizations today (Crossan 1998). 
Although a great many definitions of organizational improvisation exist in the literature, 
most of the definitions agree on a number of distinguishing characteristics (Bergh and 
Lim 2008). First, organizational improvisation entails an overlap of the planning and 
execution of a specific action (Pavlou and El Sawy 2010), and the greater the extent of 
overlap, the more improvisational the action is deemed to be (Cunha et al. 1999; 
Moorman and Miner 1998). As opposed to the activation of a pre-mediated or 
standardized routine (Bergh and Lim 2008), improvisation is depicted as an activity that 
is spontaneous, free-form and enacted in the moment (Crossan et al. 2005) for the 
purpose of seizing an unexpected opportunity or resolving an emergent problem (Weick 
1996).  
Second, organizational improvisation relates to acting or making quick decisions under 
uncertainty (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995; Vera and Crossan 2005), requiring managers to 
draw from organizational memory, experience or intuition (Crossan 1998; Moorman and 
Miner 1998) to recombine and apply organizational routines and knowledge in creative 
ways (Miner et al. 2001). Third, improvisation tends to involve actions and decisions that 
are rarely replicated, deviate from standard practices, and are tailored to a specific context 
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(Baker and Nelson 2005). Taking into account these characteristics, organizational 
improvisation is defined in our study as the material and temporal convergence of design 
and execution (Miner et al. 2001),“drawing on available cognitive, affective, social and 
material resources” (Kamoche et al. 2003) to address context-specific problems or 
seizing emergent opportunities (Baker and Nelson 2005; Weick 1996).  
2.5.1 The Process of Organizational Improvisation 
Although we did not find a process theory of organizational improvisation in our 
literature review, from the cumulative body of research, the process of organizational 
improvisation can be inferred to consist of four major steps (refer to Figure 7). More 
specifically, to improvise at the organizational level, a firm must (1) develop the means to 
improvise (e.g. Kamoche et al. 2003), (2) detect and interpret triggers of improvisation 
(e.g. Crossan 1998), (3) enact the process of improvisation (e.g. Moorman and Miner 
1998), and finally, (4) reap the outcome (e.g. Vera and Crossan 2004). We discuss each 
of these steps in turn. 
Figure 2: Generic Process of Organizational Improvisation 
 
 
In the first step of the process, the focal firm must already possess or develop the means 
for organizational improvisation. It is a well-known adage that improvisation must derive 
from ‘something’, and does not simply “materialize out of thin air” (Weick 1998). The 
‘something’ from which improvisation derives, in turn, consists of 2 components: the 
ability to improvise and the motivation to do so (Kamoche et al. 2003). The ability to 
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improvise comes from what is conceived as a ‘minimal structure’ (see Eisenberg 1990), 
defined as the shared knowledge within a collective that enables members to depart from 
conventional practices when acting in concert (Brown and Duguid 1991). The minimal 
structure represents the fundamental conditions that must be satisfied for improvisation to 
occur and can be further decomposed into (1) a social structure pertaining to behavioral 
norms, communications, and teamwork skills, and (2) a technical structure that relates to 
the task-related expertise, creativity and knowledge required for effective improvisation 
(Crossan et al. 2005; Kamoche et al. 2003). However, the ability to improvise is 
insufficient to ensure improvisation; the motivation to do so must also be present, which 
stems from the “deliberate choice of improvisation as an action strategy and a culture 
that rewards experimentation and treats mistakes as learning opportunities” (Kamoche 
et al. 2003).  
After an organization has developed the means for improvisation, the next step in the 
process entails sensing and extracting cues from the external and internal organizational 
environment that trigger the need for improvising (Crossan 1998). This implies two 
things: the manifestation of an improvisation trigger in the environment, and the ability to 
detect it. Although triggers of organizational improvisation can take a wide variety of 
different forms (e.g. Weick et al. 2005), they can generally be classified as a “surprising 
problem” (i.e. a negative trigger) or an “unexpected opportunity” (i.e. a positive trigger) 
(Miner et al. 2001). The detection of these triggers however, depends on intuition 
(Crossan 1998), the alertness of the organization (Sambamurthy et al. 2003), and its 
interactions with key stakeholders within the organization and in the external 
environment (Baker et al. 2003; Vera and Crossan 2005), all conditioned by the ability 
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and motivation to improvise that were developed previously (Moorman and Miner 1998; 
Weick 1998).  
Following the detection of a trigger for improvisation, the next step of the process is the 
execution of the actual act of improvising (Crossan 1998). In general, this step can be 
enacted through two different means: (1) Bricolage, defined as the act of making do by 
applying combinations of the resources at hand to new problems and opportunities 
(Ciborra 1996b), and (2) capability development (also known as resource seeking), which 
refers to the attempt to acquire externally the appropriate levels and types of resources 
that are required for improvisation (Baker and Nelson 2005). The two means can be 
conceptualized as opposing ends on a continuum and in reality, organizational 
improvisation usually involves a combination of both (Miner et al. 2001; Moorman and 
Miner 1998). However, an overdependence on bricolage as the means of improvisation 
tends to result in a mutually reinforcing pattern which, although it enables a firm to 
survive and function with minimal level of resources, isolates the firm from new 
environmental opportunities and inhibits learning, as well as the development of 
objectives and routines that may lead to greater growth and profitability (Baker and 
Nelson 2005; Miner et al. 2001). Conversely, the selective use of bricolage is advocated 
as the firm will be able create unique value and develop the capabilities that enable 
growth and the seizing of new opportunities, while being able to avoid “becoming 
constrained by the demands of embedded ties and an organizational identity defined by 
bricolage” (Baker and Nelson 2005). 
The final step of organizational improvisation is the derivation of improvisational 
outcomes. Organizational improvisation can be a powerful enabler of operational agility 
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through two distinct mechanisms. First, improvisation facilitates innovation as creativity 
is an inherent attribute of any process that may be considered improvisational (Crossan et 
al. 2005). Second, improvisation enhances the responsiveness and adaptability of a firm 
as the process is spontaneous by definition, and “if time is a competitive advantage, then 
people gain speed if they do more things spontaneously without lengthy prior planning 
exercises” (Weick 1998). However, recent studies have shown that improvisation may 
give rise to a number of negative outcomes as well. To avoid potential negative outcomes 
such as inconsistency and coordination problems in a tightly-coupled system, as well as 
the inhibition of long-term learning, adaptability and growth, prior research suggests the 
need to be mindful of the nature of improvisation, the context in which improvisation is 
enacted, and the alignment of improvisation with the broader strategic objectives of the 
firm (Baker and Nelson 2005; Miner et al. 2001). Finally, the organization’s ability and 
motivation to improvise tends to grow iteratively with each successive enactment of 
improvisation (as denoted by the feedback loop in Figure 7). This is because the ability to 
improvise improves with practice (Vera and Crossan 2005), and each successive iteration 
enhances the organizational memory, expertise, coordination skills and communication 
capabilities that form the fundamental building blocks of improvisation (Crossan et al. 
2005; Moorman and Miner 1998). Moreover, improvisation creates flexibility, learning 
and a “feeling of transcendence” (Kamoche et al. 2003) that enhances the motivation to 
improvise.   
Overall, the literature on organizational improvisation suggests that improvisation may be 
a possible mechanism for attaining agility in IT deployment, and consequently, 
operational agility due to its ability to facilitate innovations and enhance the adaptability 
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and responsiveness of the firm (Crossan et al. 2005; Pavlou and El Sawy 2010). The 
process of improvisation in IT deployment, in turn, may unfold in a similar sequence of 
steps (e.g. Adrot and Robey 2008), which, according to prior research on organizational 
improvisation, include (1) developing the means to improvise, (2) detecting and 
interpreting triggers of improvisation, (3) enacting improvisation, and finally, (4) deriving 
the outcome. Applying this body of knowledge as a theoretical lens to analyze the case of 
CCP (refer to Section 4.3), a process model depicting how the organizational capability 
for improvisation in IT deployment can be developed, leveraged for operational agility 
and routinized for repeated application is inductively derived (refer to Section 5.3) to 











CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Research Method Selection 
The research for this thesis was conducted using the case research method. As compared 
to quantitative research, which emphasizes the measurement and analysis of variables and 
focuses on establishing causal relationships among theoretical constructs (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2000), case research is a form of qualitative research that emphasizes language 
(as opposed to numbers), subjective interpretations, and the contextual setting of a 
phenomenon of interest (Maxwell 1996). Over the years, the prevalence of case research 
in the IS discipline has grown (Mingers 2003) to the point where its validity as a research 
method is now rarely, if ever, questioned (Lee and Hubona 2009). Although case research 
can be descriptive, exploratory or explanatory in nature (Dube and Pare 2003; Yin 2003), 
the research conducted as part of this thesis fall into the category of exploratory case 
research. In general, exploratory case research that seeks the inductive derivation of 
theories is the most common and widely-accepted form of case research (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007) because it plays to the inherent richness of case data (Miles and 
Huberman 1994).  
Case research is particularly appropriate for this study as its strengths are well aligned 
with our research objectives (refer to Table 10). First, case research is particularly useful 
for examining processes (Gephart 2004; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991), and our study 
seeks to understand the processes of developing and leveraging VCs, DBEs and the 
capability for agile IT deployment for the attainment of enterprise agility. Second, case 
research is well-suited for studying emerging phenomena and as pointed out in our 
literature review, IT-enabled enterprise agility is a relatively new research area in the IS 
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discipline (Overby et al. 2006) and there is currently little research on how the three types 
of agility that constitute enterprise agility may be achieved through the use of IT. Third, 
case research is particularly appropriate where an objective approach to research is 
difficult (Klein and Myers 1999), and we note that in light of the complex, multi-faceted 
nature of our phenomena of interest, this is indeed the case in the context of our study. 
Finally, case research is particularly appropriate for addressing “how” and “why” 
research questions (Walsham 1995; Yin 2003), and we note that all of our research 
questions are “how” research questions. 
3.2 Philosophical Underpinnings 
Before delving into the specifics of our research method, we would like to clarify the 
underlying philosophy of science that underpins our approach. Our epistemological and 
ontological beliefs are neither aligned with orthodox positivism (e.g. Yin 2003) nor 
mainstream interpretivism (e.g. Walsham 1995). Instead, they are aligned with the realist 
position (For a review, see Tsang and Kwan 1999) that straddles the middle ground 
between the two polar extremes (Mingers 2004). At this point in time, we will not 
distinguish between the different forms (i.e. naïve, scientific, and critical) of realism (see 
Madill et al. 2000) because resolving the undue controversy that such an act will 
inevitably invite is beyond the scope of the present thesis. But in any case, all variants of 
realism are unified in their ontological stand, which assumes the existence of an ordered, 
mind-independent reality (Fay 1996) consisting of separate domains that may or may not 
be observed and experienced (Mingers 2004). We would also like to point out here that 
many case researchers share our philosophical position whether they are aware of it or 
otherwise (van Maanen et al. 2007). Kirsch (2004), for example, noted that the explicitly 
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positivist Eisenhardt (1989) draws heavily from interpretive approaches, while it is 
equally apparent that a number of interpretivist researchers have strayed from the pure 
constructivist position of classic interpretivism (e.g. Strauss and Corbin 1998; Walsham 
1995). 
Table 10: Fit Between Case Research Method and the Purpose of Our Study 
Our Study… Strengths of Case Research 
Seeks to understand the process of 
developing and leveraging a VC for 
customer agility 
 
Seeks to understand the process of 
developing and leveraging a DBE for 
partnering agility 
 
Seeks to understand the process of 
developing and leveraging the capability 
for agile IT deployment for operational 
agility 
 
• Well-suited for investigating 
phenomena from a process perspective 
(Gephart 2004) 
 
• Particularly useful for examining 
processes (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991) 
Seeks to contribute to the emerging 
research area on IT-enabled enterprise 
agility (Overby et al. 2006) by examining 
how customer, partnering and operational 
agility may be achieved through the use of 
IT 
• Provides richer analysis and enables the 
identification of new issues (Myers 
1997; Walsham 1995) 
 
• Well-suited for exploring 
organizational aspects that have not yet 
been systematized and brought under 
the control of rationalized logic 
(Schultze and Leidner 2002) 
Centers on the three forms of enterprise 
agility, VCs, DBEs, and agility in IT 
deployment; all complex, multi-faceted 
phenomena that are inextricable from 
their organizational context that are 
difficult to quantify 
• Particularly useful when an objective 
approach to research is difficult as 
case research enables researchers to 
examine the phenomenon by 
interpreting the shared understanding of 
the relevant stakeholders (Klein and 
Myers 1999).   
Seeks to address “how” research 
questions 
• Well suited for addressing “how” and 
“why” research questions (Walsham 




More importantly, because realism differentiates between the domains of reality that can 
be observed (i.e. the empirical) and those that cannot (i.e. the actual) (Blaikie 1991), it 
implies that positivist methods can be used to access the observable (Madill et al. 2000), 
while interpretivist methods can be used to gain insights into the unobservable (Walsham 
2006). What this ultimately means is that although our philosophical position is 
motivated by our ontological beliefs, it does confer the benefit of being able to pick and 
choose from positivist and interpretivist case research methodologies to create a trans-
paradigmatic, best-of-breed approach to case research (Mingers 2004). In turn, we 
contend that our best-of-breed approach can potentially combine the strengths and 
mitigate the weaknesses of conventional positivist and interpretivist approaches to create 
advantages along four distinct dimensions (refer to Table 11). 
First, our approach combines the interpretivist emphasis on creativity with the positivist 
emphasis on knowledge accumulation to enable Accumulated Innovation by constraining 
creativity within a theoretical “scaffold” (Orlikowski 2006). Second, our research 
approach combines the focus of positivist approaches with the interpretivist emphasis on 
the contextual settings to generate Rich Points: Pointed conclusions that are substantiated 
with rich contextual evidence. Third, our approach marries the structure of positivist case 
research approaches with the pragmatism of interpretivist case research approaches to 
create a Pragmatic Structure that will enable a flexible but systematic approach to case 
research. Finally, our approach combines the interpretivist emphasis on unique 
circumstances and subjective meanings (Klein and Myers 1999) with the positivist 
emphasis on external validity (Yin 2003) for Theoretical Replicability (Tsang and Kwan 
1999), by seeking to generalize to, and extend theory with context-specific findings 
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(Baskerville et al. 2005). The description of our approach in the following sections will 
clarify how these advantages are realized. 
Table 11: Comparing our Research Approach with Conventional Positivist and 
Interpretivist Approaches 









reliance on prior 
theories (see Dube 











but emphasis on 
beginning with a clean 







(e.g. propositions) but 
the lack of attention 
on the contextual 
settings stifles the 
inherent richness of 
case research (e.g. 
Broadbent and Weill 
1993) 





Rich conclusions that 
account for the 
complexity of contextual 
settings but conclusions 
drawn tend to be less 
focused (e.g. Walsham 





but emphasis on 
reliability and validity 
(Yin 2003) creates 
prescriptions that may 







Practical but abstract 
nature of approach 
results in prescriptions 
that are difficult to 
evaluate or reproduce 
(Walsham 2006)2 
Generalizability Findings aim at 
external validity (Yin 
2003) but tend to be 
constrained by 








2003)  while 
seeking to extend 






(Klein and Myers 1999) 
tends to result in 
findings that are 
idiosyncratic and non-
generalizable  
1 e.g. Suddaby 2006Like a number of scholars before us ( ), we view Glaserian grounded theory as an 
interpretive process 





3.3 Overview of Research Method 
The best-of-breed case research method adopted for this thesis is termed the Structured-
Pragmatic-Situational (SPS) approach. This is for a number of reasons. First, the 
approach is structured in that it conceptually divides the process of conducting case 
research into a number of systematic steps that are specific, detailed and can be easily 
replicated. Second, the approach is pragmatic in that it is infused with techniques and 
workarounds to simplify and ensure the viability of its prescriptions that does not 
sacrifice the rigor required of an academic study. Third, the approach is situational in that 
it facilitates flexibility and adaptiveness by incorporating techniques that enable 
researchers to detect and respond to contingencies and the emergence of surprising case 
data.  
The SPS approach to case research consists of eight steps (refer to Figure 8) and begins 
with access negotiation. After access to an appropriate case organization is gained, the 
process enters what we term the ‘Framing Cycle’. The Framing Cycle begins with the 
gathering of background information on the case organization and the phenomenon of 
interest (Strauss and Corbin 1998), as well as a review of potentially relevant theories 
(Walsham 2006) so as to construct a mental concept of the phenomenon before the 
commencement of data collection. Based on this mental concept, an overview interview 
(e.g. Hallen and Eisenhardt 2008) is conducted to validate the researcher’s perspective of 
the phenomenon under study, and the initial data are organized and structured to facilitate 
a preliminary stage of theorizing. The result of this preliminary stage of theorizing is the 
construction of a theoretical lens using the constructs and propositions from an 
appropriate theory that is meant as a “sensitizing device” (Klein and Myers 1999) to 
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guide subsequent data collection and analysis. Based on the theoretical lens, the mental 
concept of the phenomenon is refined and more data are collected. The additional data are 
then iteratively used to extend the theoretical lens into a more extensive theoretical 
scaffold (Orlikowski 2006); which represents the initial, skeletal form of the eventual 
theoretical model, as the Framing Cycle continues until the state of what we term 
theoretical confidence is reached. Theoretical confidence is defined as the stage where the 
researcher is sufficiently confident that the theoretical scaffold, when fleshed out with the 
subsequent case data, is both an accurate representation of the empirical reality, and can 
make an adequate contribution to both theory and practice. 




Following the Framing Cycle, the process enters what we term the ‘Augmenting Cycle’. 
The Augmenting Cycle begins with the collection of additional data with the aim of 
obtaining corroborating evidence that transforms the previously constructed theoretical 
scaffold into a full-fledged theoretical model. The earlier data, as well as each piece of 
additional data, are then systematically coded, organized and examined using a number of 
strategies for qualitative data analysis (Langley 1999). The emergent model is then 
validated by ensuring that it is congruent with both the empirical data and the existing 
literature (Klein and Myers 1999). Following this, the emergent model is validated with 
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the informants (Neuman 2005) and additional data are collected and coded. This process 
of iterating between the emergent model, existing theories and data (Eisenhardt 1989) 
continues until the point of theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss 1967) is reached, 
where the inductively derived model can comprehensively account for the case data and 
no additional data can be collected and included to improve the derived model. Finally, 
following the Augmenting Cycle, the SPS approach concludes with the writing of the 
case report. The following stream of reporting will now discuss each step of the SPS 
approach in greater detail.  
3.3.1 Step 1: Access Negotiation 
The predominant school of thought with regards to the initiation of case research is that 
the researcher should begin by formulating a comprehensive research design (Yin 2003), 
or at the very least, decide on the research questions (Eisenhardt 1989). This is because 
by asking the questions of import to a specific literature, the chances of making a 
significant contribution to both theory and practice is usually higher (Walsham 2006). In 
our case, we had arrived at our research questions based on a comprehensive review of 
the literature on IT-enabled enterprise agility. The research questions, in turn, formed the 
basis for selecting our case organizations (Yin 2003). 
Based on our research questions, the case selection criteria for each of our case studies 
took the form of 2 general conditions. First, the case organization selected in each of the 
studies must have, of course, successfully developed the IT artifact (i.e. VC or DBE) or 
capability (i.e. Agility in IT Deployment) in question. Second, the IT artifact or capability 
should ideally have been effectively developed and leveraged for the respective forms of 
enterprise agility (i.e. customer, partnering and operational agility) repeatedly, or in a 
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variety of ways as this allows us to identify a wider range of possibilities for nurturing 
and leveraging the artifact or capability. In addition, an important benefit of studying how 
the focal IT artifact or capability is nurtured and leveraged in a number of different ways 
within a single organization is that the many contextual variables are kept constant, which 
helps to rule out possible alternative interpretations of the data. 
However, instead of screening and selecting out of “a score or so (20-30) of possible 
candidates” (Yin 2003) to find a case organization that best matches our case selection 
criteria, in the interest of pragmatism, our research began instead with an approach that is 
best characterized as “planned opportunism”(Pettigrew 1990). Planned opportunism 
means letting research interests, funding strategies and explicit opportunities for network 
building shape the long-term plan for case selection (i.e. delimiting a set of potential case 
types out of an infinite array of possibilities). But the decision to approach a specific 
organization is to be governed by shorter-term parameters that may include “forethought 
and intention, chance, opportunism, and environmental preparedness” (Pettigrew 1990) 
so that the selection of a specific site becomes an informed choice (with a higher 
likelihood of being granted access) based on resource and opportunity considerations.  
For all of our case studies, we began with a search for interesting cases that would 
satisfice by meeting our selection criteria. An interesting case could be that of an 
internationally-renowned organization (e.g. Tan et al. 2009), an extreme case (For a 
classic example, see Weick 1993), or a difficult to access phenomenon (e.g. Pan et al. 
2005). Searching for an interesting case is a more viable starting point because the means 
of gaining access to an organization that matches a predetermined research criteria 
perfectly almost always takes the form of unsolicited contact (Yin 2003), which carries a 
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high probability of rejection. In addition, another advantage of having an interesting case 
is that it is easier to generate interest. Siggelkow’s (2007) analogy of a talking pig 
supports this view. A talking pig may have little theoretical or practical relevance but if 
there was a case study of a talking pig, imagine the interest it will stir! He argues further 
that “it is much harder to make a paper interesting whose findings or conclusions only 
address theory. A paper should allow a reader to see the world, and not just the 
literature, in a new way” (Siggelkow 2007, p.23). As such, we believe that a case that is 
highly interesting (e.g. a case study of Google.com) tends to be more attractive to 
potential readers as compared to one that is not (e.g. a case study of XYZ.com – a 
pseudonym). 
After creating a shortlist of potential interesting cases, we examined the possibility of 
gaining access to each of the organizations. Based on our experience, the most effective 
means of gaining access is to seek the endorsement of an influential benefactor, who 
could be a friend, a family member, an alumnus, an executive student, or an invited 
speaker. In the case of HWZ, we were granted access by its founder and General 
Manager, who was an alumnus of the National University of Singapore. In the context of 
the second and third case studies where both case organizations were based outside of 
Singapore, we were helped by local collaborators with ready access. The case of HWZ; 
an e-business in the IT publications industry that sponsors the largest VC in Singapore, is 
particularly appropriate for addressing our first research question as its VC was used to 
facilitate a variety of business strategies that transformed HWZ from a humble e-
commerce startup to the dominant market leader within a short span of six years. On the 
other hand, the case of Alibaba.com, a B2B e-commerce portal that hosts one of the 
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largest, most diverse and vibrant DBEs in the world is well-suited for addressing our 
second research question as a variety of different means were used to facilitate the growth 
of its ecosystem and consequently, the attainment of partnering agility. Finally, the case 
of CCP, a large petrochemical firm in Taiwan with a storied history for agile IT 
deployment, is particularly appropriate for addressing our third research question as a 
variety of means were adopted to develop, renew and leverage its IT deployment 
capability for operational agility over time.   
The process of access negotiation, in itself, was relatively straightforward. Good social 
skills were important (Walsham 2006), but beyond that, we sought to define clearly the 
objectives of the case study, the resources required (in terms of the number of interviews 
and possible secondary sources of data), and to introduce the investigators that will be 
participating in data collection (Yin 2003) during the first access meeting. Although 
access was granted based on goodwill, we found it useful to offer to share our findings 
with all the case organizations as the act of reciprocity encourages them to grant us access 
to a wider range of informants and corporate materials. More importantly, we sought to 
identify an influential gatekeeper to assist with making the relevant introductions, refer 
informants that possess the required information, and scheduling the interviews. At 
HWZ, Alibaba and CCP the gatekeepers were the General Manager, the Vice-President 
of Research and Training, and the manager of the IT department respectively. Whenever 
possible, we also tried to schedule the interviews at the convenience of the informants so 
as to minimize disruptions to the informants’ routines. 
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3.3.2 Step 2: Conceptualizing the Phenomenon 
Once access has been gained, we began to turn our attention to preparing for data 
collection by developing a mental concept of the phenomenon. This was done at two 
levels. First, we turned to “non-technical literature” (Strauss and Corbin 1998) such as 
mass-market books, biographies, letters, newspapers, electronic articles, or even the oft-
vilified Wikipedia, to gather important background information about both the focal 
organization and the phenomenon under study. The information gleaned from these 
sources helped to enhance our sensitivity towards the unique aspects and pertinent issues 
of the phenomenon or organization under study, provided us with an idea of what to 
expect during data collection, and served as the basis for formulating the questions for the 
initial interviews (Darke et al. 1998). Our efforts at gathering background information 
about the organization and the phenomenon were fairly extensive prior to data collection. 
This is because the information provided us with an early opportunity to verify or modify 
our preconceptions of both the case and the phenomenon. Moreover, as case researchers 
may often find while in the field that the phenomenon of interest is not what they 
imagined it to be (Meyer 2001), the information would enable us to switch to a new 
research topic immediately if contingencies arise (Eisenhardt 1989) so that the 
opportunity for access will not be put to waste. 
Second, based on the insights gained on the organizational context and the phenomenon 
of interest, we began to “read widely on different theories” (Walsham 2006) so as to 
identify a number of candidate theories whose constructs and propositions are pertinent to 
the issues and aspects of the phenomenon under study. While there is some controversy 
with regards to the conduct of a review of prior theories before data collection (Halaweh 
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et al. 2008), like a number of other qualitative researchers, we are of the view that the 
ideal of a clean theoretical slate (Glaser and Strauss 1967) is impossible (Eisenhardt 
1989). We believe that the human mind is flexible and independent enough to read about 
theories without being trapped in them (Walsham 1995), and more importantly, 
familiarity with theories can enhance the researcher’s “sensitivity towards subtle nuances 
in data” (Strauss and Corbin 1998) and serve as “a complicated sensing device to 
register a complicated set of events” (Weick 2007) that a case study invariably is. 
Nevertheless, over the course of the study, we were constantly reflecting and evaluating if 
our theoretical preconceptions were leading us to conjure (Strauss and Corbin 1998), or 
inhibit the acceptance of emergent data (Walsham 1995). A rule of thumb that we 
adhered strictly to is that if the emergent theoretical model feels detached from reality, or 
if the process of theory building feels ‘forced’ at any time, we would take pause from 
theory development and validate the emergent theoretical model with our gatekeeper and 
the relevant informants (Klein and Myers 1999).   
In all of our case studies, after access was negotiated, we began preparing for data 
collection by gathering secondary data that would provide us with background 
information on each organization. The sources of secondary data include a number of 
Internet and newspaper articles, as well as internal publications provided by our 
gatekeepers. At both Alibaba and CCP, the secondary materials also included a number 
of teaching cases that were predominantly written in Chinese, and books documenting the 
strategies and IT initiatives of the organizations. There were plenty of these books 
available on the mass market for Alibaba in particular as the organization is one of the 
largest and most successful B2B portals in the world, as well as the source of much 
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national pride. Based on the secondary data, we were able to construct a chronological 
timeline of the key business initiatives launched by the case organizations over the years, 
which led to a number of key insights.  
At HWZ, we realized that its VC was leveraged for organizational value creation in an 
increasing variety of ways over time. Before the dotcom crisis (1998-1999), its VC was 
instrumental in helping HWZ identify and occupy an attractive competitive position 
despite market saturation. During and in the immediate aftermath of the dotcom crisis 
(2000-2004), its VC enabled HWZ to defend its competitive position from imitation and 
rapidly develop a series of innovations that were in line with its members’ needs. After 
the dotcom crisis (2005-2008), its VC was not only crucial to helping the organization 
identify and capture attractive competitive positions in a number of new markets, and 
shaping the content and features of its new offerings, but the VC was leveraged as a 
strategic resource to generate awareness and demand for their new offerings as well. 
Accordingly, we began to review the literatures on competitive strategy (e.g. Porter 
1980), the resource-based theory (e.g. Helfat 2003), social capital (e.g. Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal 1998), and organizational innovation (e.g. Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan 
1998).    
At Alibaba, we realized that the strategic objectives of the organization were distinct 
across three temporal phases. In the first phase (1999-2004), its strategies appeared to be 
centered on leveraging firm-specific capabilities and its intimate knowledge of the 
Chinese Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) market. In the second phase (2005-2006), 
its strategies appeared to be focused on relentless innovation and capability development. 
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Finally, in the third phase (2007-2009), its strategies appeared to be centered on 
developing the capabilities of the members of its trading platform. 
This insight, in turn, led to the review of a number of different literatures. As the 
strategies of the first phase appeared to echo the prescriptions of the Resource-Based 
View (RBV) of the firm (Barney 1991) and the Dynamic Capabilities Approach (Teece et 
al. 1997), we reviewed the literature on those theories. Similarly, we found traces of the 
prescriptions of the theories on Hypercompetition (D'Aveni 1994) and IT-enabled 
enterprise agility (Sambamurthy et al. 2003) in phase 2, and those of the Complexity 
theory (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997) and the literature on Business Ecosystems (Iansiti 
and Levien 2004a) in phase 3. Consequently, our attention was directed to the relevant 
literatures accordingly.  
At CCP, we realized that the organization’s agility in IT deployment stemmed from its 
ability to recombine its existing resources and capabilities rapidly with resources and 
capabilities acquired from the external environment. This ability in turn, was manifested 
repeatedly across three major phases of systems implementation over a nine year 
timeframe. Accordingly, we began to review the literatures on resource management (e.g. 
Sirmon et al. 2007), absorptive capacity (e.g. Zahra and George 2002), combinative 
capabilities (e.g. van den Bosch et al. 1999), and organizational improvisation (e.g. Miner 
et al. 2001).    
While not all of the reviewed theories were useful in the end, by the end of this step, we 
had a clear mental concept of the phenomenon under study at each organization, we were 
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keenly aware of the potential theoretical constructs and propositions of interest, and we 
were ready to begin data collection. 
3.3.3 Step 3: Collecting and Organizing the Initial Data 
Interviews typically form the primary source of data for case research because they 
provide the case researcher, who is external to the organization, with access to the views 
and interpretations of the informants (Walsham 1995). However, in each of the case 
studies conducted as part of this thesis, the focus of the initial interviews and that of the 
latter interviews were very different. The first interview, in particular, was conducted 
with an informant who could provide an overview of the phenomenon under study. This 
allowed us to validate and, if necessary, modify our mental concept of the phenomenon at 
the earliest available opportunity.  
While the first informant did not need to have detailed knowledge of all aspects of the 
phenomenon under study, we sought an informant with a good idea of who we could 
interview subsequently to obtain the required pieces of information. Subsequent 
informants were then identified through this form of “snowball” or “chain referral” 
sampling (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981). We would like to make the point here that 
snowball sampling is probably the only feasible means of identifying informants in case 
research because a case researcher rarely has enough inside information to identify the 
right informants independently. However, as the informants were not selected 
objectively, we had to be sensitive to “possible ‘biases’ and systematic ‘distortions’” 
(Klein and Myers 1999) in the accounts provided by the informants. 
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Immediately after the initial interview, we would turn our attention to organizing the data 
so as to prepare for subsequent analyses and theory building in each of the case studies. 
Our strategy for organizing our data was dependent on the ‘general shape’ of the data 
collected. At HWZ and Alibaba, the data appeared to be anchored on a process that was 
evolutionary in nature (i.e. the transformation of the means of nurturing and leveraging a 
VC or a DBE over time). As such, we adopted a temporal bracketing strategy to 
conceptually distinguish between the various phases of evolution, and a visual mapping 
strategy (For a review, refer to Langley 1999) to construct a chronological timeline of the 
key events, activities and decisions that transpired at the focal organization with regards 
to the phenomenon of interest (For an illustration of the visual mapping strategy, see Pan 
et al. 2009). The timeline served to clarify the delineation between the different 
evolutionary phases and provide a clear overall picture of the evolutionary process under 
study. This was especially useful in the case of Alibaba where multiple investigators were 
involved, and made it easier for us to clarify our interpretation of what happened with the 
study’s informants (Klein and Myers 1999). 
On the other hand, the data appeared to be centered on the repeated enactment of the 
same organizational capability over time at CCP. Consequently, we organized the data 
from this case study through “open coding” (Strauss and Corbin 1998) in which the data 
were broken down into conceptual categories (Walsham 2006). The pieces of categorized 
data were then examined, compared for similarities and differences, and organized into 
the themes (For a review, refer to Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
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3.3.4 Step 4: Constructing and Extending the Theoretical Lens  
Following the initial collection and organization of data in each of the case studies, we 
were ready to embark on a preliminary stage of theory building. Although we could have 
waited to collect more data so that we would have more empirical materials to work with, 
commencing the process of theory building at this early stage was a conscious decision as 
we wanted to take full advantage of the flexibility that the case research method affords 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
Theory building begins with the selection of an appropriate guiding theory (Walsham 
1995). While the choice of theory is a subjective one, we tried to choose one that is at the 
appropriate level of analysis (Yin 2003), insightful (Walsham 2006), and whose concepts 
and propositions represent a close fit with the empirical reality (Eisenhardt 1989). From a 
pragmatic standpoint, we also tried to avoid theories that are (1) dated, as it may be 
perceived to be no longer relevant, (2) immature, as the theory will not provide a strong 
theoretical foundation for building new theories, (3) overused, as it makes it difficult to 
justify a contribution, or (4) overly practitioner-oriented, as it may be difficult to translate 
to the academic vernacular.  
After a guiding theory was selected, the next step consisted of breaking down the selected 
theory into its component constructs and propositions to create a set of categories. This 
set of categories formed the theoretical lens, which would subsequently be used to guide 
latter iterations of data collection and analysis (Klein and Myers 1999). A theoretical lens 
may be thought of as an incomplete data table. To illustrate using a simplified example, if 
we select the RBV (Barney 1991) as our guiding theory, then based on its fundamental 
proposition that firm-specific resources and capabilities lead to the attainment of 
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competitive advantage, the proposition itself, as well as the component constructs ‘firm-
specific capabilities’ and ‘competitive advantage’, will form the categories of our 
theoretical lens (refer to Table 12). The constructed theoretical lens can then be used to 
guide the next iteration of the Framing Cycle: The identified categories can be used to 
indicate theoretical constructs and propositions of interest to refine our mental concept of 
the phenomenon (Step 2), and used as the basis for formulating the questions for 
subsequent interviews (Strauss and Corbin 1998). It could also be used to organize our 
data (Step 3), which, to reuse our earlier example, is akin to filling out the incomplete 
table with empirical evidence that substantiates the conceptual categories (refer to Table 
12).   
Table 12: Example of a Theoretical Lens Constructed from the RBV 
Category Corroborating Evidence 
1. Firm-specific capabilities  
2. Competitive advantage  
3. Firm-specific capabilities 




However, it is insufficient to simply complete the table or the study will be reduced to an 
explanatory case study that validates the original propositions of the selected theory (Yin 
2003). Instead, when surprising data that cannot easily fit within the existing schema 
emerge as they invariably do (Weick 2007), we would extend the theoretical lens by 
including new categories in the form of new constructs, propositions, or contingent 
conditions. When this happens, the set of categories is no longer a static, theory-bound 
‘lens’ through which a phenomenon is viewed, but a dynamic, generative “scaffold” 
(Orlikowski 2006) that can be used to support the construction of new theories.  
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In the HWZ case study, our initial theoretical lens was constructed by infusing 
Sambamurthy et al.’s framework on IT-enabled enterprise agility (Sambamurthy et al. 
2003) with key concepts and propositions from the existing VC literature (refer to Figure 
6). Accordingly, we identified an initial set of themes (i.e. VC competence, VC-enabled 
digital options, customer agility, rapid and effective innovations) and subthemes (e.g. 
managing content, fostering embeddedness and enhancing interactivity for the VC 
competence theme) that were potentially significant to the development and leverage of 
VCs for customer agility. The data obtained from each interview was then organized and 
coded according to the set of themes (e.g. refer to Tables 14, 15 and 16). More 
specifically, we focused our attention on data related to the measures undertaken by 
HWZ to nurture its VC (i.e. VC competence), the state of HWZ’s VC and the VC-
enabled capabilities developed after the measures have been implemented (i.e. VC-
enabled digital options), as well as how HWZ’s VC was leveraged in support of its 
strategic objectives (i.e. customer agility, rapid and effective innovations). However, as 
findings that challenged the existing schema emerged, we began to modify the initial set 
of themes incrementally. More specifically, our findings suggested that different VC 
competencies may drive the development of various VC-enabled digital options along 
different stages of VC maturity. And as the VC becomes increasingly mature, the number 
of ways in which it can be leveraged for organizational value creation increases. 
Consequently, we began to incorporate themes based on the different strategic logics 
(refer to Table 8) into our emergent process model accordingly (refer to Figure 9). 
In the Alibaba case study, our initial theoretical lens was developed based on the 
literature on business ecosystems (e.g. Pierce 2009). Accordingly, an initial set of themes 
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(i.e. core firm strategies, ecosystem role, nature of ecosystem development, consequences 
of ecosystem development) and subthemes (e.g. capability logic, guerrilla logic and 
complexity logic for the core firm strategies theme) that were potentially pertinent to the 
development and leverage of DBEs for partnering agility were identified, and the data 
obtained from each interview was once again organized and coded according to the set of 
themes (e.g. refer to Tables 17, 18 and 19). However, as findings emerged to suggest that 
different combinations of core firm strategies and ecosystem roles were producing 
different developmental outcomes for the focal DBE in three distinct temporal phases, 
our themes were gradually reorganized according to the different phases accordingly 
(refer to Figure 10). 
In the CCP case study, our initial theoretical lens was constructed based on the literature 
on organizational improvisation (e.g. Vera and Crossan 2005), which consisted of a 
number of themes (i.e. developing the means for improvisation, detecting improvisational 
triggers, iterative cycles of planning and execution, deriving improvisational outcomes) 
and subthemes (i.e. social structure, technical structure, and motivation to improvise for 
the developing minimal infrastructures theme) that were potentially important to the 
development and leverage of the capability for agile IT deployment for operational 
agility. Once again, we organized and coded the data obtained from each interview 
according to the schema provided by our theoretical lens (e.g. refer to Tables 20, 21, and 
22), and as novel subthemes began to emerge, they were incorporated into the emergent 
process model accordingly (refer to Figure 11). 
In all of our case studies, with successive iterations of the Framing Cycle, each 
theoretical scaffold was incrementally extended until the point of theoretical confidence 
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is reached. Theoretical confidence means that the theoretical scaffold has adequately 
captured the essence of the phenomenon under study (i.e. the included constructs and 
propositions provide an adequate depiction of the empirical reality). This was ascertained 
by sketching the constructs and propositions of the theoretical scaffold diagrammatically, 
and validating the diagram with the relevant informants within each case organization 
(Neuman 2005). More importantly, we also had to be confident of the contributions of 
our eventual theoretical model when the scaffold is fully fleshed out. While it is difficult 
to specify a set of objective evaluation criteria for the contributions of a study, we 
evaluated the potential contributions of each study on the basis of three questions. First, 
‘What is my contribution to the literature on the phenomenon?’ Second, ‘What is my 
contribution to the literature from which I derived my theoretical lens?’ And finally, 
‘How can a practitioner benefit from the reading of my work?’ When we were able to 
find satisfactory answers to each of these questions, we were ready to enter the 
Augmenting Cycle of our SPS approach. 
3.3.5 Step 5: Confirming and Validating Data 
With a structure provided by a validated theoretical scaffold in place, the first step of the 
Augmenting Cycle of our SPS approach is a relatively straightforward one. At this point, 
if the conditions of theoretical confidence have been aptly met, it would be reasonable to 
expect no further radical changes to the set of categories that comprise the theoretical 
scaffold, and the focus of data collection can turn to (1) gathering the evidence to 
transform the theoretical scaffold into a full-fledged model, and (2) ensuring the validity 
of the data collected. 
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For the first objective, we had to ensure that there is sufficient data.  Although sufficiency 
is most commonly associated with the point of theoretical saturation in many accounts of 
the case research method (e.g. Eisenhardt 1989; Glaser and Strauss 1967), we would like 
to add two important caveats. First, although there are no fixed prescriptions for the 
number of interviews to be conducted for a case study (Patton 2003), it is generally 
difficult to claim that the state of theoretical saturation has been reached when the 
number of interviews conducted is very small. The same can be said for the number of 
unique informants. Although the appropriate number of interviews or unique informants 
for a case study depends on a number of factors; such as the size of the organization, the 
phenomenon of interest, as well as the scope and timeframe of the study, we aimed for a 
minimum of 15 interviews, with minimal repeat informants, in each of our case studies to 
ensure the representation of “a variety of voices” (Myers and Newman 2007). Second, 
besides having an adequate number of interviews or unique informants, we also tried to 
ensure that the interview data to be included in the eventual case report does not come 
from only a small subset of the informants. This is because while certain informants may 
be particularly informative or effusive, having ‘dominant voices’ in a case report may 
expose a case study to criticisms of biased reporting. Accordingly, the number of 
interviews conducted at the HWZ, Alibaba, and CCP were 24, 28 and 32 respectively 
(refer to Appendices A-C).  
For the second objective, we tried to ensure the completeness and accuracy of our data by 
adopting a mirroring technique (refer to Myers and Newman 2007) to elicit the 
informant’s “story” in their own language. This involves inviting informants to explain 
the daily aspects of their work before getting them to provide a retrospective account of 
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the events (relevant to our topic of interest) that have unfolded. The questions asked were 
open-ended, exploratory in nature, and tailored to the role of the person interviewed (For 
a sample, refer to Appendices A-C). Each question was designed to be non-leading, yet at 
the same time non-passive to maintain a balance that allows for both control of the 
interview and spontaneity (Walsham 1995). All of our face-to-face interviews, which 
took an average of 90 minutes, were digitally recorded and later transcribed for data 
analysis. Where face-to-face interviews were not possible due to the geographical 
distribution of our informants, interviews were conducted via electronic means (e.g. 
email or instant messaging). Of the interviews conducted at HWZ and Alibaba, 6 and 10 
of the interviews were electronically conducted respectively. The email responses and 
instant messaging logs would be collated after the interview, then coded and textually 
analyzed in the same way as the transcripts produced from the face-to-face interviews.  
In addition, we applied the principles of suspicion and multiple interpretations (see Klein 
and Myers 1999) to ensure the validity of the data collected. For instance, we tried to 
ensure that every piece of evidence that we intend to use in the construction of the case 
study is triangulated by at least two sources of data (Yin 2003). However, if the 
conflicting interpretations of the same phenomenon can all be corroborated by additional 
sources, we had to look for an additional data source that can objectively mediate 
between the conflicting accounts. For example, during our interviews in the HWZ case 
study, the informants from within the organization and those from its competitors 
provided two conflicting pictures of HWZ’s strategies and performance. Naturally, the 
first group was inclined towards a more positive view while the second group was 
inclined towards a more negative view. To resolve the conflict, we conducted interviews 
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with an informant who was working for an advertising firm and were familiar with the 
happenings within the IT publications industry. We perceived the information from this 
to be objective as it stemmed from a neutral source external to the industry in question 
with no vested interests in supporting either of the conflicting views. This enabled us to 
make an informed choice about the data we wanted to include (Klein and Myers 1999). 
3.3.6 Step 6: Selective Coding 
A theoretical scaffold is transformed into a qualified theoretical model when all of its 
conceptual categories are corroborated and integrated with the case data in a process that 
some term “selective coding” (Strauss and Corbin 1998). In simpler terms, if one was to 
imagine a theoretical scaffold as an extended, but still incomplete data table (e.g. an 
extended Table 12 with new constructs and propositions as additional categories ), then 
selective coding can be understood as the process of filling in the table with at least two 
sources of data (Yin 2003) for every category. While the existing prescriptions for 
selective coding and the inductive derivation of theories in the literature may range from 
the scientific (e.g. Miles and Huberman 1994) to the artistic (e.g. Walsham 2006), in our 
case studies, we adopted a “middle-of-the-road” approach that combines the structure of 
the scientific approaches with the elegant simplicity of the artistic ones.  
To begin the process of selective coding, we would first adopt a narrative strategy 
(Langley 1999). Typically, at this point in time, a sizeable amount of data would have 
already been collected, and the purpose of the narrative strategy is to condense the 
voluminous amount of primary and secondary data to a more manageable form so as to 
avoid “death by data asphyxiation” (Pettigrew 1990). The essence of the strategy is to 
summarize the data collected in the form of a story, but a notable difference between our 
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approach and the approach advocated by Langley (1999) is that our approach involves a 
progressive form of story development, with new pieces of information incorporated into 
the narrative incrementally with each iteration of the Augmenting Cycle. The purpose of 
the narrative strategy is to help the researcher visualize the order of events that unfolded, 
as well as to clarify the association between decisions made, activities carried out, and 
their consequences. Moreover, assuming that the narrative is written well, the entire 
narrative can be efficiently ported to the eventual case report (as ‘case description’) with 
minor changes.  
Next, we would also supplement the narrative with plenty of data summary devices like 
tables and diagrams that are filled with quotes from the interviews conducted (e.g. refer 
to Tables 14-22). These data summary devices bring about a number of important 
advantages. First, by capturing the key constructs and propositions of the theoretical 
scaffold of the study, the devices can serve as a means of organizing thought, even if they 
are not included in the eventual case report (Pratt 2009). Second, by providing indications 
on which sections of the scaffold require more data (e.g. with empty data columns), the 
devices can provide a guide for subsequent data collection. Finally, as compared to the 
conventional method of presenting interview data in a separate, indented paragraph (e.g. 
Pan and Leidner 2003), these summary devices provide the means of displaying the 
supporting evidence concisely, which allows us to present more empirical data within a 
limited space. With each iteration of selective coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998), the 
scaffolds move one step closer to becoming full-fledged theoretical models. But with 
each step of theoretical development, there is a need to ensure theory-data-model 
alignment (Klein and Myers 1999), which forms the next step of our SPS approach. 
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3.3.7 Step 7: Ensuring Theory-Data-Model Alignment 
After selective coding, we checked the new developments in the emergent models of our 
case studies for theory-data-model alignment before embarking on the next iteration of 
the Augmenting Cycle so that we could adapt our subsequent data collection strategy 
accordingly. As its name suggests, the process of ensuring theory-data-model alignment 
involves recursively iterating between existing theories, data, and the emergent model 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) to ensure that the three dimensions are aligned. In other 
words, theory-data-model alignment can be conceived to consist of three types of 
alignment; (1) theory-data alignment, (2) data-model alignment, and (3) theory-model 
alignment. Ensuring each of the three types of alignment confers the attributes of 
simplicity, accuracy and generality to the emergent model respectively. These are 
attributes that characterize an ideal theory (Sutton and Staw 1995; Weick 1979), and we 
will explain how each of the three types of alignment brings about the corresponding 
attribute in turn. 
The essence of theory-data alignment is best captured by the question ‘Can the case data 
be explained by existing theories?’ Given that any theory is inevitably a simplification of 
a complex reality (Pettigrew 1990; Weick 2007), the purpose of ensuring theory-data 
alignment is to find a succinct and elegant theoretical explanation for the case data that 
helps in “preventing the observer from being dazzled by the full-blown complexity of 
natural or concrete events." (Hall et al. 1998). To achieve this, we sought to constantly 
compare the emergent data with the competing explanations for the data that are 
proffered by alternative theories (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) and, assuming 
equivalent validity, pick the most pointed explanation. This is important because 
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constructing a model with parsimonious theoretical arguments has positive implications 
for its overall comprehensibility (Bacharach 1989) and, from a practical perspective, 
enhance the probability that it will be picked up, used and cited in future research. 
On the other hand, data-model alignment is best represented by the question ‘Does the 
data support the emergent model?’ Since an inductively derived model is invariably a 
product of the researcher’s mind (Walsham 2006), the objective of data-model alignment 
is to ensure that the constructed model is an accurate depiction of empirical reality, which 
is of course, the basic aim of theory building (Eisenhardt 1989). To check for data-model 
alignment, we used the data summary devices described in the Step 6 to conduct a ‘test of 
inclusion’; by ensuring that the interview data to be included in the case study 
corroborate the constructs and propositions of the emergent model. In addition, we re-
examined the data that have been left out from the case study in a ‘test of exclusion’; by 
ensuring that the data that have been excluded does not contradict or extend the 
fundamental arguments of the emergent model.  
Finally, the concept of theory-model alignment may be rendered as the question ‘Do 
existing theories support the emergent model?’ Given that a theory must be generalizable 
in order to be useful, and that statistical generalization is impossible from case studies, 
the alignment between the emergent model and the existing theories in the literature is 
crucial as it provides a different means of establishing generality (Lee and Baskerville 
2003). In particular, if the emergent model, which is essentially a stylized representation 
of the empirical reality, resonates with previously developed theories, then generality 
may be claimed on the basis of the logic of replication (see Yin 2003). To ensure theory-
model alignment, we sought to systematically decompose the emergent model into a set 
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of propositions and tried to explain each of the propositions based on the theoretical 
arguments of prior theories. In order to claim to have generalized from the emergent 
model to theory (Walsham 1995), we tried to ensure that there were theoretical 
explanations for all of the propositions of the emergent model, even for the most 
surprising findings. 
After the developments in the emergent model for the present iteration of the Augmenting 
Cycle have been validated for theory-data-model alignment, we had to decide if the point 
of theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt 1989) and data sufficiency (refer to Step 5) had been 
reached. Theoretical saturation and data sufficiency is indicated by significant overlaps in 
the data collected and difficulties in extending the emergent model in a meaningful way 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998). When these indications arise in the course of our case studies, 
we would exit the Augmenting Cycle and move on to the final step of conducting case 
research: the writing of the case report. 
3.3.8 Step 8: Writing the Case Report 
In the writing of this thesis, our objective was to present our theoretical arguments in the 
most coherent and convincing way possible. This of course, necessitated the 
demonstration of a clear chain of logic (Klein and Myers 1999), and the ability to express 
oneself clearly.  
To establish a clear chain of logic, we adopted a highly structured approach to reporting 
our research. This is because a structured approach to writing helps to (1) ensure that 
nothing important is left out, (2) strengthen the linkages between the various sections of 
the thesis, and (3) enhance the efficiency of writing. Although a number of structures for 
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writing case research has been described in the literature (For a review, see van de Blonk 
2003), we adopted the “linear-analytic” (Yin 2003) structure. This is because the linear-
analytic structure is not only appropriate for our research purpose, but it is also the most 
commonly used. Hence, it represents the least controversial option, and there are also 
plenty of examples in the literature that can serve as references for us. The linear analytic 
structure consists of six standard sections (Yin 2003): (1) Introduction, (2) Literature 
Review, (3) Research Methodology, (4) Case Description, (5) Discussion, and  (6) 
Conclusion. Although minor variations exist, a number of components are generally 
expected in each of the standard sections and we have included them accordingly in this 
thesis. These components are listed in the following table (refer to Table 13). 
While the ability for expressing oneself clearly is often associated with language 
proficiency, we also tried to enhance our clarity of expression through the liberal use of 
organizing tables and diagrams. Organizing tables and diagrams may be used in all the 
sections of a case research paper and can serve to depict methodological procedures, 
display a chain of evidence, illustrate complex analyses, summarize findings, or explain 
the process of inductive derivation (Pratt 2009). More importantly, the use of these 
devices carries two additional advantages. First, it reduces the burden of language as 
there is no need for elegant and flowing prose. Second, it captures the essential 
information succinctly, such that potential readers do not have to pore over every line and 





Table 13: The Six Standard Sections of a Typical Case Report 
Section Key Components 
1. Introduction • Background of phenomenon  
• Gaps in the literature (i.e. what has not been studied) 
• Explanation for why studying the gaps is important (e.g. benefits of 
addressing gaps, risks of not addressing gaps) 
• Description of the purpose of the study (e.g. addressing the 
aforementioned gaps) 
• Formal statement of research questions (The research questions 
should correspond to the purpose of the study) 
2. Literature 
Review 
• Review of the literature on the phenomenon (This section should 
begin with a broad overview (e.g. definition of key terms) before 
gradually narrowing the focus to the specific phenomenon of interest) 
• Review of the literature on the adopted theoretical lens ( i.e. we begin 
by explaining how our theoretical lenses can help us understand our 




• Justification for using case research method (e.g. especially 
appropriate for examining complex phenomena (Klein and Myers 
1999) and addressing ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Walsham 1995)) 
• Case selection criteria (i.e. theoretical justification for choosing the 
focal case organization) 
• Details of data collection (e.g. sources of data, number of interviews, 
format of interviews etc.) 
• Details of data analysis (e.g. Organization of data, procedures adopted 
in the inductive derivation of the model etc.) 
4. Case 
Description 
• Organizational Background 
• Account of the key events, decisions and activities that transpired at 
the focal case organization (This may be arranged in temporal phases 
if the phenomenon of interest involves the dimension of temporality) 
• Presentation of primary and secondary data (Data summary devices 
such as tables and diagrams may be especially useful for presenting 
large amounts of data within a limited space (Pratt 2009)) 
5. Discussion • Description of how the developed model(s) was inductively derived 
from the data 
• Explanation of how existing theories corroborate the derived model(s)  
• Explanation of how the derived model(s) extends or differs from the 
adopted theoretical lens  
6. Conclusion • Limitations of the study (e.g. Generalizing from case data, use of 
retrospective data) and suggestions for future research (that addresses 
the identified limitations) 
• Theoretical and practical contributions of the study (Describe the 
contributions of the study to (1) the literature on the phenomenon, (2) 




CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTION OF CASES 
4.1 Hardwarezone.com 
4.1.1 Organizational Background 
According to a Nielsens/Netratings survey conducted in 2006, HWZ is the most popular 
technology website in Singapore with an average of 330,000 unique browsers per month 
(refer to Appendix D). Although the business of HWZ is primarily centered on providing 
news and information about the latest IT products, HWZ also provides numerous 
member-centric services such as consolidated price lists of the major IT vendors in 
Singapore, a classified ads directory to facilitate the trading of IT products online, and an 
online discussion forum that serves as the basis for its VC. Incidentally, the online 
classifieds directory and the VC organized by HWZ were also ranked top of their 
respective categories in the same survey, attracting approximately 165,000 and 200,000 
unique visitors per month respectively. 
HWZ began as a mere hobby for its founders on a US$650 budget. Yet, within six years 
of its inception, HWZ attained market leadership in the Singaporean IT publications 
industry, capturing 29.7 % of the market share in 2004. In comparison, HWZ’s closest 
competitor in the industry only had a 9.9% market share. Since then, HWZ has 
maintained its firm grip of the industry, winning 17 awards from online traffic tracking 
agency Hitwise as the top website in the “Computers and Internet – Hardware”, “News 
and Media – IT media” and “Computers and Internet - Social Networking and Forums” 
categories to date. More recently, HWZ was named the third most popular website in 
Singapore and the sixth most popular online media site in Asia, outperforming immensely 
popular sites such as MSN, Friendster, CNET, Bloomberg and Yahoo. HWZ’s 
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achievements are considerable given that Singapore; with its small domestic market, 
presents an environment where e-commerce success tends to be the exception rather than 
norm. The unprecedented success of HWZ prompted the most widely circulated business 
newspaper in Singapore to compare its two founders with the two founders of Google, 
heralding HWZ’s founders as “Singapore’s very own Google Guys”. 
The initial manifestation of HWZ was a virtual community of interest (COI) hosted under 
the umbrella of SingaporeOne, a public initiative aimed at promoting e-commerce in 
Singapore. The COI catered primarily to the needs of a niche community of CPU 
overclockers, allowing members to post their hardware configurations and overclocking 
results in an online discussion forum. Although the CPU overclockers community was 
relatively small, the COI generated such heavy web traffic that it overwhelmed 
SingaporeOne by taking up 90% of the parent site’s total bandwidth within a month of its 
inception. Unable to cope with the traffic that the COI was generating, the management 
of SingaporeOne had no choice but to dissolve the community.  
Endorsed by the management of SingaporeOne, the founders of HWZ applied for and 
were eventually awarded a US$13,000 grant by the Infocomm Development Authority of 
Singapore; a public agency whose mission is to promote and develop the IT industry in 
Singapore. With this grant, HWZ was founded on August 9, 1998 in a small factory space 
measuring four by six meters, running on office equipment contributed by friends and 
family members. At this point in time, HWZ was running on empty; the initial capital 
was only sufficient for one web server and six months of bandwidth charges. 
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4.1.2 Developing a Unique Value Proposition (Late 1998 – Late 1999) 
In the initial phase, HWZ’s efforts in nurturing its VC were centered on generating 
proprietary content to make up for the lack of breadth and depth in member-contributed 
content, and enhancing the responsiveness and extent of interactions in their discussion 
forum by responding to new posts in the timeliest fashion possible. These measures led to 
the attraction and retention of a core group of members that consisted of the IT 
enthusiasts from the previous COI that they organized. Yet, although the VC was limited 
in size at this stage, the VC was able to serve as a platform for HWZ to interact with its 
members. For HWZ, this platform provided the means for organizational value creation 
that was crucial for their fledgling business.  
At the point of HWZ’s market entry, the Singapore IT publications industry was in a state 
of market saturation. Yet, feedback from members of its nascent VC made the founders 
of HWZ realize that there was an unmet need in the IT publications industry for a 
comprehensive and credible provider of free, localized IT content. Based on this 
revelation, HWZ moved quickly to exploit the opportunity by catering to the unmet need. 
A positioning strategy; with an emphasis on establishing a unique value proposition, was 
employed by HWZ during this period. An overview of the measures undertaken by HWZ 
to nurture its VC, the state of HWZ’s VC, the VC-enabled capabilities developed, and the 
way in which HWZ’s VC was leveraged to support its strategic objectives at the point of 




Table 14: The Development and Leverage of HWZ’s VC from Late 1998 to Late 
1999 
Measures undertaken by HWZ to nurture its VC 
Managing 
content 
“When (HWZs VC) first started, the quality of the (member contributed) 
content was a problem…There was not much (content) to begin with… 
and (the content) was lacking in depth and breadth… I would say that 
most of the product reviews, news and articles came from (HWZ’s 
founders) at the time” –Pioneering HWZ member A 
Enhancing 
interactivity 
“We were trying to make our forum very responsive… and increase the 
amount of interactions going on… so we were on the forum all the time… 
you could see that whenever someone posted something, within 20 
minutes, one of us (HWZ’s founders) would reply” – HWZ Co-Founder  




“In the beginning, we didn’t have many members… it was mainly them 
(HWZ’s founders) and the group of hardcore “techies” who came over 
from the previous (COI)” – Pioneering HWZ member A 







“ I joined (HWZ’s VC) because I can chat with people there who shared 
the same interests as me…” – Pioneering HWZ Member B 
 
“The community was an important source of feedback for us… By 
looking at what they (VC members) were talking about, we were able to 
get a feel of what they wanted” – HWZ Senior Executive 










“The market was very stable… (and) saturated at the time of (HWZ’s) 
entry… There were your traditional offline (printed) magazines (e.g. 
Chip, PC World, PC Magazine)… there were some local printed 
(magazines) like Singapore Computer Magazine and Tech… In terms of 
online (publications), there were foreign IT websites like Tom’s 
Hardware and SharkyExtreme… there was also a local website called 
Hardwareone” – IT Publications Industry Insider 
 
“Based on the feedback we were getting (from the VC members), we 
realized that the foreign publications do not meet their needs because the 
content is not meant for the local audience. For example, the products 
reviewed in these publications are often unavailable locally, the prices 
may be outdated or listed in US dollars. And the main problem with the 
local IT publications is that although their contents are localized, they 
are usually not comprehensive because they lacked funding, which comes 
with credibility and market reach.” – HWZ Co-Founder  
 
“By not charging a subscription fee for our content, we had a cost 
advantage as compared to printed IT magazines (which can cost up to 
US$11.00 in Singapore)… We tried to provide a comprehensive coverage 
of the local IT scene…we established our own labs to generate 
proprietary content…  We wanted to be perceived to be more credible 
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than the local IT websites, and produce high quality content that are 
comparable to our foreign counterparts... (Yet,) we used local lingoes… 
we only covered the IT products available in the local market… this made 
us more relevant and attuned to the taste of the local market as compared 
to the  foreign IT publications…”  - HWZ Senior Executive 
 
The unique value proposition established by HWZ allowed the organization to transform 
itself into an immensely popular technology website that provided the latest reviews, 
pricing and availability information of IT products in Singapore. By the end of 1999, 
HWZ was attracting a webpage impression count of over 16 million per month while 
online advertising revenue had reached US$200,000 per annum. Yet, although HWZ had 
been a resounding success up to this point in time, new challenges were about to emerge. 
4.1.3 Creating New Revenue Streams (Early 2000 – Late 2004) 
As HWZ’s VC began to grow (official membership for their VC had exceeded 40,000 by 
early 2000), the management of HWZ began to realize the importance of strengthening 
and maintaining relationships within the rapidly growing community to enhance the 
“stickiness” of its VC. Consequently, HWZ began to undertake measures aimed at 
cultivating a sense of belonging and developing a complementary offline presence. 
Through these measures, HWZ was able to increase participation in the VC and enhance 
its relationship with its VC members. The increased participation led to the accumulation 
of information assets within its VC, while the enhanced relationship with its members 
increased the members’ willingness to commit resources, abilities and ideas towards 
HWZ’s cause. Collectively, these factors provided the means for organizational value 
creation that proved crucial to the survival of HWZ when the conditions in the IT 
publications industry took a dramatic turn. 
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The advent of the dotcom crisis in 2000 created an adverse economic climate that 
plunged the Singapore IT publications industry into a period of great turmoil and 
uncertainty. As HWZ was a “pure play” dotcom that depended solely on online 
advertising for revenue, the effects of the dotcom crisis on HWZ were particularly severe. 
In addition, with the phenomenal success of HWZ, new competitors that sought to imitate 
HWZ’s e-business model were emerging in the industry. Particularly troubling to the 
HWZ management was the news that several local IT vendors, some of whom used to be 
HWZ’s partners in the past, were now eying its lucrative business.  
Faced with new challenges, the management of HWZ realized that the rules of 
competition in the Singaporean IT publications industry had fundamentally changed, and 
that HWZ’s dependency on online advertising as its sole revenue stream made the 
organization susceptible to any form of turbulence that affected that particular source of 
income. Based on these insights, HWZ leveraged the accumulation of information assets 
within its VC to defend its market position from competitive imitation, and mobilized its 
members in the development of a series of innovations that include (1) a printed IT 
magazine, (2) a PC gaming website, (3) a digital photography magazine, and (4) country-
specific versions of its website, with the aim of creating new streams of revenue to bring 
about financial stability to the organization. Table 15 provides a summary of the 
measures undertaken by HWZ to nurture its VC, the state of HWZ’s VC, the VC-enabled 
capabilities developed, and the different mechanisms through which HWZ’s VC 
facilitated the attainment of its strategic objectives during the dotcom crisis and the 
immediate years after. 
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Table 15: The Development and Leverage of HWZ’s VC from Early 2000 to Late 
2004 
Measures undertaken by HWZ to nurture its VC 
Fostering 
embeddedness 
“We (HWZ’s top management)… organized outings and barbecues to 
get to know our members better… We invited key forum contributors 
and opinion leaders down to the office for tea and we gave them 
freebies such as T-shirts… If they (VC members) feel a sense of 
belonging, they will keep coming back.” HWZ Co-Founder 
 
“They opened a bubble tea outlet (located at one of Singapore’s largest 
IT mall)… to allow (VC members) to gather and chill out before they do 
their shopping…” HWZ Member D 




“The community grew very quickly… although most of the topics were 
still centered on IT, people started talking about things like (PC) 
gaming, (gaming) consoles… and mobile phones…” – HWZ Member B 




“The discussion forum was where I went to get the information I need 
(sic)… there were reviews of a wide array of IT products…For example, 
(there were reviews) of the latest graphics cards, motherboards, 
CPUs… and (articles that made comparisons) between products…” 




“Since this is an IT community, some of our members are really tech 
experts… (and) they have a lot of interesting ideas… Because we made 
them feel like they belong, many of them were willing to contribute their 
ideas and put in the effort to help (HWZ) move forward…” – HWZ 
Senior Executive 





“As the community grew, the knowledge base accumulates… (which) 
makes it very hard for our competitors to go after our market (demand 
for local IT content)… Because we are in the business of providing 
information, to be able to compete with us, their content will at least 







(1) a printed 
magazine, (2) 
a PC gaming 




“Our members were very receptive when we floated the idea of the 
(printed) magazine … they (VC members) gave us many ideas on the 
type of content that would appeal to them…” HWZ Editor-in-Chief 
 
“A group of us (VC members), we came together and developed the 
entire (PC gaming) website from scratch without the management’s 
knowledge… We only presented the website to the management when 
we were done. Luckily, the CEO liked our idea and gave us the go 
ahead…” – Pioneering HWZ Member A  
 
“(The digital photography magazine) started as a special interest group 





versions of its 
website  
interest… so we thought: ‘can we create something for them?’” – HWZ 
Managing Director  
 
“We didn’t just translate our existing website into the language spoken 
in the country (for the country-specific websites). We tailored the 
features and content of the website according to the local needs… we 
gathered feedback from the (new regional) members and delivered what 
they wanted accordingly” – HWZ Senior Executive 
 
By defending its market position, HWZ managed to safeguard its existing revenue stream 
from competitors that were emerging in the IT publications industry. In addition, through 
the innovations developed, new revenue streams were created that brought about 
increased profitability and financial stability for HWZ. Moreover, the development of 
country-specific versions of its website and magazines led to a dramatic influx of new 
VC members from regional countries, which made HWZ more attractive to the 
advertisers that were crucial to sustaining its business model. By 2004, annual advertising 
revenue for HWZ from both online and offline channels had surged to an estimated 
US$2.6million. These factors facilitated HWZ’s survival during and in the immediate 
aftermath of the dotcom crisis. 
4.1.4 Diversifying into New Industries (Early 2005 – Present) 
By early 2005, official membership figures of HWZ’s VC had breached the 200,000 
mark. With the growing realization that it was becoming both unfeasible and unnecessary 
to manage and control the VC directly, the management of HWZ began to adopt 
measures aimed at formalizing leadership roles and enabling community-directed rules, 
norms and dialogue within the VC. The aim of these measures was to promote self-
governance and community control, which enhanced the ease of management and 
scalability of HWZ’s VC that enabled the attainment of self-sustaining critical mass. For 
HWZ, the attainment of critical mass transformed its VC into a strategic resource that 
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they could leverage for new forms of competitive advantage as the Singapore IT 
publications industry returned to a state of normalcy.    
By 2005, the recovery of key industry parameters such as the rates of organizational 
mortality and the levels of online advertising signaled the end of the dotcom crisis. 
Following the shakeup in the industry, HWZ had emerged as the dominant market leader, 
but with the realization that further investments in developing the present market would 
likely lead to diminishing returns, the management of HWZ began looking to diversify 
into other industries that offered opportunities for replicating its successful business 
model. Based on an analysis of the profiles of its members, HWZ identified attractive 
market positions in a number of diverse industries that led to the launch of (1) an online-
offline motoring publication, (2) an online-offline golf publication, and (3) a printed 
travel magazine. Moreover, in addition to working with its VC to shape the content and 
features of these innovations, HWZ leveraged its mature VC as a strategic resource to 
generate awareness and demand for its new offerings An overview of the measures 
undertaken by HWZ to nurture its VC, the state of HWZ’s VC, the VC-enabled 
capabilities developed, and the ways in which HWZ’s VC was leveraged to support the 
strategic objective of diversification after the dotcom crisis is provided in Table 16.  
From the latest financial and performance data obtained, HWZ’s strategy of diversifying 
into radically different industries is shaping up to be the latest in a line of successful 
strategies that continues to propel the organization forward. By 2007, official 
membership for HWZ’s VC had increased to over 300,000 while HWZ’s revenue was 
estimated at over US$4 million per annum. The strong financial and market performance 
of HWZ attracted the attention of a number of potential investors, and HWZ was 
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eventually acquired by Singapore Press Holdings Limited; the leading media organization 
in Singapore, for US$4.6 million on September 29th 2006. 
Table 16: The Development and Leverage of HWZ’s VC from Early 2005 to Present 
Measures undertaken by HWZ to nurture its VC 
Granting 
Autonomy 
“I think at this stage (of VC development), the VC has become too big 
for the management to control (directly)… (In the end,) many of (the 
opinion leaders) in the forums were given administrative rights…  
users who contribute to the forum a lot were granted moderator 
privileges… members were allowed to vote on new sections and topics 
that they would like to see on the forum… we were empowered  to 
establish our own rules and etiquette…”   – HWZ Forum Moderator 
State of HWZ’s VC 
Maturity stage 
of development  
“At this point in time, the community was more or less self-
organizing… (and) self-sustaining in that we (HWZ’s management) 
don’t have to actively tend to the growth of the community… The 
topics that they were discussing on the forum grew more and more 
diverse… our most active section is (the lifestyle section) where people 
can talk about anything under the sun… we also have sections for… 
fitness… music, food… education…we even have a section for pets” – 
HWZ Chief Content Officer 
VC-enabled capabilities developed 
Critical mass “The community became an important marketing tool for us… we can 
use (the VC) to communicate with our target audience directly… 
Obviously, the bigger (the VC), the more effective it is (as a marketing 
channel)… (the current VC) size is an advantage because the amount 
of people that we can reach is a lot more…” – HWZ Senior Executive 






in the motoring, 
golf and travel 
publications 
industry 
“We looked at our (membership) database and who did we have? We 
had (mainly) guys, who are IT professionals, engineers… slightly 
‘richer’ people who can afford to travel, own cars… and are starting 
to pick up golf… So to cater to their (the primary customer segment’s) 
needs, we launched (an online-offline motoring publication), (an 
online-offline golf publication)… and (an offline travel magazine)” – 
HWZ Managing Director 
Helped to shape 
the content and 
features 
included in the 
new 
publications 
“We took the suggestions of our members very seriously… (For 
example,) many of the features on (HWZ’s motoring website) like the 
consolidated price lists, COE (certificate of entitlement) bidding 
results for each month… (and the) classified ads directory… came 
about from the feedback that we received from our community 
members” – HWZ General Manager 





demand for their 
new 
publications 
aggressively on the (HWZ) forum… There were announcements… 
hyperlinks… and advertisements… they packaged the subscription for 
their new products with the existing IT magazine… As someone who is 
interested in IT as well as cars, I joined (HWZ’s motoring website) as 
well… I think about 60% of existing (HWZ’s motoring website) 
members came from the original HWZ forum”- HWZ Member C    
 
4.2 Alibaba.com 
4.2.1 Organizational Background 
According to the latest statistics from the web traffic tracking agency Compete, Alibaba 
(refer to Appendix E) is one of the world’s largest B2B e-commerce portals with over 2.6 
million unique visitors per month. Alibaba’s business centers on providing a trading 
platform that connects international buyers to millions of small-medium enterprises 
(SMEs) in China that supply a kaleidoscopic array of products, ranging from agricultural 
products to aircraft parts. But since its inception, Alibaba has diversified into a wide 
range of businesses ranging from a consumer-to-consumer (C2C) online auction website 
(Taobao), an Internet portal (Yahoo China), an online review website for lifestyle 
products and services (Koubei), and an online advertising trading platform (Alimama). 
Incidentally, according to the web traffic tracking agency Alexa, these spin-offs, together 
with Alibaba, are all among the top 100 most popular websites in China, a considerable 
achievement that belies Alibaba’s humble origins. 
The initial manifestation of Alibaba was ChinaPages.com. Launched in April 1995, 
ChinaPages was a small e-business that provided website development and indexing 
services to local enterprises. At the time, there were no commercial Internet service 
providers in China and the general population was unaware of the existence of the 
Internet. Yet, led by Jack Ma, the iconic founder of ChinaPages and later Alibaba, 
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ChinaPages was able to convince many Chinese firms of the business potential of the 
Internet and subsequently, to engage its services. For approximately US$3,000, 
ChinaPages would translate the corporate and product information of their clients into 
English and send the translation to collaborators in the US who would develop and 
launch websites based on the information. And as commercial internet access became 
available over time, ChinaPages developed the technical capabilities required for website 
development and eventually, took over the role from their US collaborators as well.  
In 1997, ChinaPages was merged with a local competitor but due to differences in 
strategic vision, Jack Ma and eight members of the core development team left the 
organization. Because of their experience in e-commerce, they were eventually roped in 
by the Chinese government to develop ChinaMarket, an e-government portal for global 
firms to locate products, services and business opportunities in China. It was the 
experience of managing both ChinaPages and ChinaMarket that led to the realization that 
China’s enormous SME market would benefit immensely from the global exposure 
afforded by the Internet and back then, there were no B2B platforms that catered 
exclusively to Chinese SMEs as the costs of joining a B2B platform were prohibitive. 
With this critical insight, Jack Ma and his core team left ChinaMarket and returned to 
Hangzhou with the dream of establishing a B2B e-commerce portal that connected the 
hundreds of thousands of Chinese SMEs to the world. This led to the founding of Alibaba 
in March 1999 and at the time, Alibaba was operating out of Jack Ma’s apartment and the 
entire development team drew a salary of only US$73 a month. Yet, within a short span 
of 9 years, Alibaba would become a publicly listed multi-national corporation with over 
10,000 employees worldwide and an annual revenue of US$207 million. Alibaba’s 
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vibrant and populous DBE was cited by numerous informants as the primary driver of 
partnering agility, which in turn, was crucial to its phenomenal success. To illustrate, a 
senior executive at Alibaba attested to the integral role of its DBE: 
“Our ecosystem is the key to our success… We have a close relationship with our 
(ecosystem) members … we know their needs and we are able to meet their needs quickly 
and effectively… this strengthens our members and enables them to contribute to the 
collective good… It is a virtuous cycle. When the ecosystem prospers, everyone (within 
the ecosystem) prospers…” 
Informed by our review of the literature on business ecosystems, we narrowed the focus 
of our inquiry to three pertinent themes: (1) the antecedents of ecosystem development – 
manifested in the strategies and ecosystem role of Alibaba  (Iansiti and Levien 2004a), 
(2) the nature of ecosystem development, and (3) the consequences of ecosystem 
development – centered on the enablement of partnering agility. From the emergent data, 
it became readily apparent that Alibaba underwent three distinct phases; adopting 
different strategies and ecosystem roles in each phase that resulted in the attainment of 
different stages of ecosystem development, with correspondingly distinct implications for 
partnering agility. Accordingly, we organize the presentation of our data according to the 
temporal sequence of the phases in the subsections that follow. 
4.2.2 Leveraging Firm-Specific Resources and Capabilities (1999-2004) 
In the first phase from 1999 to 2004, Alibaba’s business objectives were centered on 
establishing itself as the de facto platform for B2B e-commerce in China. Competitive 
imitation was rampant in the rapidly developing Chinese e-commerce industry then, and 
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Alibaba had to act quickly to preempt potential competitors from imitating its business 
model. Accordingly, Alibaba enacted a number of strategies that were broadly aligned 
with three strategic thrusts. First, Alibaba took advantage of its unique insight of the 
unmet needs of Chinese SMEs and structured value creation towards meeting those 
needs. Second, Alibaba exploited its superior technical capabilities, developed from its 
experience in operating ChinaPages and ChinaMarket, to differentiate itself from the 
existing B2B portals in China (e.g. HC360, EasyTrade). Third, Alibaba leveraged its 
intimate knowledge of local SMEs and incorporated the nuances of Chinese business 
practices into its transactional processes to differentiate itself from the global B2B portals 
(e.g. allactiontrade, eceurope, MFGTrade). The collective consequence of these strategic 
thrusts is a unique value proposition targeted at fulfilling the needs of the immense SME 
market, which served to attract many Chinese SMEs to join Alibaba’s business 
ecosystem. 
In addition, as many of the SMEs lacked the technical capabilities to go online, Alibaba 
took on the role of a service provider within the ecosystem, helping to collate, organize, 
publish and promote the corporate and product information of their members on their 
website. This enabled the SMEs to participate meaningfully in the ecosystem and 
consequently, benefit from the ubiquitous exposure afforded by the Internet. By 
providing a unique value proposition and lowering the barriers of participation, Alibaba 
was able to attract a myriad of SMEs to attain self-sustaining critical mass, and entrench 
itself at the center of value creation within the DBE. Its centrality in the network, in turn, 
enhanced Alibaba’s ability to sense its members’ needs as Alibaba was able to collect 
feedback directly from the other entities within the ecosystem. Moreover, as Alibaba’s 
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organizational actions were enacted at the center of the network, its actions impacted the 
entire business ecosystem concurrently, which enabled a quicker response to its 
members’ needs. The key organizational strategies and ecosystem role adopted by 
Alibaba, the nature of ecosystem development, and the underlying mechanism though 
ecosystem development facilitated partnering agility in Phase 1 are summarized in Table 
17. 
Table 17: How Alibaba’s Ecosystem was Developed and Leveraged in Phase 1 
(1999-2004) 







“We were the first to cater exclusively to the needs of SMEs. As a result, 
our networking platform, the trust supporting mechanisms we used, and 
our payment systems were all geared towards meeting the needs of this 
particular segment. This was what differentiated us from the other B2B 









“The experience from managing ChinaPages (and later ChinaMarket) 
was instrumental to Alibaba’s (initial) success. It was here that they 
picked up the technical skills of website development and learnt what it 
took to run a B2B e-commerce portal… In terms of technical 
capabilities, Alibaba’s platform was clearly superior to its competitors” 








“There were three factors that differentiated us from our foreign 
competitors. First, we provided tools like ‘Wangwang’ (an instant 
messenger system that allowed transacting parties to haggle over 
prices) and ‘Alipay’ (an escrow service that helped mitigate the greater 
mistrust of online transactions among Chinese firms). Second, we 
provided our services free of charge. Third, our websites were designed 




“Many of our members did not know much about e-commerce. But they 
had posted their corporate and product information on trade-oriented 
electronic Bulletin Board Systems (BBS)… We helped to collate, 
organize and publish the relevant information on our website… we 
organized the information by product category and provided search 
functionality to lower the cost of finding the information. Lastly, we 
helped to create awareness for our members… we went to different 
websites to promote Alibaba, telling people that business opportunities 
and all kinds of products from all over the globe can be found on our 
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website…” - General Manager (GM) of Alibaba B2B 







“We attracted many SMEs as well as individual users. As the number of 
our ecosystem members increased, so did the variety of products on our 
website… We were positioned at the center of the ecosystem… the 
ecosystem was dependent on us for survival for we were the 
infrastructure providers, and the possibility of sustaining our growth 
was very good – Senior Scientist  





“Our position (at the center of the ecosystem) helps us to effectively 
sense and respond to the needs of our members. We can obtain feedback 
directly from our members, and this gives us a good feel of what is 
happening on the ground… By responding to the feedback and acting at 
our end, the rest of the ecosystem benefits from our actions as well…” – 
GM of Alibaba 
  
4.2.3 Acquiring New Organizational Capabilities (2005-2006) 
Having established a firm dominance over the Chinese B2B e-commerce market, Alibaba 
began to realize that the biggest threat to its business came not from the existing B2B e-
commerce portals, but rather from massive Internet portals such as Baidu and Google. 
This is because global firms looking for products, services and business opportunities 
from Chinese partners; and vice versa, can potentially find them by searching on these 
Internet portals, disintermediating Alibaba from the process of transaction. Consequently, 
Alibaba began to move in a new strategic direction in 2005. The new strategic direction 
was characterized by the aggressive acquisition of new organizational capabilities in 
preparation for the inevitable conflict with the Internet portals in the near future.  
First, Alibaba acquired search engine capabilities with the acquisition of Yahoo China in 
October 2005. The strategic intent behind the acquisition is to create a business-oriented 
search engine and isolate the members of its DBE from Internet portals such as Google or 
Baidu. To date, most of the information published on the Alibaba network can no longer 
be accessed by third-party search engines. Second, in October 2006, Alibaba acquired 
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Koubei.com, one of the most popular online portals for the review of lifestyle products 
and services, such as restaurants, hair salons, and hotels. Alibaba’s management felt that 
the acquisition of Koubei would strengthen the sense of community within the ecosystem 
by enabling its members to “work, spend and play” on Alibaba, and facilitate greater 
interaction between ecosystem members by encouraging them to spend more time on the 
Alibaba network.  
In addition, with exponential increases in the size of the ecosystem each year – Alibaba 
had over 10 million registered members by 2005, and as ecosystem members became 
more experienced and savvy in the use of Internet technologies, it became neither feasible 
nor necessary for Alibaba to continue providing “hands-on” services for its ecosystem 
members. Relinquishing its “hands-on” approach was potentially problematic as Alibaba 
could run the risk of disintermediation. To mitigate this risk, Alibaba’s role in the 
ecosystem evolved into that of a platform provider, maintaining its value to its ecosystem 
members by supplying the mechanisms that enable them to exchange information, 
interact and transact with each other, without having to involve itself directly in these 
activities.  
By acquiring Yahoo China, Alibaba was able to demarcate the boundaries of the DBE 
and consolidate its position at the center of the ecosystem. In addition, by acquiring 
Koubei and taking on the backend role of a platform provider, thereby relinquishing 
direct control over its ecosystem members, Alibaba enabled richer and more frequent 
interactions between members, which facilitated the formation of informal, autonomous 
networks within the ecosystem. This in turn, enhanced partnering agility as Alibaba was 
able to move beyond simply sensing and responding to expressed member needs, to 
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monitoring and analyzing the interactions between its members to anticipate and predict 
future and unexpressed needs. The key strategies and ecosystem role of Alibaba, the 
nature of ecosystem development, and the underlying mechanism though ecosystem 
development enhanced partnering agility in Phase 2 are summarized in Table 18. 
Table 18: How Alibaba’s Ecosystem was Developed and Leveraged in Phase 2 
(2005-2006) 







“With our acquisition of Yahoo China, we are priming ourselves for 
the inevitable conflict with search engines like Baidu...By integrating 
e-commerce (Alibaba) with the Internet portal(Yahoo China), search 
engine capabilities with synchronous communications (Wangwang 
Instant Messenger), we can increase the stickiness, breadth and depth 
of our business... Currently, most of the information published on our 
network have been sealed off from (third party search engines like) 







“Koubei represents the initiative to integrate lifestyle services with e-
commerce… and represents a step towards the development of search 
and community building tools. Our investment in Koubei strings 
together all our disparate businesses, allowing our ecosystem members 
to work, spend and play on the Alibaba network.” – Communications 




“Alibaba became a platform provider; providing mechanisms for its 
members to interact and transact, and no longer had to be directly 
involved in the transactions. Alibaba served as a platform for 
exchanging information, communications and interactions, as well as 
transactions. With Yahoo and Koubei, Alibaba was also the platform 
for members to search for and review one another.” – VP of Research 
and Training  











“By integrating the largest and most vibrant lifestyle portal in China 
(Koubei) with the advanced Internet capabilities, large user base and 
global search capabilities of Yahoo (China), we are able to advance in 
terms of volume, convenience, trustworthiness and stickiness. In 
addition, both Yahoo (China) and Koubei encourage interactions and 
the formation of bonds between our members, helping the SMEs and 
individual users on our network to live, grow, develop and create 
leading-edge networks (between themselves)” – Communications 
Manager of Yahoo Koubei        








“The development of Alibaba (acquisition of Yahoo China and Koubei) 
emerged spontaneously and was not the result of systematic 
planning… By allowing our members to interact with one another and 
form their own networks, we can collect data on their interactions and 
transactions, analyze the data to detect patterns or opportunities, and 
share our results with the entire organization.” – VP of Research and 
Training  
 
4.2.4 Developing Ecosystem Capabilities (2007-Present) 
The capability acquisition/ development strategies of Alibaba led to performance gains 
that outstripped all initial expectations. Between 2005 and 2006, Alibaba registered an 
88.1% increase in revenue, an astounding 212% increase in net profits, and an 80.1% 
growth in terms of the number of registered members. The phenomenal success of the 
strategies of this phase made Alibaba’s management more keenly aware of the 
advantages of an organic, self-organizing ecosystem. Soon after, an ecosystem-oriented 
mentality took hold within the collective organizational consciousness and provided the 
foundation for a new strategic direction that began in 2007. 
The new strategic direction is manifested in the enactment of two key organizational 
strategies. First, at the start of 2007, Alibaba launched Aliloan, an initiative in partnership 
with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the China Construction Bank to 
help SMEs with limited assets or credit history secure financing for business expansion 
based on their transaction histories and credibility ratings at Alibaba. Second, in 
November 2007, Alibaba launched Alimama, a trading platform for online advertising 
space to enhance the ecosystem capability for online marketing and generating online 
advertising revenue. The overarching objective of these strategies is to foster a healthy 
DBE by enhancing the organizational capabilities of the other entities in its ecosystem. In 
doing so, ecosystem members are able to contribute more to networked value creation, 
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which enhances the overall competitiveness of the ecosystem and benefits Alibaba in the 
long run. 
Moreover, driven by the new ecosystem-oriented mentality, Alibaba’s role within the 
ecosystem evolved into that of a utility computing service provider (see Carr 2008; Ross 
and Westerman 2004) with the launch of Alisoft in January 2007. Alisoft is an online 
software portal based on a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) model. The purpose of Alisoft is 
to develop and provide its ecosystem members with a comprehensive suite of low cost, 
user-friendly web-based enterprise applications to meet their business IT needs. With its 
new strategies and ecosystem role, Alibaba was able to foster symbiotic relationships 
between entities; including itself, within the ecosystem, and channel the resources and 
actions of individual entities towards the shared objectives of the ecosystem. In this spirit 
of symbiotism, ecosystem members were engaged in the co-production of innovations, 
which gives rise to an advanced form of partnering agility as the innovations are 
developed and tailor-made for the members of Alibaba by the members themselves. The 
key organizational strategies and ecosystem role adopted by Alibaba, the nature of 
ecosystem development, and the underlying mechanism though ecosystem development 
facilitated partnering agility in Phase 3 are summarized in Table 19. 
Table 19: How Alibaba’s Ecosystem was Developed and Leveraged in Phase 3 
(2007-Present) 







“Alibaba has kept a comprehensive record of all our members’ 
transactions for many years. We can use this to track how the money is 
used before, during, and after the loan to minimize the costs of filtering 
the credit-worthy enterprises for the banks… Aliloan is especially 
important in helping SMEs grow their business as it is difficult for 
them to obtain loans through conventional channels, and they cannot 














“After opening a web store, many of Alibaba’s members, especially the 
larger establishments and the ‘power sellers’ on Taobao have two 
needs: To promote their store; which implies the need to buy 
advertisement space, and to sell advertisement space. (They will ask) 
‘Can I convert my web traffic into revenue?’  Our existing services 
didn’t cater to their needs… This led to the launch of Alimama (an 
online advertising trading platform)… Alimama is different from 
Google’s or Baidu’s advertising programs. It is based on a whole new 






“Alibaba provides everything an e-merchant needs to run a business. 
We provide the platform… (as well as) applications and online tools 
(on Alisoft), allowing them to start their business easily with minimal 
capital investment. It’s like in a village… we have dug the well for 
everyone… Our business users can use our various platforms to gain 
access to the SaaS services they need, and they are charged according 
to usage…We hope to provide for all their needs, such that all anyone 
needs is a computer to become an e-merchant – Alisoft Senior 
Manager 







“By providing services and opportunities to the ‘bit players’ in our 
ecosystem, they attract more ‘bit players’ into the ecosystem… With a 
very large volume of these small players working synergistically for 
the collective good of the ecosystem, Alibaba’s profitability increases, 
and we have more resources to invest in enhancing our service 
platforms…  This virtuous cycle results in a healthy ecosystem that is 
beneficial for all ecosystem members. – VP of Operations  




“Many third-party application developers joined our ecosystem to 
develop software for Alisoft… Some of our B2B and C2C members 
used the open-source platform to develop their own applications. 
These applications include VOIP applications, video conferencing 
software, wireless telephony applications, website management 
systems, electronic ID services, and many others… The applications 
are all available on Alisoft. Alisoft is like a software supermarket and 





4.3 Chang Chun Petrochemicals 
4.3.1 Organizational Background 
CCP (refer to Appendix F) is the oldest petrochemical firm in Taiwan.  It started as 
Chang Chun Plastics Co in 1949 for the purpose of manufacturing a form of engineering 
plastic known as the Phenolic Molding Compound. Over the years, CCP gradually 
increased the variety of its product offerings and expanded its production facilities to 
meet the increasing demands of the global market as its business grew exponentially 
through joint ventures and technology licensing. Today, CCP is an international company 
that provides a broad range of products from engineering plastics and electronic 
chemicals to molding materials. CCP owns more than 10 subsidies, with Chang Chun 
Petrochemical Co, Chang Chun Plastics Co and Dairen Corporate being the three major 
ones. By 2007, CCP had successfully built business relationships with more than 15,000 
customers located in 111 countries and offered more than 100 categories of products. It 
currently has more than 4,500 employees worldwide and an annual revenue of about 
US$4.6 billion, making it the one of the largest privately-owned petrochemical firms in 
the country. 
CCP’s IT department was formed in 1984, marking the organization’s first foray into the 
use of IT. Since its inception, the IT department has played an instrumental role in the IT 
deployment projects at CCP, providing the driving force that propelled the organization 
through three major phases of systems implementation since 2001. The phases are 
internally abbreviated as the ‘E-Phase’ (E for Electronic), the ‘M-Phase’ (M for Mobile), 
and the ‘U-Phase’ (U for Ubiquitous) respectively. With just over 20 employees, the 
department has developed an internal reputation for its efficiency and ability to deliver 
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business-critical IT systems that support the operations of the entire firm despite limited 
resources. The department is led by the organization’s Senior Executive Vice President, 
who personally initiated and managed many instances of IT innovations at CCP.  
Informed by our review of the literature on organizational improvisation, we narrowed 
the focus of our inquiry to four pertinent themes: (1) The development of the means for 
improvisation, (2) detecting and interpreting triggers of organizational improvisation, (3) 
the enactment of improvisation, and (4) the outcomes of organizational improvisation – 
centered on the facilitation of agile IT adoption and operational agility. In addition, as 
CCP underwent three major phases of systems implementation, we organize the 
presentation of our data according to the temporal sequence of the phases in the 
subsections that follow. 
4.3.2 E-Phase (2001-2004) 
From the establishment of the IT department in 1984 and prior to 2001, CCP’s operations 
were supported by a DOS-based legacy system that was developed internally. In 2001, 
when Microsoft announced the launch of Windows XP, the DOS-based system was 
rendered obsolete, triggering the need for the implementation of a new system. Yet, the 
management of CCP was unwilling to commit the funds for an off-the-shelf ERP package 
(which costs between NT$30-100 million). Faced with a pressing need for a new system 
and yet constrained by the limited resources they had, the IT department was forced to 
improvise to deliver a solution. An in-house ERP development project was eventually 
launched with two overarching objectives: (1) Developing an ERP system to meet the 
present needs of CCP that is, at the same time, scalable to support the future growth of 
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the firm, and (2) implementing it at a lower cost than commercial, ‘off-the-shelf’ 
packages.   
Comprised of slightly over than 10 employees with limited knowledge about ERP 
systems and little prior experience in large-scale systems implementation, the IT 
department spent almost one year in implementing the system. During this period, the 
extensive business domain knowledge of the members of the IT department; accrued 
from the years of managing the DOS-based system, the unwavering support and the 
experimental environment encouraged by the top management, and a supportive culture 
marked by a fervent ‘can-do’ spirit were critical to the success of systems 
implementation. Moreover, to augment their software development capabilities, CCP also 
engaged Lian Quan, a small software company with formidable research and technical 
capabilities, as their technical partner. The CASE (Computer Assisted Software 
Engineering) tools provided by Lian Quan played a critical role in simplifying the coding 
process for the internally-developed system by enabling a consistent coding standard. The 
result was the successful implementation of an ERP system that was developed at a low 
cost (as compared to commercial ERP packages), within a short time frame (as compared 
to industry standards), and provided tailored support for the operations of the CCP. The 
means, triggers, process and outcomes of improvisation in IT deployment at CCP in the 
E-Phase are summarized in Table 20. 
Table 20: Development and Leverage of the Capability for Improvisation in IT 
deployment in the E-Phase 
Means for improvisation 
Extensive domain 
knowledge 
“A unique characteristic of our department is that staff turnover 
rate is very low. So many of our staff have extensive knowledge of 
the business processes because they have been supporting the 
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operations of the organization since the DOS days... Being familiar 
with all the business process flows, all we had to do is to write it 
into the new system” – Head of IT Department 




and tolerance for 
failure 
“The credit goes to our Senior Executive Vice President. He 
encourages and supports innovation without reservation. He is 
willing to let us try and experiment. Sometimes it is hard to justify 
an IT system’s value if you purely look at the economic ROI. 
However, our boss is willing to invest in such ‘high cost – low 
return’ projects because he believes in the importance of giving 
employees the exposure to advanced technologies; technologies 
that he believes will be the trend of the future even though they are 
not yet widely adopted today. As a result, we, as IT staff, are less 




“We have a ‘can do’ spirit that originated from the time when we 
first started building our own ERP system. Throughout the entire 
process of starting from scratch to what we have achieved today, 
this spirit is continuously cultivated.  Therefore, when we are faced 
with another IT challenge or opportunity today, we are much more 
confident (in handling the challenge or seizing the opportunity). It 
just does not seem to be that hard anymore.” – Deputy Head of IT 
Department 
Triggers of improvisation 
Technology 
obsolescence 
“The new (Windows XP) will not support our DOS-based 
systems… It was a natural choice under the changing technological 
environment… We simply couldn’t rely on simulating the DOS 
environment in Windows XP. It would cause a lot of trouble and 




“Even before Microsoft announced the details of (Windows XP)… 
(From our interactions with external IT communities-of-practice) 
we learnt that our DOS system will probably not be supported… 
We reacted to it quickly.  We realized we couldn’t continue relying 
on DOS, so we decided to switch to Windows. ” -  IT Project Team 
Leader 




“We studied several ERP vendors’ products, took their strong 
points and used that in the design of our own system. Based on 
what we saw, we made guesses on their underlying architecture 
design and discussed among ourselves how we could restructure 





“Our information on the latest technologies is very limited. So we 
need to rely on these small companies (technology partners like 
Lian Quan) to gather such information and present them to us 
because they are out there in the field…” – Senior Executive Vice 
President 
“We used the CASE tools (provided by Lian Quan) extensively. 
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With the CASE tools, the process of software development is 
simplified. Technical skills became less important to software 
development. Understanding the process flows were more 
important” – Head of IT Department 
Improvisational Outcomes 
Rapid, more cost 
efficient mode of 
systems 
implementation 
“The cost of off-the-shelf ERP packages (for a company of our 
scale) ranges from NT$30 million to more than NT$100 million. 
We spent NT$12 million in developing our own… In terms of time 
spent, one of our factories in Changshu adopted SAP’s ERP system 
and took 3 years, while we only took 1 year for an organization-




“Our IT systems are designed to cater to our users’ needs and 
match their habits. Sometimes it is hard to change the users’ habit, 
so we decided to design our system to match their requirements so 
as to lower their resistance. From the IT department’s standpoint, 
a huge advantage is the flexibility in customizing the system based 
on user feedback. We don’t have to engage external consultants 
again and again, and ask if they can make certain changes. We will 
just do it ourselves.” – Deputy Head of IT Department 
 
4.3.3 M-Phase (2005-2006) 
The M-Phase of CCP’s systems implementation journey was triggered by a construction 
accident in 2005. Prior to the accident, CCP was reliant on phone lines and ADSL for 
data transmission. However, these lines were severed in the construction accident and 
consequently, access to CCP’s ERP system was down for several hours. Critical 
operational information could not be transmitted in time, which resulted in losses of over 
tens of millions of dollars because of the accident. At the same time, internal 
organizational stakeholders began to demand for remote access to some of CCP’s IT 
applications. These driving forces, coupled with the opportunity provided by the 
emerging mobile technologies (i.e. 3G and Wi-Fi) provided the impetus to enable CCP’s 
IT applications on the mobile platform. Yet, as the organizational resources allocated for 
the implementation of the M-Phase was similarly limited, and because the mobile 
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applications market lacked the specific applications that CCP needed, the IT department 
was once again forced to improvise to develop the solution they needed.  
In the implementation of the M-Phase, the IT infrastructure developed in the E-Phase, the 
capabilities for coordination and teamwork developed between the various business units 
and the IT department over time, and a powerful intrinsic motivation driven by a stoic, 
collective sense of mission, were prior resources that were crucial to the success of IT 
deployment. In addition, the IT department relied heavily on their existing technical 
expertise, developed from the experience of the E-Phase, and acquired complementary 
technological resources in the form of pre-written software modules to make 
improvisation possible. The result was the successful launch of a comprehensive suite of 
mobile applications; including a Push Mail, an M-ERP, an M-CRM, and a remote facility 
monitoring application, that was once again developed in a fast and cost efficient manner. 
In addition, as compared to existing off-the-shelf alternatives, the internally developed 
system had more functionality and represented a better fit with the business processes of 
CCP. Table 21 provides a summary of the means, triggers, process and outcomes of 
improvisation in IT deployment at CCP in the M-Phase. 
Table 21: Development and Leverage of the Capability for Improvisation in IT 
deployment in the M-Phase 




“The underlying ERP system (developed in the E-Phase) provides the 
foundation for the M-Phase… Let’s say that a manager wants to 
access an application on his mobile phone... the mobile phone is just 
the platform right? There has to be a backend system… that is our 
ERP. Without our ERP, all the applications that we wanted to develop 




“During the E-Phase, we established a number of cross-functional 
steering committees consisting of the managers of the various 
departments to chart the direction of systems development. By the time 
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of the M-Phase, as we interact and become more familiar with one 
another over time, our coordination improved. We had a better 
understanding of each other’s business processes and we had no 
qualms about raising our requirements to the IT department… 
Between the different departments, we also looked at the different 
ways in which we can collaborate to make the overall operations (of 




“We didn’t get any material rewards for our success in the previous 
phase but we are happy to do it… In spite of our limited resources, we 
see delivering solutions (to organizational problems) as part of our 
job scope, part of our responsibilities. I think the culture… a culture 
for innovation… really crystallized after the E-Phase. We were more 
confident of our abilities and we were given the freedom to be 
creative” – Head of IT Department 
Triggers of improvisation 
Business crisis “Our daily revenue is tens of millions of dollars. Even if our ERP is 
just down for an hour, the economic loss would be catastrophic. In 
Miao Li (one of CCP’s production bases), after only a few minutes of 
systems breakdown, the line of trucks (waiting to be loaded) stretched 
all the way from the summit (where the facility was based) to the foot 
of the hill. There were 2 miles of trucks” – Head of IT Department 
Business needs “The managers of the various business units and the top management 
asked for (applications on the mobile platform)… Particularly for 
push mail because checking emails is really a very important part of 
their work… It was a good timing. At that time, 3G just came out. It 
solved a huge performance issue that previous mobile platforms 
couldn’t solve. 3G made mERP (and other mobile applications) 




“We had been monitoring mobile technologies for some time… At our 
organization, a few staff members are dedicated to monitoring the 
developments in the technological landscape… One (staff member) is 
responsible for monitoring web application frameworks… we have 
another four looking at mobile platforms and applications.” – Head of 
IT Department    




“Once you know how to do it, it (systems implementation) can be very 
fast. However, if you do not know how to do it, it will take you forever. 
I think by the time ( of the M-phase), we have reached a certain level 
of technical competency, implementing the initiatives of this phase 





“Although there were very few mobile apps that met our needs, we 
bought whatever (apps) that was compatible and modified them 
according to our needs. I think it is important to ‘stand on the 
shoulder of giants’… as long as someone has written something that 
we need (and if it is priced reasonably), we would buy them… Given 
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the time and (resource constraints) that we had, we can’t be writing 






“At the time, it will cost a several hundred thousand (NT$) dollars just 
for a simple mobile scanning inventory output system that can run on 
a PDA. And with all the applications we wanted, it will take the 
vendor half a year to deploy.  We did everything ourselves… It is 





“With the m-CRM, managers can access the information they need 
anywhere, anytime… With our inventory management applications on 
the mobile platform, the efficiency of inventory and logistics 
management is also greatly enhanced… (As compared to commercial, 
off-the-shelf solutions,) we found a company doing a software called 
‘mobile intelligence’, but its functionality was very limited and 
incompatible with our existing processes. We have much better control 
(over the functionalities of our system) in this way” – Head of IT 
Department  
 
4.3.4 U-Phase (2007- Present) 
The major systems implemented in the U-Phase were triggered by a number of changes 
in the external and internal organizational environment in 2007. In the case of the GPS 
vehicle tracking system, the impetus for systems implementation came about as a result 
of a legislative change in Taiwan that required all vehicles transporting hazardous 
materials to be outfitted with a tracking device for safety reasons. In the case of the QR-
Code enabled inventory and logistics management system and the IP-PBX telephone 
system, they were implemented as a result of a directive from CCP’s Senior Executive 
Vice President. By this phase, the IT department had become conditioned to working 
with resource constraints and an improvisational mode of IT deployment. Consequently, 
even when they were given the option to purchase an expensive ‘off-the-shelf’ solution in 
the case of the IP-PBX telephone system, they chose to improvise to “piece together” 
their own solution instead. 
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In the implementation of the three major systems of the U-Phase, the existing hardware, 
software and network infrastructure, the cohesion between the IT department and the 
various business units that crystallized over a long history of collaboration, and the 
creativity of the IT department, were previously developed capabilities that facilitated the 
success of IT deployment. Moreover, the IT department leveraged their technical 
proficiency to experiment with various alternative solutions concurrently in iterative 
cycles of planning and execution. Finally, similar to the earlier phases, the outcome of 
improvisation was cost savings and the successful launches of a number of IT systems 
that permeated, supported and enhanced many inter-related aspects of CCP’s operations. 
A summary of the means, triggers, process and outcomes of improvisation in IT 
deployment at CCP in the U-Phase is provided in Table 22. 
Table 22: Development and Leverage of the Capability for Improvisation in IT 
deployment in the U-Phase 




“To link all the various new systems and our existing ones, we relied on 
our existing network infrastructure… In terms of the hardware that 
supported our new applications, most of the infrastructure is already 
there… For the software of our new systems, the only difference was 
that we used a different development environment… We used Visual 






“When we were implementing our QR-Code inventory management 
system, we were actively consulting with the various factories and 
business units. We told them what QR-Code could do… they would 
imagine how it can be applied to their business processes and tell us 
what kind of support they hope to receive using the technology… We 
would then implement the relevant modules based on their 
specifications” – Senior IT Executive C 
Creativity “I think over time, we have learnt how to be creative to deal with 
‘surprises’ (like the directive to implement QR-Code)… Otherwise, we 
would not be able to come up with the solutions that the top 
management wants all the time. (The top management) would throw us 
an idea… an abstract concept… On one hand, it indicates that the top 
management has a lot of confidence in us…(On the other,) we have to 
carry it to fruition.– Senior IT Executive A 
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Triggers of improvisation 
Legislative 
changes 
“A law was passed that required us to install GPS tracking in all our 
trucks in October 2008… This is because of the hazardous materials 
that we were transporting.” – Senior IT Executive A 
Managerial 
alertness 
“Our Senior Executive Vice President used to study in Japan. He reads 
a lot of Japanese books (on technology). QR-Code was one of the 
technologies he found… He was very keen on QR-Code. He saw many 
applications of QR-Code in Japan, so he told us that we must think of 
an application that uses QR-Code in CCP.” – Head of IT Department 




“We had no idea what to do with QR-Code initially, so we did some 
study on it. We had to come up with some application. We thought of 
replacing our current one-dimensional code with QR which is two-
dimensional. But we hesitated because there was not much value in 
doing so…We experimented quite a bit. For example, we tried to print 
out big pictures of QR-Code and paste them on the side of trucks, 







“Instead of QR-Code, we thought about using RFID... we also thought 
of using this wireless platform called ETC, which is used by the 
government for cashless toll charges. We went as far as developing a 
number of trials using these technologies. But we quickly realized that 
they would not work… In the case of RFID, under certain frequencies, 
it will cause a static shock, which is a definite ‘no-no’ for us since a lot 
of our materials are flammable… The case of ETC was infuriating… we 
wanted to see their management with our plans but they kept avoiding 






“Let’s take for example the case of IP-PBX. We could have spent NT$5 
million on a world-renowned brand like Avaya, or we can spend NT$1 
million to piece together our own. Which would you choose? A NT$5 
million solution or NT$ 1million solution? In the end, it is really up to 
you … as long as it works, the top management doesn’t care how it is 
done… but of course, the savings are tangible” – Senior IT Executive 





“For example, the time in UK is 8 hours behind Taipei. It does not 
make sense for a manager in Taipei to wait in the office after working 
hours for a early call from UK. Our IP phone solved the problem. The 
manager can be at home or outside. As long as there is internet, he can 
be reached by his UK counterpart…” – Deputy Head of IT Department 
“We know our system is used extensively by people in the factories 
because they would call us immediately whenever they experience any 
problems. It shows that our system has a huge impact on their daily 
work. We feel proud that our work has made good contributions to their 
work” – Senior IT Executive B 
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 The Attainment of Customer Agility 
By integrating the distinct patterns in which HWZ’s VC was developed and leveraged 
across the three temporal phases, and mapping the two discrete processes (i.e. 
development and leverage) along a horizontal axis and a vertical axis, a two-dimensional 
(2-D) process model of VC-enabled organizational value creation can be inductively 
derived that sheds light on how customer agility can be attained (refer to Figure 9). As 
opposed to our initial theoretical lens on VC-enabled customer agility (refers to Figure 6), 
our 2-D process model suggests that different competencies may drive the development 
of various VC-enabled capabilities along different stages of VC maturity, and the 
capability for customer agility is only developed when the VC is in the formative stage. 
Moreover, as the VC becomes increasingly mature, the number of ways in which it can 
be leveraged for organizational value creation increases. The following stream of 
reporting explains the 2-D process model, how the model was constructed from the case 
data, how it differs from our initial theoretical scaffold, and how the existing literature 
corroborates the model. 
5.1.1 Phase 1: The Nascent Stage of VC Development 
Grounded in the empirical data, our 2-D model of VC-enabled organizational value 
creation suggests that following the initial formation of a VC, a sponsoring organization’s 
efforts in nurturing the VC should center on the VC competencies of managing content 
and enhancing interactivity (Porter and Donthu 2008; Preece 2001). To illustrate, in the 
case of HWZ, a pioneering member of its community alluded to the capability of 
managing content in noting that “most of the product reviews, news and articles came 
108 
 
from (HWZ’s founders) at the time” to make up for the lack of breadth and depth in 
member-contributed content. In addition, one of HWZ’s Co-Founders provided an 
indication of the capability of enhancing interactivity in describing the management’s 
efforts in enhancing the responsiveness and extent of interactions in the discussion forum, 
saying “we (HWZ’s founders) were on the forum all the time… you could see that 
whenever someone posted something, within 20 minutes, one of us (HWZ’s founders) 
would reply” (refer to Table 14). 
Figure 4: A 2-D Model of VC-Enabled Organizational Value Creation 
 
 
Content management is particularly important in this phase as there tends to be is a dearth 
of member-contributed content in the early stages of VC development (Mohammed et al. 
2004). Consequently, by ensuring a continuous influx of high-quality, administrator-
generated content, the sponsoring organization can stimulate and maintain the members’ 
interest in the VC (Balasubramanian and Mahajan 2001; Rothaermel and Sugiyama 
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2001). In addition, the perceived effort of a sponsoring organization to provide quality 
content tends to promotes beliefs about the congruence of the sponsor’s values with, and 
respect for, the community. This in turn, creates a basic level of trust that stimulates 
participation and the initiation of relationships between members and the community 
sponsor (Porter and Donthu 2008; Ridings et al. 2002). Similarly, enhancing the 
interactivity of a fledgling VC is crucial for two key reasons. First, it lays the foundation 
for a step-shift increase in the quality and quantity of member-contributed content (e.g. 
reviews, opinions and advice) as interactivity works in a virtuous cycle to drive 
participation and knowledge contribution (Dholakia et al. 2004; Porter and Donthu 2008). 
Second, it facilitates the formation of subgroups that provide members with the 
opportunity to discuss a variety of topics related to the community’s interest, which in 
turn, enhances the diversity and attractiveness of the community (Mohammed et al. 
2004).  
Conversely, as opposed to our initial theoretical lens, our model suggests that the VC 
competence of fostering embeddedness is less appropriate in the initial phase. The 
“strength of weak ties” hypothesis (Granovetter 1973) of the social network theory 
provides a possible explanation for this. Fostering embeddedness increases the strength of 
social ties (Blanchard and Markus 2004; Ma and Agarwal 2007) but inhibits the inflow of 
diverse information (i.e. member-contributed content) and access to disparate social 
networks (i.e. awareness among potential members) (Perry-Smith and Shalley 2003; 
Wellman et al. 2001). As such, fostering embeddedness is less crucial for a fledgling VC 
because diverse content and network access are resources that the VC will arguably 
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require more as they seek to create awareness and attract new members in its embryonic 
state (Mohammed et al. 2004; Porter and Donthu 2008). 
The mechanisms of the two competencies, in tandem, facilitate the attraction and 
retention of community members, and enable the VC to arrive at a state typically defined 
as the nascent stage of the VC development lifecycle (e.g. Lee et al. 2005; Mohammed et 
al. 2004). At this stage, the VC is small, and dominated by the community founders and a 
core group of early adopters (Mohammed et al. 2004). The same pioneering member of 
HWZ’s community, for example, stated “In the beginning, we didn’t have many 
members… it was mainly them (HWZ’s founders) and the group of hardcore “techies” 
who came over from the previous (COI)” (refer to Table 14). More importantly, the VC-
enabled capability of digitized knowledge richness (Sambamurthy et al. 2003) is 
developed as the VC is now able to serve as a platform for interactions between members 
and the sponsoring organization, and it is this VC-enabled capability that serves as the 
basis of organizational value creation at this stage of VC development. 
More specifically, the VC as a platform for interactions enables the sponsoring 
organization to obtain direct feedback on the existing and expressed needs of the core 
group of early adopters (Armstrong and Hagel 1996; Porter and Donthu 2008), or 
monitor the interactions between them to gain an understanding of their future or 
unexpressed needs (Kozinets 2002; Nambisan 2002). Based on the knowledge obtained, 
the community sponsor can then enact “needs-based positioning” (Porter 1996) by 
occupying a market position that serves the identified needs of their members. For 
example, in our case study (refer to Table 14), HWZ’s Co-Founder explained how the 
HWZ’s unique value proposition as a comprehensive, credible provider of free, localized 
111 
 
IT content was derived based on the feedback they received from the early adopters of 
HWZ, as the management “realized that the foreign publications do not meet their needs 
because the content is not meant for the local audience,” while local publications were 
“usually not comprehensive because they lacked funding, which comes with credibility 
and market reach” (refer to Table 14). In other words, through the VC-enabled capability 
of digitized knowledge richness, the VC can facilitate the logic of positioning by helping 
the sponsoring organization identify and occupy an attractive market position, which in 
turn, results in the creation of organizational value as the sponsoring organization is able 
to avoid competitive threats and capitalize on the market opportunities associated with its 
unique market position. 
However, contrary to Sambamurthy et al.’s framework (2003), which suggests that IT-
enabled organizational value creation in the digital age should be based primarily on a 
logic of opportunity, our model suggests that a VC is unlikely to facilitate organizational 
value creation through this mechanism in the nascent stage of development. This is 
because in the nascent stage, the VC is dominated by early adopters, and while the 
behavioral and subjective feedback from these members can provide indications on the 
general direction in which the community should be headed, the needs of early adopters 
tend to be different from the majority and may not provide a reliable basis for developing 
a continuous stream of innovations that are in line with the overall needs of the VC 
(Mohammed et al. 2004; Rogers 2003). Likewise, a nascent VC is unlikely to create 
value for its sponsoring organization through the logic of leverage as the VC, in its 
immaturity, is easily imitable (Hagel and Armstrong 1997), and may not be sufficiently 
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large (Rothaermel and Sugiyama 2001) or committed to the community sponsor (Porter 
and Donthu 2008) to be leveraged effectively. 
5.1.2 Phase 2: The Formative Stage of VC Development 
Following the attainment of the nascent stage of VC maturity (Lee et al. 2005), our 
process model suggests that to sustain the development of its VC, a sponsoring 
organization should focus its efforts on the VC competence of fostering embeddedness 
within the community (Porter and Donthu 2008; Preece 2001). For instance, HWZ’s Co-
Founder noted that one of the measures undertaken by HWZ to nurture its VC in the next 
phase of development was aimed at cultivating a sense of belonging (Lin 2008) among 
“key forum contributors and opinion leaders” by inviting them “down to the office for 
tea” to recognize them, and giving them incentives in the form of “freebies such as T-
shirts”. Another measure adopted by HWZ was to develop an offline presence (Lombard 
and Ditton 1997) by organizing “outings and barbecues”, and, as noted by another of 
HWZ’s members, establishing “a bubble tea outlet (located at one of Singapore’s largest 
IT mall)… to allow (VC members) to gather and chill out…” (refer to Table 15). These 
measures foster embeddedness by “facilitating contact between the sponsor and 
members” (Porter and Donthu 2008) and imbuing the relationships between VC members 
and the sponsoring organization with an added physical dimension (Koh and Kim 2003; 
Mohammed et al. 2004) that enables intense, personalized and “more socially embedded 
information exchanges” (Rothaermel and Sugiyama 2001). In particular, measures aimed 
at fostering embeddedness (For a review of these measures, refer to Bhattacharya and Sen 
2003; Porter and Donthu 2008) are especially appropriate in this stage of VC 
development for a number of key reasons. 
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First, as the community continues to grow, it becomes increasingly difficult for individual 
members to maintain the strength of their social ties to the other members of the VC 
(Rothaermel and Sugiyama 2001; Wellman et al. 1996). Therefore, measures that foster 
embeddedness are necessary to help members of the growing VC to better identify, 
understand, and trust each other (Koh and Kim 2003; Porter and Donthu 2008), which 
serves to broaden and reinforce their mutual ties (Koh and Kim 2003) and compensate for 
the low social presence inherent in online interactions (Lombard and Ditton 1997). 
Second, at this juncture of VC development, the social processes within the VC are 
beginning to mature (Mohammed et al. 2004; Palloff and Pratt 2007), and it is at this 
point when it becomes possible to embed the economic processes of the sponsoring 
organization within the underlying social processes to provide additional “focus-related, 
consumption and approval-related utility” (Balasubramanian and Mahajan 2001) for the 
members of the VC. Finally, a growing VC tends to attract a higher proportion of 
peripheral or non-contributing members (Kim 2000; Mohammed et al. 2004; Zhang and 
Storck 2001), while at the same time, negative network externalities may emerge that 
decrease the value of the VC to the core members (Asvanund et al. 2004; Gu et al. 2007), 
which include the regulars, leaders and elders (Kim 2000) of the community. 
Consequently, measures that promote embeddedness can mitigate the effects of these 
converging forces by enhancing the relationship between the community and the 
sponsoring organization (Bhattacharya and Sen 2003; Porter and Donthu 2008). This 
serves to maintain a significant portion of the VC members as “community insiders” 
(Kozinets 2002), which forms a particularly important segment of a commercial VC as 
insiders tend to be heavier users, more loyal, and amenable to that marketing overtures of 
114 
 
the sponsoring organization (Cothrel 2000; Kozinets 2002). On the other hand, in contrast 
with our theoretical lens, our model suggests that the VC competencies of managing 
content and enhancing interactivity are less salient in this stage of VC development. This 
is because as a VC grows, the variety and richness of user-generated content, as well as 
the extent of interactivity within the community increases (Mohammed et al. 2004), 
which reduces the burden on the part of the community sponsor to enact explicit 
measures to generate content or increase participation (Balasubramanian and Mahajan 
2001; Porter and Donthu 2008). 
By strengthening the social ties between members in the VC (Koh and Kim 2003) and 
grafting the economic processes of the sponsoring organization on the underlying social 
processes of the VC to create additional utility (Balasubramanian and Mahajan 2001), the 
VC is able to attract and retain an increasing number of participants, which enables the 
VC to attain the formative stage of the VC development lifecycle (see Lee et al. 2005; 
Mohammed et al. 2004). The formative stage is characterized by a growing number of 
participants, a disproportionate member-to-administrator ratio, and a marked increase in 
the diversity and richness of the community dialogue (Mohammed et al. 2004). In the 
case of HWZ, evidence of the attainment of these traits were revealed in our interview 
with one of its members, who noted that “the community grew very quickly” during this 
stage. The informant further alluded to an increase in diversity of the subtopics generated 
in the discussion forum by describing how the community dialogue moved beyond the 
mainstream topics of IT hardware (e.g. reviews of “the latest graphics cards, 
motherboards, CPUs…”), to technology-related topics such as “(PC) gaming… (gaming) 
consoles… and mobile phones” (refer to Table 15).  
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More importantly, our model suggests that the attainment of the formative stage of VC 
development precipitates the development of two VC-enabled capabilities. First, the VC-
enabled capability of digitized knowledge reach (Sambamurthy et al. 2003) develops as 
the increased membership, participation and diversity of the community dialogue 
facilitate the accumulation of information assets in HWZ’s VC (Ginsburg and Weisband 
2006; Li 2004). Second, the VC-enabled capability for collective community action; 
defined as the extent to which VC members are willing to pool their resources, abilities 
and ideas towards the community sponsor’s cause, materializes as the measures that 
foster embeddedness strengthen the ties between members and enhance their relationship 
with the community sponsor (Kim 2000; Mohammed et al. 2004). Collectively, the two 
VC-enabled capabilities form the basis of organizational value creation in this stage of 
VC development. 
More specifically, while the mechanism for organizational value creation described in our 
initial theoretical lens is centered on the process of entrepreneurial action based on the 
logic of opportunity (Sambamurthy et al. 2003), our model reveals two possible 
mechanisms of organizational value creation in this stage of VC development. In 
particular, the VC-enabled capability of digitized knowledge reach (Sambamurthy et al. 
2003) facilitates organizational value creation through the logic of positioning by raising 
the entry barriers for existing and potential competitors seeking to imitate the market 
position of the sponsoring organization (Porter 1996). This is because adopting a similar 
position would necessitate an equivalent knowledge base on the topic of interest, which is 
difficult to recreate as the accumulation of knowledge requires time and extensive 
resources (Bieber et al. 2002; Schubert and Ginsburg 2000). HWZ’s product manager, for 
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example, attested to this in saying “As the community grew, the knowledge base 
accumulates… (which) makes it very hard for our competitors to go after our market 
(demand for local IT content)…  Because we are in the business of providing information, 
to be able to compete with us, their content will at least have to be as good as ours… and 
that takes time…” (refer to Table 15). This is indicative of how HWZ’s VC enabled the 
organization to consolidate its positioning strategy: By making it difficult for competitors 
to adopt a similar market position as the information assets of the VC accumulated over 
time. 
In addition, through the VC-enabled capability of collective community action, the VC 
can facilitate organizational value creation through the logic of opportunity in two 
distinct ways. First, as opposed to the nascent stage of VC development when the VC was 
dominated by early adopters, a VC in the formative stage of maturity consists of a wide 
spectrum of members that can provide indications on the overall needs of the VC (Kim 
2000; Mohammed et al. 2004). This can serve as the basis of customer agility 
(Sambamurthy et al. 2003), which can subsequently be leveraged in developing a stream 
of innovations for a series of temporary competitive advantages (Eisenhardt and Sull 
2001), or launching competitive actions that create fundamental instability in the 
organizational environment to keep competitors off-balance (D'Aveni 1994). As noted 
earlier, these indications may be directly obtained in the form of feedback from the VC 
members (Armstrong and Hagel 1996; Ginsburg and Weisband 2006; Kannan et al. 
2000), or be indirectly gleaned from unobtrusive means such as analyzing the profiles of 
the members (Balasubramanian and Mahajan 2001; Kozinets 2002) and monitoring the 
interactions between members in the VC (Hagel and Armstrong 1997; Rothaermel and 
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Sugiyama 2001). From the accounts provided by HWZ’s Editor-in-Chief, Managing 
Director, and Senior Executive for example, we could see how the feedback and ideas 
contributed by the members of HWZ’s VC facilitated the development of the printed IT 
magazine, the digital photography magazine and the country-specific versions of HWZ’s 
website respectively (refer to Table 15). 
Second, with an accumulation of members ready to commit their resources and abilities 
to helping the community sponsor, customer agility is enhanced as members can be 
engaged in the co-production of innovations (Nambisan 2002; Porter and Donthu 2008). 
Engaging customers in the co-production of innovations represents one of the fastest and 
most effective means of innovation development since the innovations are developed and 
tailor-made for the VC members by the members themselves (Fuller et al. 2006; 
Lengnick-Hall 1996). For instance, from the account of one of the pioneering members of 
HWZ’s VC, we noted how a group of VC members “came together and developed the 
entire (PC Gaming) website from scratch without the management’s knowledge” (refer to 
Table 15), which saves HWZ from having to commit the time and resources to develop 
an offering to meet the PC gaming needs of their VC members. 
On the other hand, we did not find conclusive evidence of VC-enabled organizational 
value creation through the logic of leverage from the case data of this phase. A possible 
explanation is that despite a significant increase in the number of community members, a 
VC in the formative stage of development has yet to attain self-sustaining critical mass 
(Lee et al. 2005; Mohammed et al. 2004). Critical mass is crucial to the organizational 
ability to leverage the VC as a strategic resource for two reasons. First, the attainment of 
critical mass unlocks new possibilities for strategic leverage in the form of transaction, 
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marketing and advertising revenue opportunities (Armstrong and Hagel 1996; Kozinets 
2002). Second, critical mass enables the sponsoring organization to emerge as the 
dominant community for a particular topic of interest (Armstrong and Hagel 1995), 
which imposes “high switching costs” (Mahadevan 2000) for the members of the VC that 
renders the strategic resource inimitable. In other words, without attaining critical mass, a 
VC may be unable to serve as a strategic resource for the sponsoring organization as the 
criteria of being sufficiently valuable or inimitable (Barney 1991; Hoopes et al. 2003) 
may be violated. 
5.1.3 Phase 3: The Maturity Stage of VC Development  
Finally, following the formative stage of VC development, our process model suggests 
that a sponsoring organization’s efforts in nurturing its VC should be aligned with what 
can be termed the VC competence of ‘Granting Autonomy’, defined as the capability to 
enable self-governance and community control within the VC (Rothaermel and Sugiyama 
2001; Walden 2000). This derives from the account provided by one of the forum 
moderators on HWZ, who noted that the measures undertaken by HWZ to nurture its VC 
in this phase of development were aimed at (1) formalizing leadership and community 
roles (Mohammed et al. 2004) by awarding “administrative rights” and “moderator 
privileges” to the opinion leaders and the key contributing members of the VC, and (2) 
enabling community-directed rules, norms and dialogue (Kozinets 2002) by allowing 
members to establish their “own rules and etiquette” and “vote on the new sections and 
topics that they would like to see” in the VC (refer to Table 16). 
Compared to the VC competencies described in our initial theoretical lens, the VC-
enabled capability of granting autonomy is arguably more important at this stage of VC 
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development because beyond the formative stage, a VC tends to be both resistant to direct 
management by the community sponsor (Mohammed et al. 2004; Walden 2000) and too 
large to be effectively managed (Rothaermel and Sugiyama 2001). Consequently, as the 
internal structures put in place by the sponsoring organization to manage content, 
enhance interactivity, and foster embeddedness since the formation of the VC become 
increasingly ineffective with VC development (Mohammed et al. 2004), a sponsoring 
organization can promote self-organization and empower members to develop their own 
language, protocols and policies within the VC (Kozinets 2002; Preece 2001). This serves 
to institute an alternative set of internal structures, which sustains the quality of 
community-generated content, the extent of interactions, and the strength of community 
relationships by reducing the cost of communications, the complexity of dialogue 
management, and incidences of negative behaviors such as free-riding and social loafing 
(Butler 2001). In addition, measures aimed at granting autonomy and promoting self-
governance allow members to shape the community dialogue based on their needs 
(Walden 2000), and promote the perception of their importance and influence within the 
community (Blanchard and Markus 2004). This enables the sponsoring organization to 
satisfy the demand for more freedom and responsibility that tends to manifest in the older 
and more established VCs (Mohammed et al. 2004). 
Enacting measures aligned with the VC competence of granting autonomy gives rise to 
three important outcomes. First, the VC increases in scalability as the installation of 
effective community control mechanisms makes the management of a large member 
population feasible (Rothaermel and Sugiyama 2001). Second, the trust that VC members 
have towards the community sponsor increases as relinquishing control over the VC to 
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the members removes the perception of and the potential for a favorable bias towards the 
community sponsor (Walden 2000). Third, the diversity, and hence the attractiveness, of 
the community increases as members are empowered to form their own subgroups, 
promulgate a variety of subtopics, and assume responsibility for the direction of the 
community dialogue (Mohammed et al. 2004). Collectively, these outcomes sustains the 
growth of the VC and enables the attainment of the maturity stage of the VC development 
lifecycle (see Lee et al. 2005; Mohammed et al. 2004). 
The maturity stage is characterized by the attainment of self-sustaining critical mass 
(Hagel and Armstrong 1997; Wellman et al. 1996) and a further step-shift increase in the 
diversity of the community dialogue, which is reflected in the emergence of a number of 
member-initiated main topics that extends into a kaleidoscopic array of subtopics 
(Mohammed et al. 2004). Although the point of critical mass may be difficult to define 
due to the lack of a consistent measure in the literature (Bieber et al. 2002), we can 
nevertheless infer that HWZ’s community had attained critical mass from the account of 
HWZ’s Chief Content Officer, who noted that “the community was more or less self-
organizing… (and) self-sustaining” and that the management no longer had “to actively 
tend to the growth of the community.” Moreover, he further noted that the community 
dialogue had significantly increased in diversity with the initiation of a variety of topics; 
such as “fitness… music, food… education…” and even “a section for pets” that extends 
far beyond the earlier focus of the VC on IT (refer to Table 16). 
But more pertinent to our interest, the full range of possibilities for organizational value 
creation becomes unlocked when a VC attains the maturity stage of the development 
lifecycle (Hagel and Armstrong 1997; Mohammed et al. 2004; Rothaermel and Sugiyama 
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2001). In particular, with critical mass, the VC becomes more valuable in that it can be 
used as an effective push marketing channel to generate awareness and demand for the 
sponsoring organization’s market offerings (Balasubramanian and Mahajan 2001; 
Kozinets 2002). In addition, critical mass renders the value proposition of the community 
sponsor inimitable as it imposes high switching costs (Mahadevan 2000) that consolidates 
the VC’s position as the de facto community for a particular market segment or topic of 
interest (Armstrong and Hagel 1995). By imbuing the VC with added value and 
inimitability (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993), critical mass enables the creation of 
organizational value through the logic of leverage (Hoopes et al. 2003) in a mechanism 
that is distinct from the strategic process of entrepreneurial action described in 
Sambamurthy et al.’s framework (2003), and the positioning-based mechanisms 
developed in the earlier phases. Evidence from the case study corroborates this in that we 
were not only able to see how HWZ’s VC facilitated organizational value creation 
through the logic of positioning; by helping HWZ identify and attain attractive market 
positions in the motoring, golf and travel publications industry, and the logic of 
opportunity; by providing inputs that shaped the generation of new content and features 
in the process of innovation, from the accounts of HWZ’s Managing Director and 
General Manager respectively. But more importantly, the account proffered by one of 
HWZ’s members reveals how by bundling “the subscription for their new products with 
the existing IT magazine” and placing “announcements… hyperlinks… and 
advertisements” within the community discussion forum, HWZ’s VC facilitated 
organizational value creation through the logic of leverage by serving as the basis of a 
122 
 
strategic resource to generate awareness and demand for HWZ’s new offerings (refer to 
Table 16). 
5.2 The Attainment of Partnering Agility 
By integrating the different patterns in which Alibaba’s DBE was developed and 
leveraged across the three distinct phases, a process model of how a DBE can be 
developed and leveraged for partnering agility (refer to Figure 10) can be inductively 
derived. As our model suggests, the development and subsequent leverage of a DBE for 
partnering agility is an evolutionary process that can be decomposed into three 
progressive stages. Given that our model is inductively derived from the Alibaba case 
study data, the following stream of reporting provides an explanation of how the existing 
literature corroborates our model and how the model enriches the existing perspectives of 
IT-enabled enterprise agility.  
5.2.1 Phase 1: Establishing Centrality and Attaining Critical Mass 
At the time of its inception, Alibaba’s strategies were aligned with the capability logic in 
that it leveraged firm-specific resources and capabilities such as (1) its unique insight of 
the unmet needs of Chinese SMEs, (2) its superior technical capabilities, and (3) its 
intimate knowledge of Chinese business practices to create a unique value proposition 
(Barney 1991). Specifically, by catering to the needs of the large SME market, and 
differentiating itself from local and global B2B portals, Alibaba was able to attract a large 
number of ecosystem members, establish its identity as the de facto B2B platform for 
business opportunities in China, and structure ecosystem value creation around its vision 
of connecting global buyers to a vast supplier network of Chinese SMEs.   
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In addition, Alibaba was aware that many of the Chinese SMEs at the time lacked the 
technical capabilities to publish their trade-related information online. By taking on the 
ecosystem role of a keystone service provider and involving itself directly in collating the 
necessary information published on various electronic BBSs, publishing the relevant 
information on its website, facilitating access to the information by organizing the 
information and providing navigational tools, and promoting the information on other 
websites for international trade, Alibaba enabled many Chinese SMEs to overcome their 
technical limitations, participate in the ecosystem, and subsequently, benefit from the 
global exposure afforded by the Internet. 
Based on these findings, our model suggests that the focal organization, with the ability 
and motivation to be a core firm, should (1) pursue strategies aligned with a capability 
logic and (2) adopt the ecosystem role of a keystone service provider in the initial phase 
of DBE development. By enacting strategies aligned with a capability logic, the 
organization is able to structure ecosystem value creation around its unique value 
proposition, attract new ecosystem members, and define a distinct identity that delineates 
the boundary of the ecosystem (Moore 1996). Moreover, by adopting the ecosystem role 
of a keystone service provider, the focal organization shares value (Iansiti and Levien 
2004a) with the entire ecosystem by providing direct services that lower the barriers of 
ecosystem membership, which in turn, enables a larger pool of entities to participate in 
the ecosystem. 
Through these mechanisms, the focal organization can establish itself at the center of 
ecosystem value creation. Centrality enables the organization to effectively influence the 
development of the DBE and subsequently, leverage the DBE for the attainment of 
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partnering agility (Koka and Prescott 2008; Pierce 2009). Moreover, by lowering the 
barriers of participation, and supporting the attraction of new ecosystem members, these 
mechanisms enable the DBE to attain self-sustaining critical mass. Critical mass is 
particularly important in the initial phase of DBE development as it (1) is the key enabler 
of effective collective action (Hargrave and van de Ven 2006; Oliver et al. 1985), and (2) 
facilitates the attraction and retention of ecosystem members (Moore 1996), which is 
important because in networked competition, network entities tend to be highly mobile 
unless barriers to switching have been instituted (Pierce 2009). 
The attainment of network centrality and critical mass gives rise to the formation of a 
hub-and-spoke ecosystem and positions the focal organization as a core firm at the center 
of the network. The hub-and-spoke ecosystem in turn, can be leveraged for a basic 
“sense-and respond” type of partnering agility (Overby et al. 2006) through two distinct 
mechanisms. First, the hub-and-spoke network configuration enhances the sensing 
capabilities of the core firm as its immediate ties with the other entities in the ecosystem 
enable the firm to solicit direct feedback, providing it with critical information on the 
needs of these members (Koka and Prescott 2008). Second, the centrality of the core firm 
in the ecosystem enhances its ability to respond to detected needs as similar entities 
within the ecosystem tend to have similar needs, and organizational actions taken in 
response to the expressed needs of a small subset of members may effectively benefit all 
entities within the ecosystem concurrently (Blyler and Coff 2003).     
5.2.2 Phase 2: Nurturing Internal Networks and Fortifying Ecosystem Boundaries 
In the second phase of ecosystem development, Alibaba’s strategies were aligned with 
the guerilla logic in that they were centered on the acquisition/development of search 
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engine (i.e. Yahoo China) and community building (i.e. Koubei) capabilities; self-
serving, internal organizational capabilities meant to disrupt the basis of business 
competition for existing (i.e. B2B portals) and future (i.e. Internet portals/ search engines) 
competitors (D'Aveni 1994; Teece et al. 1997). By augmenting search engine capabilities 
to their organizational repertoire, Alibaba was able to enhance interactivity within the 
ecosystem by allowing members to search for and form relationships with one another, 
and restrict external access to the information of its ecosystem members. Similarly, with 
the acquisition of community building capabilities, Alibaba was able to strengthen the 
sense of community among its ecosystem members, which served to enhance interactivity 
by encouraging them to “work, spend and play” on the Alibaba network. Moreover, as a 
result of the rapid growth of its business ecosystem, Alibaba was forced to relinquish its 
role as a “hands-on” service provider and take on the role of a keystone platform 
provider, sharing value with the ecosystem by providing the backend platform for 
information-sharing, interactions and transactions. By relinquishing direct control over its 
ecosystem members, interactivity within the ecosystem was further enhanced as frequent, 
rich and autonomous interactions between ecosystem entities were made possible. 
Grounded in the empirical data, our model suggests that following the attainment of 
network centrality and critical mass, in the next phase of ecosystem development, the 
core firm should (1) pursue strategies aligned with a guerilla logic, with a particular 
emphasis on acquiring/developing capabilities that enhance internal interactions within 
the ecosystem and minimize external interactions with entities outside the ecosystem, and 
(2) adopt the ecosystem role of a keystone platform provider. By acquiring/developing 
capabilities that enhance internal interactions and adopting the ecosystem role of a 
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keystone platform provider, the core firm can provide opportunities for ecosystem 
members to exchange diverse information and knowledge that enable the creation of 
unique value (Koka and Prescott 2008), enhance the coordination of their activities to 
strengthen ecosystem value creation, and increase the commitment of its members to the 
ecosystem (Holm et al. 1999). These mechanisms, in turn, facilitate the formation of 
informal, autonomous networks within the ecosystem, which can compete with one 
another for prominence in the ecosystem “in an escalating game of dueling paradigms” 
(Moore 1996), and result in continuous innovation and diversity in ecosystem value 
creation. In addition, with the acquisition/development of capabilities that minimizes 
external interactions with entities outside the ecosystem, the core firm is able fortify the 
boundaries of the ecosystem by establishing barriers that prevent its network resources 
from leaking into the external environment. This serves to protect the competitive 
advantage of the ecosystem from the competitive actions of rival business networks 
(Dyer and Singh 1998). 
The formation of informal, autonomous networks between ecosystem entities and the 
fortification of ecosystem boundaries leads to the development of a networked 
ecosystem. The networked ecosystem in turn, can be leveraged for an advanced, 
“predictive” form of partnering agility. This is because the core firm, which manages the 
platform for internal interactions in its capacity as a keystone platform provider, is able to 
move beyond sensing and responding reactively to the existing and expressed needs of its 
members, to monitoring and analyzing the interactions between its members to anticipate 
future and unexpressed needs, and subsequently, respond proactively to those needs 
(Chandra and Kumar 2001). 
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5.2.3 Phase 3: Fostering Symbiotism 
The phenomenal success that resulted from granting its members autonomy in forming 
informal networks provided Alibaba’s management with an indication of the potential 
benefits of an organic, self-organizing ecosystem. Consequently, influenced by a new 
ecosystem-oriented mentality that was rapidly taking hold across the organization, the 
strategies enacted by Alibaba in the third phase of ecosystem development were centered 
on the development of ecosystem capabilities meant for the benefit of its members that 
conferred little or no direct benefits on Alibaba itself. These strategies, aligned with the 
complexity logic (Iansiti and Levien 2004a; Lengnick-Hall and Wolff 1999), include the 
development of capabilities for business expansion (i.e. Aliloan), online marketing and 
online advertising revenue generation (i.e. Alimama) for its ecosystem members. In 
addition, in line with the new ecosystem-oriented mentality, Alibaba’s role within the 
ecosystem evolved from a backend platform provider into a utility computing service 
provider (Carr 2008; Ross and Westerman 2004) as it expanded its backend role to 
provide a comprehensive suite of applications and online tools that catered to its 
members’ every need (i.e. Alisoft). The strategic intent underlying Alibaba’s strategies 
and its new ecosystem role was to strengthen their members and enable them to 
contribute more to networked value creation. In doing so, Alibaba was able to foster 
symbiotic relationships between its members and itself, and channel the resources and 
actions of disparate ecosystem entities towards the collective good that enhanced the 
health and overall competitiveness of the business ecosystem. 
Based on the case data, our model suggests that when ecosystem development is at an 
advanced stage, the core firm should (1) pursue strategies aligned with a complexity logic 
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and (2) adopt the ecosystem role of a keystone utility computing service provider. The 
enactment of strategies aligned with a complexity logic leads to a number of important 
consequences. First, by providing the means of capability development for the other 
entities in the ecosystem, there is increased mutual interdependence between the core 
firm and the other entities, which enhances ecosystem value creation (Holm et al. 1999) 
and serves as the foundation for stability, productivity and creativity in the ecosystem 
(Iansiti and Levien 2004a). Second, by strengthening the organizational capabilities of the 
other entities in the ecosystem, the core firm enhances its goodwill and social relations 
with the other entities in the ecosystem, which provide the opportunity, motivation and 
ability for solidarity and collective action (Adler and Kwon 2002). Third, by facilitating 
ecosystem capability development and becoming more valuable to the other entities, the 
core firm simultaneously gains power and control within the ecosystem, and enables 
greater diversity in ecosystem value creation. This results in conflicting forces that 
simultaneously pulls the ecosystem towards stability and instability, positioning the 
ecosystem at the “edge of chaos” (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997) that primes the 
ecosystem for innovation and continuous change (Stacey 1995). In addition, by adopting 
the role of a keystone utility computing service provider, the core firm lowers the costs of 
IT, provides on-demand IT capacity, and more importantly, enhance the strategic focus of 
their ecosystem members by enabling them to concentrate on their core competencies 
(Ross and Westerman 2004).  
By increasing mutual interdependence, creating the conditions for solidarity and 
collective action, priming the ecosystem for innovation and continuous change, and 
enhancing the strategic focus of its ecosystem members, a “co-evolving, symbiotic, self-
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reinforcing system of strategic contributions” is formed (Moore 1996) that gives rise to a 
symbiotic ecosystem. As the entire ecosystem functions as a single entity, utilizing 
communal resources and capabilities towards the shared objectives of the ecosystem, 
individual ecosystem entities may be engaged in the co-production of innovations 
(Lengnick-Hall 1996), which precipitates a “collective” form of partnering agility. 
Relative to the two previous forms of partnering agility, collective agility facilitates an 
even faster and more effective response to the needs of ecosystem members. This is 
because collective agility (1) invalidates the need to sense or anticipate those needs, (2) 
enables the concurrent development of a near-infinite range of personalized innovations, 
and (3) provides the strongest assurances that the innovations pursued are in line with its 
members needs (Tan et al. 2010), since the innovations are tailor-made for ecosystem 
members by the members themselves. 
5.3 The Attainment of Operational Agility 
By integrating the different patterns in which improvisation in IT deployment was 
enacted across the three distinct phases of systems implementation, a process model of 
routinized improvisation in IT deployment (refer to Figure 11) can be inductively 
derived. As our model suggests, the process of improvisation in IT deployment can be 
decomposed into 4 cyclical steps. Given that our model is inductively derived from the 
CCP case study data, the following stream of reporting provides an explanation of how 
the existing literature corroborates our model and how the model enriches the existing 










5.3.1 Step 1: Developing the Means for Improvisation 
Based on the empirical evidence across the three phases of IT deployment at CCP, our 
model suggests that improvisation is a viable alternative to conventional, pre-mediated 
systems development methodologies (e.g. Markus and Tanis 1999) for practitioners 
confronted with resource constraints or time pressures, and an effective means of 
achieving agility in IT deployment (Pavlou and El Sawy 2010). However, to enable 
improvisation, the first step an organization must take is to develop the means to do so, 
which comprises of the ability and motivation to improvise with IT (Kamoche et al. 
2003). Similar to organizational improvisation, the ability to improvise in IT deployment 
consists of a composite ‘minimal structure’ (see Eisenberg 1990) made up of a technical 
structure and a social structure (Kamoche et al. 2003).  
In the context of improvisation in IT deployment, the technical structure refers to the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities related to the techno-structural aspects of deploying IT 
(Cunha et al. 2003). Based on the case data, the technical structure may consist of a 
foundational IT infrastructure, business domain knowledge, as well as the technical 
proficiency and the creativity of the personnel involved in IT deployment. On the other 
hand, since improvisation in IT deployment is necessarily a collective form of 
improvisation (e.g. Faia-Correia 2003), the social structure refers  to the behavioral norms 
and communicative codes that regulate coordination and collective action in a given 
context (Cunha et al. 2003). From the case study, the social structure may comprise the 
capability for collaboration, the cumulative social capital, as well as an organizational 
mindset that is open to experimentation, risk taking, and the possibility of failure. In 
addition to the ability to improvise with IT, the motivation to do so is important as well 
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(Crossan et al. 1996; Kamoche et al. 2003). However, our case study reveals that this 
motivation tends to be intrinsic in nature and can take the form of a collective sense of 
responsibility, or a supportive culture characterized by a strong, collectively held sense of 
mission. Table 23 provides a summary of the constituent elements of the means of 
improvisation, the illustrative examples of each element from our case study, and the 
supporting theoretical arguments from the existing literature. 
Table 23: Developing the Means of Improvisation 





The systems implemented in the U-
Phase built on the IT infrastructure 
developed in the M-Phase, which in 
turn, built on the ERP system developed 
in the E-Phase  
Existing IT infrastructure can 
leveraged in novel ways to 
resolve unexpected problems 
and seize emergent 
opportunities (Orlikowski 




The business domain knowledge 
accrued from managing the DOS-based 
system and gained from interactions 
with the business units were crucial to 
CCP’s ability to improvise in the E- and 
U-Phases respectively  
Business domain knowledge 
encompasses the procedural 
and declarative memory of an 
organization’s operations, 
both of which influence the 
quality of improvisation 
(Moorman and Miner 1998) 
Technical 
Proficiency 
Informants noted that they have reached 
a “certain level of technical 
competency” by the time of the M-
Phase which makes the implementation 
of the initiatives of the phase faster and 
easier 
Technical proficiency relates 
to the procedural memory of 
the organizational IT 
function, which has an effect 
on the quality of 
improvisation (Moorman and 
Miner 1998) 
Creativity Creativity was key to deriving the 
architecture of CCP’s ERP system from 
existing commercial offerings in the E-
Phase, and delivering IT solutions in 
response to the management’s directives 
in the U-Phase 
Improvisation requires the 
subconscious processing and 
creativity that characterizes 
intuition (Crossan 1998)  
Social Structure 
Collaboration Collaboration between the business 
units and the IT department led to the 
development of systems that were 
Teamwork quality, related to 
collaboration and trust, has a 
positive influence on the 
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tailored to CCP’s business processes in 
the M- and U-Phases  
quality of improvisation 
(Vera and Crossan 2005) 
Social 
Capital 
Prolonged interactions and growing 
familiarity led to mutual understanding 
and openness which enabled the clear 
specification of the business units’ IT 
needs in the M- and U-Phases 
The social experience of 
collective improvisation has a 
powerful influence on the 
process of improvisation 
(Kamoche et al. 2003) 
Experimental 
Mindset 
Cultivation of an experimental mindset 
led to the willingness to experiment, 
take risks and tolerate failure in the E- 
and U-Phases   
An experimental mindset 
enhances the relationship 
between improvisation and 
innovation (Vera and Crossan 
2005) 
Motivation for Improvisation 
Intrinsic 
Motivation 
Motivation for improvisation is intrinsic 
in nature, evidenced by the sustained 
drive for improvisation despite the lack 
of material rewards in the M-Phase 
Intrinsic motivation is 
required for tasks that 
demand creativity (Osterloh 
and Frey 2000) 
Supportive 
Culture 
The “can-do spirit” and the “culture of 
innovation” at CCP created an 
organizational culture that was 
conducive to improvisation 
Effective improvisation 
requires a supportive culture 
characterized by a common 
goal and shared responsibility 
(Vera and Crossan 2005) 
 
5.3.2 Step 2: Detecting Improvisation Triggers 
After an organization has developed the means for improvisation, the empirical evidence 
from our case study suggests that a trigger is necessary for the initiation of improvisation 
in IT deployment. This is in line with the notion that improvisation is typically a response 
to some form of stimulus (Crossan 1998). As in the case of organizational improvisation, 
the trigger of IT improvisation can take two forms: a problem (i.e. a negative trigger) or 
an opportunity (i.e. a positive trigger) (Miner et al. 2001). Moreover, our case study 
reveals that sometimes both types of triggers can manifest at the same time to influence 
the nature of IT improvisation. For example, in the M-Phase, the internal demand for 
mobile applications and the realization of the need of wireless connectivity as a result of 




Furthermore, our model suggests that the mere presence of a triggering factor in the 
external or internal organizational environment is insufficient. The trigger must also be 
sensed and interpreted in order to effect improvisation in IT deployment (Crossan 1998). 
The CCP case also reveals a number of interesting aspects about how improvisation 
triggers can be detected and acted upon. Sometimes, detection can be automatic as in the 
case of an announced legislative change. But more frequently, detection may require a 
number of sensing capabilities (Cunha et al. 2003)  which can be in the form of 
managerial alertness, deliberate technology monitoring (for triggers that arise from the 
technological landscape), and professional interactions. These sensing capabilities are in 
turn, influenced by the ability and motivation for improvisation (Moorman and Miner 
1998; Weick 1998). For example, in the U-Phase of our case study, the alertness 
displayed by the Senior Executive Vice President to the promise of IP-PBX and QR-Code 
technologies stems from his confidence in the IT department’s capability to deliver a 
solution. A summary of the key elements of this step of the process, the illustrative 
examples of each element from our case study, and propositions from prior research that 
corroborate our argument is presented in Table 24. 
Table 24: Detecting Improvisation Triggers 
Element Illustrative Examples from Case Data Corroborating Arguments 
Negative Improvisation Triggers 
Technology 
Obsolescence 
Obsolescence of the DOS-based system 
provided the impetus for the 
implementation of their ERP system in 
the E-Phase 
Technology obsolescence 
breaches the expectation of 
continuity and stimulates 
efforts towards restoring 
normalcy (Weick et al. 2005) 
Legislative 
changes 
The GPS vehicle tracking system of the 
U-Phase came about as a result of 
legislative changes that mandated the 
tracking of trucks transporting 
hazardous materials 
Legislative changes are a 
form of coercive pressure 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983)  






The Push Mail application of the M-
Phase was developed at the request of 
CCP’s managers 
Triggers for improvisation 
may stem from internal 
demands “as an organization 
may be unsatisfied with its 
present state and create a 
new vision for itself” (Cunha 
et al. 2003) 
Business 
crises 
The construction accident in the M-
Phase led to the realization of the need 
for wireless data transmission 
The occurrence of crisis 
events tends to effect more 
radical forms of 
improvisation (Vera and 
Crossan 2005) 




The emergence of 3G and Wi-Fi 
technologies facilitated the initiatives of 
the M-Phase  
Technological advancement 
can give rise to new 
opportunities that induces 





The Senior Executive Vice President 
was alert to the availability and business 
potential of IP-PBX and QR-Code 
technologies in the U-Phase 
Managerial alertness enables 
a firm to sense product-
market discontinuities and 
visualize how organizational 
resources can be orchestrated 
and exploited (Sambamurthy 
et al. 2003) 
Technology 
monitoring 
CCP delegated a number of staff 
members to monitoring the 
technological landscape to keep abreast 
of the latest developments  
Technology monitoring 
enhances systemic insight 
which refers to the ability to 
visualize connections 
between IT capabilities and 
emerging market 
opportunities in architecting 
competitive actions 
(Sambamurthy et al. 2003). 
Professional 
interactions 
CCP was able to react to the changes to 
Microsoft’s operating system before 
they were announced due to interactions 
with external IT communities-of-
practice in the E-Phase 
Professional interactions can 
enhance the organization’s 
ability to sense environmental 
changes and emergent 





5.3.3 Step 3: Iterative Cycles of Planning and Execution 
After the detection of an improvisation trigger, our process model suggests that the actual 
act of improvisation can be initiated (Crossan 1998). Our case study reveals that the 
process of improvisation in IT deployment involves iterative cycles of planning and 
execution. For instance, in the U-Phase of the case study, we noted that CCP was trying 
to design an application that utilized QR-Code technology while developing prototype 
solutions at the same time (e.g. printing a huge QR-Code on the side of their trucks). This 
is in line with the conceptualization of improvisation as “the conception of action as it 
unfolds” (Kamoche et al. 2003)  
Similar to organizational improvisation, the empirical evidence from our case study 
suggests that improvisation can be enacted through two different means: bricolage and 
capability development (Baker and Nelson 2005). However, the case of the CCP appears 
to suggest that in the context of improvisation in IT deployment, improvisation is a 
combination of some extent of bricolage and capability development, as opposed to either 
means exclusively (Miner et al. 2001; Moorman and Miner 1998). Moreover, the choice 
between bricolage and capability development appeared to be contingent on two factors: 
cost and the confidence of the IT department in delivering the solution. For example, in 
the M-Phase, although the IT department possessed the technical competencies and wrote 
most of the mobile apps of the phase themselves, they nevertheless bought a number of 
pre-written apps if they thought the apps would save them time and money. However, for 
the implementation of the IP-PBX telephone system in the U-Phase, although the IT 
department was provided with the resources to purchase an expensive ‘off-the-shelf’ 
package, they chose to improvise a solution as they were confident of their ability to 
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deliver. Table 25 summarizes the key elements of the process of improvisation, the 
illustrative examples of these elements from our case study, and the propositions from the 
existing literature that corroborates our argument. 
Table 25: Iterative Cycles of Planning & Execution 
Planning 






CCP conducted trials using RFID 
and ETC technologies as alternatives 
to QR-Code technology in the U-
Phase 
The creation and 
exploration of alternatives is 





The IT department conducted a 
number of experiments using QR-
Code technology (e.g. printing a 
large QR-Code on the side of a 
truck) during the U-Phase 
Improvisation requires 
tolerance for errors (Crossan 
1998), which can inform 
subsequent attempts at 






The IT department entered a 
partnership with Lian Quan for their 
technology and systems development 
capabilities in the E-Phase and 
purchased pre-written mobile apps 
and customized them in the M-Phase  
Improvisation can be 
enacted through the 
acquisition of the 
appropriate levels and types 
of resources that the existing 
challenges demand (Baker 





Bricolage of the creativity and 
technical skills of the IT department 
was evident in the E-Phase (in 
referencing and redesigning 
commercial ERP packages), and the 
M-Phase (in the efficient development 
of mobile apps) 
Improvisation can be 
enacted through bricolage 
along 5 domains: physical 
inputs, labor, skills, 
customers, and the 
institutional environment 
(Baker and Nelson 2005). 
 
5.3.4 Step 4: Deriving Improvisational Outcomes 
The final step of improvisation in IT deployment involves the derivation of 
improvisational outcomes. Based on the data of our case study, our process model 
suggests that improvisation leads to agility in IT deployment as it enables a rapid, 
effective and cost efficient means of systems implementation. Given the resource 
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constraints reported at CCP, improvisation might also be seen as the means for the 
implementation of a solution that would otherwise have been impossible (Baker and 
Nelson 2005). Agility in IT deployment, in turn, facilitated operational agility as the 
implemented systems enabled rapid and effective responses to the triggers of 
improvisation across the three phases, which could be in the form of a business need, an 
emergent opportunity or an unexpected problem (Overby et al. 2006; Sambamurthy et al. 
2003). In addition, the experience, skills, knowledge, and infrastructure that underlies 
improvisation in IT deployment are developed over the course of improvising, which 
serves to enhance the ability and motivation to improvise, and the organizational 
capability to detect triggers of improvisation in the external and internal organizational 
environment (Crossan et al. 2005; Moorman and Miner 1998). A summary of the key 
elements of this step of the process, the illustrative examples of each element from our 
case study, and the relevant excerpts from prior research that support the propositions of 




Table 26: Elements of the Means of Improvisation 
Agility in IT Deployment 







Across the three phases, CCP was 
consistently able to deploy IT 
effectively at a lower cost and 
within a shorter time frame 
Improvisation eliminates the 
need for lengthy prior planning 
exercises (Weick 1998). 
Bricolage reduces the cost of 
resource acquisition(Baker and 








The rapid and effective deployment 
of IT enabled decisive responses to 
the environmental triggers of 
improvisation and provided 
effective support for the operations 
of CCP 
Improvisation attempts to 
create something new and 
useful to the situation, and with 
certain enabling factors (i.e. 
related to the means of 
improvisation) gives rise to 
effective innovation (Crossan 
et al. 2005) 
Enhancement of improvisation capabilities 
Enhanced means 
of improvisation 
Various aspects of the ability and 
motivation for improvisation are 
enhanced in each phase and 
leveraged in subsequent iterations 
of improvisation. 
Improvisation capabilities 
improve with practice (Vera 
and Crossan 2005) and 
successful improvisation 
increases the motivation for 





Successful improvisation in the 
prior phases enhanced the 
confidence of the management in 
exploring IT related opportunities 
in the U-Phase  
Experience enhances intuition 
(Crossan and Sorrenti 1997), 
which facilitates the ability to 
see the environment in its full 








CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
6.1 Limitations and Future Research 
This thesis is not without its limitations. Although the single case research method used 
in addressing each of our research questions is a “typical and legitimate endeavor” in 
qualitative research (Lee and Baskerville 2003), a common criticism of the methodology 
is the problem of generalizability or external validity (Walsham 2006). However, while it 
must be readily acknowledged that the single case research method makes statistical 
generalization impossible, we nevertheless assert that the single case studies of our thesis 
are valid and generalizable beyond their singular contexts as the developed process 
models are not only grounded in the empirical reality of real world organizations, but also 
corroborated by the propositions of some of the most established works in management 
and IS literature. As such, this study invokes the principles of “analytic generalization” 
(Yin 2003) or what some researchers refer to as “generalizing from description to 
theory” (Lee and Baskerville 2003). Nevertheless, future research can be directed at 
statistically validating the propositions of our process models, so that the boundary 
conditions of the inductively derived theories that constitute this thesis can be better 
defined. 
A second limitation of this study concerns the retrospective nature of the personal 
interviews that form our primary source of data. Given that our account of the events, 
decisions and activities that unfolded at HWZ, Alibaba and CCP spanned periods of 
almost 10, 11, and 9 years respectively, it must be acknowledged that a synchronous 
approach to data collection would be impossible. However, as retrospective responses are 
susceptible to errors of recall (Glick et al. 1990), we have tried to circumscribe the 
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problem by only having informants who were intimately involved in the events of the 
relevant periods of interest (Pan et al. 2007), and focus our interviews on only the major 
incidents that could be reliably recalled. In addition, a systematic data verification 
procedure was adopted to ensure that all the information used in this study were was 
verified by the organization (Neuman 2005), and triangulated by at least two sources of 
data (Klein and Myers 1999).  
A third limitation is that despite our efforts to be as inclusive as possible, we must 
acknowledge that it is impossible to exhaustively describe all the possible mechanisms 
for achieving the various forms of enterprise agility within a single study. While we are 
bounded by feasibility concerns and the limits of the data collected, future research can 
certainly investigate mechanisms beyond those that have been examined in this study. 
Possible mechanisms for the attainment of customer, partnering and operational agility, 
for example, may include the development of online social networks (Kumar et al. 2010), 
the enactment of boundary spanning strategies and capabilities (Du and Pan 2010), and 
organizational control (Goh et al. 2010) respectively. 
Finally, a fourth limitation related specifically to our second case study is that the agility-
enabling mechanisms described are constrained to the context of a core firm operating 
within a DBE (i.e. Alibaba). However, it must be noted that a DBE consists of other 
peripheral entities that form niche markets within the ecosystem as well (Pierce 2009), 
and while the enhanced integration and collaboration afforded by DBEs (Riggins and 
Rhee 1998) may similarly result in partnering agility for these peripheral entities (Adner 
2006; Teece 2007), the mechanisms for the attainment of partnering agility may 
conceivably be very different. Although it must be acknowledged that it is impossible to 
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exhaustively describe all the agility-enabling mechanisms of DBEs for all types of 
ecosystem members within a single study, examining the ways in which DBEs can be 
leveraged for partnering agility for these peripheral entities may certainly be a fruitful 
avenue for future inquiry, and will provide a more complete picture of the networked 
perspective of IT-enabled enterprise agility. 
6.2 Theoretical Contributions 
By addressing the research questions set forth at the beginning of this paper, this thesis 
makes several important theoretical contributions.  
6.2.1 Overall Contributions of the Thesis 
First, this thesis provides three empirically grounded frameworks that contribute towards 
addressing the lack of empirical studies in IT-enabled enterprise agility research (Tan et 
al. 2009). In doing so, it is hoped that this study can serve as a precedent for future 
research in the derivation of empirically supported models and propositions, so that in 
complementing the existing conceptual work (e.g. Overby et al. 2006; Seo and La Paz 
2008), clarity and theoretical advancement can be achieved. 
Second, in constructing detailed process models that depict the primary mechanisms for 
achieving customer, partnering, and operational agility, this thesis can serve as the basis 
for deriving concrete and testable propositions for the attainment of IT-enabled enterprise 
agility. In this way, we hope that this thesis can provide a foundation for future research 
aimed at validating, extending or establishing the boundary conditions of our theoretical 
arguments, and serve as the catalyst for more empirical work in this area, so that in 
reinforcing the studies that have examined the phenomenon from a more abstract level 
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(e.g. Holmqvist and Pessi 2006; Zain et al. 2005), a more holistic perspective of the 
phenomenon can emerge. 
6.2.2 Specific Contributions of the First Case Study  
Third, in relation to our first case study, although VCs have been suggested as one of the 
primary IT-enabled means for attaining customer agility (Nambisan 2002; Porter and 
Donthu 2008), there is scant research to date on the association between this specific IT 
artifact and customer agility. In addition to being one of the first in-depth studies of this 
association, this study also challenges the existing knowledge in this area (as represented 
by Figure 6).  More specifically, the prevailing school of thought seems to be that the VC 
competencies of managing content, fostering embeddedness and enhancing interactivity, 
precipitate the development of the VC-enabled digital options of digitized knowledge 
reach and richness. The two VC-enabled digital options, in turn, give rise to the creation 
of organizational value through the logic of opportunity in which the resultant customer 
agility is leveraged for the launch of a series of rapid and effective innovations.   
In contrast, our inductively derived process model reveals that the enactment of the 
various VC competencies should be sequenced according to the maturity of the VC (i.e. 
managing content and enhancing interactivity when the VC is in the nascent stage, 
fostering embeddedness when the VC is in the formative stage, and granting autonomy – 
a fourth VC competence – when the VC finally reaches maturity). Moreover, distinct VC-
enabled capabilities (i.e. critical mass and collective community action, in addition to the 
two VC-enabled digital options) are developed when different VC competencies are 
applied in the various stages, and customer agility can only be attained in the formative 
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stage when the VC consists of a sufficiently diverse array of members that can provide 
indications on the overall needs of the VC (Kim 2000; Mohammed et al. 2004).  
Fourth, the first case study also makes a contribution to the literature on IT-enabled 
organizational value creation. In particular, the contemporary thinking in this area is that 
any form of competitive advantage must be fleeting and unsustainable due to the 
unprecedented turbulence and unpredictability of the modern competitive landscape 
(McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2008; Sull 2009). Consequently, more recent studies have 
emphasized the role of IT in facilitating the logic of opportunity for a series of temporary 
competitive advantages as the primary means of IT-enabled organizational value creation 
(e.g. Overby et al. 2006; Sambamurthy et al. 2003). However, our study has demonstrated 
that despite a dynamic organizational environment; which transitioned from a state of 
stability, to a state of turbulence, and back again as a result of the emergence and 
subsidence of the dotcom crisis, the logics of positioning and leverage can also be salient 
to IT-enabled organizational value creation. As such, we contend the underlying 
mechanisms of IT-enabled organizational value creation are not solely determined by the 
state of the organizational environment, but the nature of and the organizational 
capabilities enabled by the focal IT artifact as well. In particular, if the organizational 
capabilities enabled by the IT artifact can (1) help in the identification, attainment and 
retention of an attractive market position (Porter 1996), or (2) provide competitive 
advantage for the focal organization, and yet, are inimitable by existing and potential 
competitors (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993), then, in spite of turbulent environmental 
conditions, the focal IT artifact may yet be able to facilitate organizational value creation 
through the logics of positioning or leverage respectively. 
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6.2.3 Specific Contributions of the Second Case Study  
Fifth, although a technology-enabled platform that facilitates inter-firm collaboration has 
been identified as one of the primary mechanisms for attaining partnering agility 
(Sambamurthy et al. 2003), there is a lack of research on how such a platform may be 
nurtured and exploited. Focusing on the DBE as a specific instance of a technology-
enabled platform, the second case study of our thesis contributes to the state of existing 
knowledge by examining how specific combinations of the strategies and ecosystem roles 
of a core firm may contribute to the development of a DBE, and how the DBE, in the 
various stages of its development, can be leveraged for differing levels of partnering 
agility. In addition, by examining how partnering agility was attained through the 
development and leverage of a DBE at Alibaba, this study contributes to a networked 
perspective of IT-enabled enterprise agility and provides important indications for firms 
that have the ability and motivation to operate as a core firm within business networks. In 
doing so, this study complements the existing perspectives that emphasize internal 
organizational processes such as the development of IT capabilities (e.g. Weill et al. 
2002) and organizational learning (e.g. Sambamurthy et al. 2003) as the means of 
achieving enterprise agility, and contributes to a more holistic perspective of IT-enabled 
enterprise agility. 
Sixth, the second case study also makes an important contribution to the literature on 
business ecosystems. Although previous studies have identified a number of antecedents 
of ecosystem development (e.g. Iansiti and Levien 2004b; Moore 1993), this study takes 
a step further by describing and explaining the dynamics of ecosystem development. 
More specifically, our second case study reveals the sequence of strategies that a core 
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firm should employ as well as the complementarities between the strategies and 
ecosystem roles that a core firm could adopt. Moreover, while prior research have 
suggested that business ecosystems can facilitate partnering agility by enhancing the 
organizational ability to sense and respond to market and technological opportunities 
(Teece 2007), and facilitating the co-creation of effective and timely innovations (Adner 
2006), this study advances the state of knowledge by making a conceptual distinction 
between the different stages of ecosystem development, and providing detailed 
explanations of the underlying mechanisms through which each of the stages gives rise to 
partnering agility. 
6.2.4 Specific Contributions of the Third Case Study  
Seventh, in tracing the development of a specific mechanism (i.e. improvisation in IT 
deployment) for agile IT deployment in its entirety, the process model constructed in the 
third case study takes an important step towards addressing the lack of knowledge on the 
attainment of agility in IT deployment. This is significant as agility in IT deployment is 
viewed as one of the primary means of achieving operational agility (Mathiassen and 
Pries-Heje 2006; Tiwana et al. 2003). Moreover, in providing insights about how 
improvisation in IT deployment leads to operational agility, this study has opened the 
“black box” of the relationship between agile IT deployment and operational agility (e.g. 
Donnellan and Kelly 2005; Hovorka and Larsen 2006). By doing so, this study sheds 
light on a number of theoretical constructs, as well as the relationships and temporal 
sequence between them, which are pertinent to agile IT deployment and the broader 
concept of IT-enabled enterprise agility. In this way, it is hoped that this study can serve 
as a signpost for future research and contribute towards addressing the lack of clarity, 
148 
 
unified direction, parsimony, and a cumulative research tradition that characterizes the 
existing research in this area (see Conboy 2009; Dyba and Dingsøyr 2008). 
Finally, this study also makes two important contributions to the literature on 
organizational improvisation. First, although the generic process of organizational 
improvisation can be inferred from the cumulative research in the area (as in Figure 7), 
our review of the literature has failed to identify a single process model that describes and 
explains the intricacies and dynamics of improvisation. The process model developed in 
this article is thus an important contribution, as it not only describes the necessary 
conditions for successful improvisation, but structures them in a step-by-step “recipe that 
strings (the conditions) together in such a way as to tell the story of how (the outcome) 
occurs whenever it does occur” (Mohr 1982). Second, while prior research have 
suggested that the ability to improvise improves with practice (Vera and Crossan 2005), 
and each successive iteration enhances the memory, expertise, coordination and 
communications that are required for organizational improvisation (Crossan et al. 2005; 
Moorman and Miner 1998), our suggestion that this capability can be routinized for 
repeated application is novel and goes against the conventional school of thought (e.g. 
Bergh and Lim 2008). As our arguments are corroborated by the empirical evidence from 
the CCP case, it at least suggests the need for more research in this area so that the 
boundary conditions surrounding our arguments can be better defined. 
6.3 Practical Contributions 
Beyond its theoretical implications, this thesis also makes a number of contributions to 
practice. For VC sponsors and managers, our first case study is significant in that it 
provides a comprehensive and empirically supported framework for leveraging their 
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investments in VCs. Given that a VC carries both opportunities and risks for the 
sponsoring organization (see, e.g. Preece 2001; Walden 2000), the process model 
developed from the case study can serve as a detailed roadmap for practitioners to 
identify the potential pitfalls and “missing links” associated with nurturing and leveraging 
a VC. In particular, by describing and explaining the specific mechanisms for developing 
and leveraging a VC across the various stages of the VC development lifecycle (e.g. Lee 
et al. 2005; Mohammed et al. 2004), this study should be especially useful for the 
majority of sponsoring organizations and VC practitioners who have been unable to 
translate their resource investments in VCs into economic returns, as it helps to identify 
the appropriate remedial measures to re-align their investments in VCs to the path of 
commercial success. 
For organizations operating in the networked economy and the managers of the core 
firms in business networks in particular, our second case study is significant in that it 
provides a holistic and systematic framework for the development and subsequent 
leverage of a DBE. More specifically, the process model developed from the case study 
has identified the crucial drivers of DBE development, and provided important 
indications on how a DBE, in the various stages of its development, can be leveraged for 
different levels of enterprise agility. Moreover, in tracing the antecedents, nature and 
implications of DBE development from its initial formation to maturity, this study should 
be useful for practitioners managing DBEs in varying stages of development. In 
particular, it is hoped that practitioners who face difficulty in advancing the development 
of their ecosystems or leveraging their ecosystems for tangible gains can use the process 
model as a detailed roadmap to identify the appropriate remedial actions, so that they can 
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make the most of the efforts and resources invested in managing their DBEs, and exploit 
their fullest potential. 
For managers overseeing the implementation of new IT initiatives, our third case study is 
significant in that it provides a detailed blueprint for the development and routinization of 
the capability to improvise during the deployment of IT. If improvisation can enhance the 
creativity, efficiency and effectiveness (Crossan et al. 2005; Orlikowski 1996; Weick 
1998) of IT deployment, and provide the means for the implementation of a IT system 
that would otherwise have been impossible (Baker and Nelson 2005), then improvisation 
can be a key mechanism for the attainment of the capability for agility in IT deployment 
(Hovorka and Larsen 2006). Moreover, if the capability for improvisation can be 
routinized for repeated application, then it essentially means that the organization has 
acquired a consistent mechanism for sensing market opportunities and developing IT-
enabled solutions to seize the opportunities with speed and surprise (Sambamurthy et al. 
2003). This is because the ability to be consistently agile in deploying IT is associated 
with operational agility (Mathiassen and Pries-Heje 2006), which creates strategic 
benefits for the organization by enabling the creation of a series of transient competitive 
advantages amidst the turbulence of the contemporary business landscape (Overby et al. 
2006). 
In particular, the process model developed in the third case study is useful as it has not 
only identified the crucial enabling factors, environmental triggers, necessary steps, and 
potential benefits of improvisation in IT deployment, but provided specific and actionable 
prescriptions for how the capability can be reinforced iteratively and leveraged for 
repeated application as well. This should be especially relevant for practitioners who face 
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resource constraints or time pressures in IT deployment as they can use our prescriptions 
to identify the appropriate actions and steps to undertake, so that they can leverage their 
existing resources and capabilities to develop innovative solutions to the problems at 
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APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGICAL DETAILS FOR 
HARDWAREZONE CASE STUDY 
A.1 Details of Primary Interviews 
Table 27: Informants and Topics Discussed - HWZ 
Interviewee Topics Discussed 
ITC General 
Manager 
Background of ITC, Overview of the IT publications industry and ITC’s 
business strategies over the years 
IT Publications 
Industry Analyst  
Evolution of IT publications industry, ITC’s performance and effect on the 
IT publications industry  
Local IT 
Enthusiast 
Key players, market offerings and state of the local IT scene over time 
ITC Investor Reasons for ITC investment, Views on ITC’s strategies & direction 
ITC Managing 
Director 
The factors driving ITC’s success, the evolution of ITC’s strategies, as well 
as the development and leverage of ITC’s VC 
ITC Product 
Manager  




Content generation process, organizational culture, leverage of ITC’s VC in 
content generation 
VC Member A Opinion of ITC’s website, content, management, VC, and new business 
initiatives 
VC Member B Opinion of ITC’s website, content, management, VC, and new business 
initiatives 
VC Member C 
(Pioneering 
member) 
The origins of ITC, state of the IT publications industry, early measures 
undertaken by the ITC management in developing the VC 
VC Forum 
Moderator 
Measures undertaken by the ITC management in developing, managing and 
leveraging the VC, role of forum moderators  
VC Member D 
(Foreign 
member) 
ITC’s foreign initiatives, and the development, management and leverage of 
ITC’s foreign community 
ITC Editor-in-
Chief 
The content generation process and the role of VC members in the process 
of innovation 
ITC Co-founder Benefits of VCs for ITC, evolution of ITC’s business strategies  
VC Member E Cultural norms and governance policies within the VC, as well as the 




Benefits of VCs for ITC, evolution of the IT publications industry and 
ITC’s business strategies  
VC Member F Measures undertaken by the ITC management in developing, managing and 
leveraging the VC 
VC Member G 
(Pioneering 
member) 
Early measures undertaken by the ITC management in developing and 






Follow up questions on the development and leverage of ITC’s VC, the 
evolution of the IT publications industry, and ITC’s business strategies 




Early measures undertaken by the ITC management in developing and 
leveraging the VC 
VC Member H Measures undertaken by the ITC management in developing, managing and 
leveraging the VC between 2000 and 2007 




Measures undertaken by the ITC management in developing, managing and 
leveraging the VC, in comparison to the measures of other community 
sponsor in the member’s home country 
VC Member B  
(2nd interview) 
Measures undertaken by the ITC management in developing, managing and 
leveraging the VC between 2000 and 2007.  
VC Member J Measures undertaken by the ITC management in developing, managing and 
leveraging the VC between 2005 and 2007 
 
A.2 Sample Interview Questions for HWZ’s Top Management 
1. HWZ’s History 
• What was the situation in IT publications industry before the inception of HWZ? 
• What impact did HWZ have on the IT publications industry? 
• What was the reason for the GDIS investment? 
• What is the impact of the GDIS investment? 
 
2. Current Challenges 
• Who are your current competitors? 
• Are there any threats and business opportunities in the business environment? 
 
3. Current Strategy 
• What is HWZ’s current business strategy for dealing with the challenges it face at 
the moment 
 
4. Diversification Strategy 
• Why the need for Diversification? 
• How does HWZ decide on the new products to develop? 
• What kind of resources does HWZ need to acquire/develop for its new products? 
• What can you tell me about Carma and Inside Golf? 
 
5. Regionalization Strategy 
• What is the rationale behind Regionalization? 
• What is the basis for choosing the countries to expand into? 




• How do you plan to avoid the problem of being viewed as a “foreign” publication 
in the countries you expand into? 
• What are HWZ’s future regionalization plans? 
 
6. Vision for HWZ 
• What is your vision for HWZ? What do you think the evolution of HWZ’s 
business will lead to? 
• What are HWZ’s future plans? 
 
A.3 Sample Interview Questions for HWZ’s Technical Staff 
1. About yourself 
• When did you join HWZ?  
• What is your role in HWZ? 
 
2. Content Generation 
• Can you describe the content generation process? 
• Is it any different comparing how content is generated now in the beginning? 
• How do you decide which reviews go into the website and which reviews go into 
the magazines? 
• What are the advantages of having developing proprietary content as opposed to 
buying content from other IT publications? 
• Given that some of the vendors you are reviewing are HWZ’s advertisers as well, 
how do you maintain neutrality/ objectivity 
• How do you keep the information timely and accurate? 
 
3. Managing the HWZ forums 
• What do you feel is unique about the HWZ forum? 
• As a moderator at the HWZ forum, are there any rules/ regulations in the forum? 
• How does one go about becoming a moderator? 
• Does the HWZ community have a physical presence, are there outings being 
organized etc.? 
• How do you make the forum and hence the website sticky? 
• What is the makeup of HWZ community members in terms of Nationality, age, 
etc.? 
• A lot of HWZ’s content (Gameaxis & Photoi) included originated from the forum. 
What is the basis for deciding which information to include? 
• How are new forums created? 
 
4. Your perspective of HWZ as a staff member 
• How would you describe HWZ as an organization? 
• Can you describe HWZ’s culture? 
• Can you describe the management style at HWZ? 




A.4 Sample Interview Questions for HWZ’s Investors 
1. Background of GDIS 
• Can you tell me a little bit more about GDIS other than the information on 
corporate website? In terms of management structure, its core business and 
strategies? 
• What is the investment strategy of GDIS? 
• I noticed GDIS has a very diverse portfolio in that it operates miw, onemotoring, 
can.com.sg. How does the investment in HWZ complement GDIS’s existing 
business? 
 
2. Rationale behind investment in HWZ 
• What is the rationale behind GDIS’s  investment in HWZ 
• I noted that the price GDIS paid for a 20% stake is significantly higher than 
HWZ’s net assets of $2million as reported in The Business Times. What is the 
reason for paying a premium for HWZ? 
• Can you tell me who the other shareholders of HWZ are and the stake they are 
holding in HWZ? 
 
3. GDIS’s role after the investment 
• Based on the 20% stake in HWZ, What is the role of GDIS in the operations of 
HWZ? 
• Were there any cultural changes/ changes in reporting structure and working 
styles after GDIS’s investment? 
 
4. GDIS’s expected returns on investment 
• What does GDIS expect to gain from its investment, financially or otherwise? 
 
5. GDIS’s vision for HWZ in the future 
• Where does GDIS see HWZ in the near future? What is your vision of HWZ? 







A.5 Email Interview Form for Community Members 
Email Interview 
 
The purpose of this research is to develop a case study on Hardwarezone, which is of 
interest to e-commerce educators, students and practitioners in Singapore and around the 
world due to its unique success in a country where dotcom failures are the norm rather 
than the exception. Your input will be immensely valuable as it would provide a view of 
Hardwarezone from the perspective of a group of stakeholders that possibly contributed 
most to Hardwarezone’s success; the members of its community. 
 
Please answer the following questions. If the space provided for your answer is 
insufficient, please feel free to make the necessary adjustments. When you have 




Do drop me a mail if you wish to clarify anything as well. Thank you so much for your 






Number of Years of Participation in Hardwarezone: __________________________ 
 
 

















































4. What is your opinion on some of Hardwarezone’s other products (such as 














5. What do you think of the new products that Hardwarezone is currently 







































APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGICAL DETAILS FOR 
ALIBABA.COM CASE STUDY 
B.1 Details of Primary Interviews 
Table 28: Informants and Topics Discussed - Alibaba 






Motivation for establishing Alipay, competitive 
environment of Alibaba, interactions with ecosystem 
members and complementary service providers (e,g. 






Initial strategy at the founding of Taobao, business 
objective of Taobao Mall (Alibaba’s B2C platform), 




Business rationale for the establishment of Alimama, 
strategic objectives of Alimama, difference between 
Alimama and Alisoft, competitive environment of 
Alimama, marketing of Alimama, services provided by 




Business rationale for the establishment of Alisoft, 
strategic objectives of Alisoft, competitive environment 
of Alisoft, services of Alisoft, openness of Alisoft 






Evolution of Alibaba’s business strategies, competitive 
environment of Alibaba B2B, continuous innovation at 




of Research and 
Training – 
Alibaba HQ 
Business rationale for the establishment of Alimama, 
organizational structure of Alibaba, concept of business 
ecosystems at Alibaba, Alibaba’s competitive 






Rationale behind the acquisition of Yahoo and Koubei, 
strategic objectives of Yahoo and Koubei, competitive 
implications of Yahoo and Koubei for the Alibaba group 
2 
Vice President 
of Operations – 
Alibaba B2B 
Structure of Alibaba group, evolution of Alibaba’s 
business strategies, role of subsidiaries in Alibaba’s 





Evolution of Alibaba’s business strategies, role of 
subsidiaries in Alibaba’s business model, business 
rationale for the establishment of new subsidiaries, 





Industry Analyst Development of Alibaba’s platform, competitive 
advantages and disadvantages of Alibaba, the 
embeddedness of Chinese culture in Alibaba’s business 
practices 
2 
Alibaba Seller Formation of networks between sellers on Alibaba’s 
platform, evolving customer needs over time, business 
ecosystem of Alibaba, embeddedness of Chinese culture 




Relationship and interactions between Alibaba and 
customers. Entrepreneurship on the Taobao platform, 





Relationship and interactions between Alibaba and 
customers. Entrepreneurship on the Taobao platform, 





Relationship and interactions between Alibaba and 
customers. Entrepreneurship on the Taobao platform, 





Experience of using Yahoo and Koubei. Services and 
benefits provided by Yahoo and Koubei. 
1 
Taobao User A Experience of using Taobao. Services and benefits 
provided by Taobao. 
1 
Taobao User B Experience of using Taobao. Services and benefits 
provided by Taobao. 
1 
Alibaba User Experience of using Alibaba’s B2B platform. Services 
and benefits provided by Alibaba’s B2B platform 
1 
Alisoft User A Experience of using Alisoft. Services and benefits 
provided by Alisoft 
1 




B.2 Alibaba in Phase 1 (1999-2004): Sample Interview Questions  
1. Industry Background 
• What is the estimated size of the SME market in China?  
• What is the estimated number of SMEs in China? 
• What is their contribution (in terms of percentage) to China’s economy?  
 
2. Alibaba’s Corporate Strategy 
• What was the reason for founding Alibaba.com?  
• Why was the Small Medium Enterprises (SME) market targeted specifically? 
• What was the market situation at the time? 
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• Were there unmet needs in the market?  
• How did Alibaba fulfill those needs?  
• Why was the B2B exchange market depressed in 2000?  
• When did business for Alibaba pick up? What were the factors that caused the 
market to pick up? 
  
3. Alibaba’s Competitors 
• Who were Alibaba’s main competitors at the time of its launch (both local and 
international)?  
• What were the factors that helped Alibaba defeat its competitors (both local and 
international)? 
• How has the market share of Alibaba grown over time in the B2B marketplace 
industry (in terms of local market share and global market share)? 
 
4. Taobao.com 
• What was the reason for founding Taobao.com?  
• What was the market situation at the time? 
• Were there unmet needs in the market? 
• How did Taobao fulfill those needs? 
• What were the key factors that helped Taobao defeat Eachnet? 
• How has the market share of Taobao grown over time? 
 
5. Alibaba’s Business Ecosystem 
• How did Alibaba’s actions and strategies affect the development of its business 
ecosystem? 
• What is the impact of the ecosystem development on Alibaba’s organizational 
performance?  
 
B.3 Alibaba in Phase 2 (2005-2006): Sample Interview Questions 
1. Alibaba’s Corporate Strategy 
• What were the strategic initiatives pursued by the Alibaba group between 2005 
and 2006? 
• What were the impact of these initiatives on Alibaba’s operations? 
 
2. Acquisition of Yahoo China 
• What was the original strategic intent behind the acquisition of Yahoo China? 
• What is the impact of the acquisition of Yahoo China on Alibaba’s operations? 
• Who are the targeted customers of Yahoo China? Has Yahoo China been 
successful in acquiring these customers? 
• What is the market share of Yahoo China? 
 
3. Acquisition of Koubei 
• What was the original strategic intent behind the acquisition of Koubei? 
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• What is the impact of the acquisition of Koubei on Alibaba’s operations? 
• Who are the targeted customers of Koubei?  
• Has Koubei been successful in acquiring these customers? 
• What is the market share of Koubei? 
 
4. Rivalry with Baidu 
• When did Alibaba begin to perceive search engines such as Baidu as a rival? 
• Why did Alibaba perceive search engines such as Baidu as its rival? 
 
5. Alibaba’s Business Ecosystem 
• How did Alibaba’s actions and strategies affect the development of its business 
ecosystem? 
• What is the impact of the ecosystem development on Alibaba’s organizational 
performance?  
 
B.4 Alibaba in Phase 3 (2005-2006): Sample Interview Questions 
1. Alibaba’s Corporate Strategy 
• When did the concept of ecosystem mentality of Alibaba originate? 
• How did the ecosystem mentality of Alibaba come about? 
• What benefits did the management of Alibaba expect from developing an 
ecosystem mentality? 
• What were the initiatives implemented by Alibaba for the purpose of 
strengthening the capabilities of the members of the ecosystem? 
• What was Alibaba’s rationale for developing these initiatives? 
• How did these initiatives benefit the members of Alibaba’s business ecosystem? 
 
2. Launching Alimama 
• What was Alibaba’s rationale for developing Alimama? 
• How does Alimama benefit the members of Alibaba’s business ecosystem? 
 
3. Launching Alisoft 
• What was Alibaba’s rationale for developing Alisoft? 
• How does Alisoft benefit the members of Alibaba’s business ecosystem? 
 
4. Launching Aliloan 
• What was Alibaba’s rationale for launching Aliloan? 
• How does Aliloan benefit the members of Alibaba’s business ecosystem? 
 
5. Alibaba’s Business Ecosystem 
• How did Alibaba’s actions and strategies affect the development of its business 
ecosystem? 




B.5 Members of Alibaba’s Ecosystem: Sample Interview Questions 
1. For customers of Alibaba.com 
• Why did you choose to become a member of Alibaba.com? 
• How is Alibaba.com different from other B2B exchanges? 
• What improvements would you like to see in the future at Alibaba.com? 
 
2. For customers of Taobao.com 
• Why did you choose to become a member of Taobao.com? 
• How is Taobao.com different from other online auction sites? 
• What improvements would you like to see in the future at Taobao.com? 
 
3. For users of Yahoo/Koubei 
• How do the search capabilities provided by Yahoo China benefit your business 
(e.g. does it help in your search for customers or suppliers?)? 
• How do the review capabilities provided by Koubei benefit your business (e.g. 
does it help in your search for customers or business partners?)? 
• What is the difference between Yahoo China and other search engines like Baidu? 
 
4. For users of Alisoft 
• How does Alisoft benefit your business (e.g. what software modules do you use 
and what are the benefits of using these software?) 
 
5. For users of Alimama 
• How does Alimama benefit your business (e.g. Describe how Alimama has made 





APPENDIX C: METHODOLOGICAL DETAILS FOR 
CHANG CHUN CASE STUDY 
C.1 Details of Primary Interviews 
Table 29: Informants and Topics Discussed - CCP 





Overview of IS Strategy, history of systems development, 
rationale for systems development approaches, challenges 
of systems developments, role in initiating systems 





Overview of systems development, IS strategy and vision, 
rationale for systems development approaches, resources 
and capabilities required, role in directing systems 
development across the three phases 
3 
IT Department (System Developers) 
Deputy Head 
A 
Organizational and departmental culture, enactment of IS 
strategies, process of systems development, bricolage and 
development of capabilities, challenges and consequences 




Overall structure of the IT department, triggers of systems 
development, bricolage and development of capabilities, 





Operations and routines of the IT department, response to 
IS strategy, triggers of system development, process of 




Triggers of systems development, bricolage and 
development of capabilities, consequences of systems 




Organizational and departmental culture, process of 
systems development, resources and capabilities required, 





Operations and routines of the IT department, process and 
consequences of systems development, interactions with 




Opinions on the IS leadership of CCP, interactions with 
business units, process and consequences of systems 




Operations and routines of the IT department, triggers of 
systems development, process of systems development, 
resources and capabilities required, challenges of systems 






Triggers of systems development, bricolage and 
development of capabilities, consequences of systems 




Organizational and departmental culture, rationale for 
systems development, process and consequences of 




Operations and routines of the IT department, bricolage 
and development of capabilities, consequences of systems 




Opinions on the IS strategy of CCP, triggers of systems 
development, process and consequences of system 
development, interactions with business users across the 




Process and consequences of systems development in the 
U phase, organizational and departmental culture, opinions 
on the IS leadership of CCP. 
1 




Alignment of IT systems and business processes, 
effectiveness of systems development, performance of IT 






Technical specifications of developed systems, use of 
systems, effectiveness of systems development, 
performance of IT department, benefits of systems across 
the three phases 
1 
 
C.2 IT Deployment in the E-Phase (2001-2004): Sample Interview 
Questions 
Q1. Organizational Resources: IT Infrastructure 
Describe the IT infrastructure at Chang Chun before the implementation of the ERP 
system in terms of the 
• Hardware used ? 
• Software used (i.e. DOS-Based System)? 
• Network (e.g. Internal networks, intranets)? 
 
Q2. Sensing Capabilities 
How did the organization find out that Microsoft was no longer supporting their old 
DOS-based systems?  
• Was it due to active technology monitoring by the internal IT department? 
• Did the IT department hear about this from other IT professionals or the top 
management? 
 
Q3. Planning: Evaluating Alternatives 
Prior to the implementation of the ERP system, Chang Chun considered the commercial 
packages from SAP, Oracle and JD Edwards.  
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• What is the estimated cost of implementing these packages if Chang Chun had 
decided to implement them?  
 
Q4. Execution: Bricolage 
• How did the organization make use of their existing IT infrastructure (see Q1 – 
i.e. existing hardware, software and network infrastructure) in the implementation 
of ERP system 
• How did the job scope of the IT department change when the ERP system was 
implemented (e.g. organizational role changed from IT support to systems 
development)? 
 
Q5. Partnering Agility: Implementation Agility 
• How long did the organization take to implement the ERP system?  
• How long would it typically take to implement a packaged system from a 
commercial vendor? 
• If the development cycle was shortened as a result of internal development (i.e. 
the answer to 5.1 is less than 5.2),  please provide an explanation for the shorter 
development cycle 
• What are the other benefits of the internally developed ERP? 
 
C.3 IT Deployment in the M-Phase (2005-2006): Sample Interview 
Questions 
Q1. Organizational Resources: Human Resources 
• There were 2-3 personnel assigned to the implementation of the M-ERP system. 
Were these personnel also involved in the implementation of the previous phase? 
 
Q2. Organizational Resources: Top Management Endorsement 
• Was the top management supportive of the initiatives of the M-Phase?  
• Describe the ways in which they supported the project 
• Do you think that they had more confidence in the implementation initiatives of 
the M-Phase because of the successful ERP implementation of the previous 
phase? 
 
Q3. Organizational Resources: Organizational Knowledge 
• In the cross-functional steering committee established to manage ERP 
implementation, did interactions between committee members over time enhance 
their knowledge of the business processes of the other departments? 
 
Q4. Planning: Developing and Evaluating Alternatives 
• Besides the systems implemented under the M-Phase, were there other 
alternatives considered? (e.g. packaged systems from commercial vendors, 
systems based on different technologies)? 





Q5. Execution: Bricolage 
• How did the organization make use of their existing IT infrastructure in the 
implementation of initiatives under the m-phase? 
• How did the job scope of personnel involved in implementation change when the 
initiatives of the m-phase were being implemented (e.g. organizational role 
changed from systems maintenance to systems development)? 
 
Q6. Partnering Agility: Implementation Agility 
• How long did the organization take to implement the initiatives under the M-
Phase?  
• How long would it typically take to implement a similar packaged system 
purchased from a commercial vendor? 
• If the development cycle was shortened as a result of internal development (i.e. 
the answer to 5.1 is less than 5.2),  please provide an explanation for the shorter 
development cycle 
• What are the other benefits of the developing the initiatives of the M-phase 
internally? 
 
C.3 IT Deployment in the U-Phase (2007-Present): Sample Interview 
Questions 
Q1. Organizational Resources: IT Infrastructure 
• Did the initiatives of the U-Phase build on the systems developed during the M-
Phase? 
 
Q2. Organizational Resources: HR 
• There were 5-6 personnel involved in the implementation of the initiatives of this 
phase. Were these personnel also involved in the implementation of the previous 
phases? 
 
Q3. Organizational Resources: Organizational Knowledge 
• Many of the systems (e.g. QR code, GPS tracking) require an in-depth knowledge 
of the business processes of the various functional departments. How did the IT 
department acquire knowledge of these business processes? Did knowledge of 
these business processes come about as a result of ERP/ M-ERP/ M-CRM / 
Pushmail implementation? 
 
Q4. Organizational Resources: Top Management Endorsement 
• Was the top management supportive of the initiatives of the U-Phase?  
• Describe the ways in which they supported the project 
• Do you think that they had more confidence in the implementation initiatives of 





Q5. Improvisational Capabilities: IT Skills 
• Explain how the implementation team’s knowledge of Visual Studio contributed 
to the implementation of the initiatives in the U-phase 
 
Q6. Motivation for Improvisation: Intangible 
• Was there a strong sense of responsibility to ensure that systems implementation 
was successful in the U-Phase? 
• Describe how the IT personnel feel when the systems is implemented 
successfully. Was there a great sense of achievement? 
 
Q7. Motivation for Improvisation: Culture 




• Did the organization implement the QR code on a smaller scale before 
implementing the initiatives organization wide? Describe the sequence of 
implementation at different locations 
 
Q9. Execution: New Capability Development 
• Was there a need to develop or acquire new resources (e.g. IT infrastructure, IT 
staff, organizational knowledge) and capabilities (e.g. technical capabilities, 
coordination capabilities) during the implementation of the initiatives of the U-
Phase? 
 
Q10. Execution: Bricolage 
• How did the organization make use of their existing IT infrastructure in the 
implementation of initiatives under the m-phase? 
• How did the job scope of personnel involved in implementation change when the 
initiatives of the m-phase were being implemented (e.g. organizational role 
changed from systems maintenance to systems development)? 
 
Q11. Partnering Agility: Implementation Agility 
• How long did the organization take to implement the various initiatives under the 
U-Phase?  
• How long would it typically take to implement a similar packaged system 
purchased from a commercial vendor? 
• If the development cycle was shortened as a result of internal development (i.e. 
the answer to 5.1 is less than 5.2),  please provide an explanation for the shorter 
development cycle 






APPENDIX D: SNAPSHOTS OF HARDWAREZONE.COM 
Figure 7: Hardwarezone Portal circa 2008 
 
 





Figure 9: Printed Magazines/ Product Range Extensions (Early 2000 – Late 2004) 
 












APPENDIX E: SNAPSHOTS OF ALIBABA.COM 
Figure 12: Alibaba.com (International Portal) 
 
 




Figure 14: Taobao.com 
 
 





Figure 16: Koubei.com 
 
 










APPENDIX F: SNAPSHOTS OF CHANG CHUN 
PETROCHEMICALS 




Figure 20: Snapshots of QR Code System 
 
1. QR Code received on mobile 2. QR Code decoded with a reader 
3. Decoded information is printed 4. Verification with ERP Records 
195 
 
Figure 21: Screenshots of GPS Tracking System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
